ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SAVIOR OR TYRANT?

NORTH & SOUTH

THE OFFICIAL MAGAZINE OF THE CIVIL WAR SOCIETY

VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 1

"SHOT ALL TO PIECES"
The Battle of Lone Jack

CHANGING TACTICS OF THE CIVIL WAR

$5.99US $6.99CAN

01>

0 09281 02860 4



Lions in Winter

General Robert E. Lee and General Stone
Near Fredericksburg, Virginia – Winte

JOHN PAUL STRAIN
HISTORICAL ART

Phone: (817) 560-2143



wall Jackson
of 1863

During the early months of 1863 Confederate forces made their winter quarters well back from the Rappahannock. During those snowy days Generals Lee and Jackson, often riding together, began to formulate their plans to crush President Lincoln's armies and end the war. The two great men who had often worked independently of each other now joined to form one of the greatest leadership commands in history.

For the North this period was known as some of the darkest days yet seen. All of President Abraham Lincoln's hand-picked commanders had failed him, either through defeat or their own inaction. Burnside and his generals had blundered at Fredericksburg, and in the west Grant was according to the New York Times, "stuck in the mud of northern Mississippi, his army of no use to him or anybody else." Treasury chief Salmon P. Chase told the President they were out of money and could raise no more. Lincoln would say in frustration, "the bottom is out of the tub, what should I do?"

President Lincoln and his command desperately needed to come up with a plan of action and a commander that could successfully lead the army, as the lions would soon be at the gate.

New John Paul Strain Christmas Ornament for 2003

"Christmas Blessing"

750 Signed and numbered Limited Edition Christmas Ornaments – $25

75 Artist's proofs – $30

www.johnpaulstrain.com

SPOTSYLVANIA!!!

WITNESS AMERICA'S FIRST HEAVYWEIGHT FIGHT!



140TH ANNIVERSARY REENACTMENT

May 7,8,9, 2004

Sponsored by
Spotsylvania County Tourism
And
Special Events Commission



Come celebrate American History at the crossroads of our nation's past . . .

Spotsylvania, Virginia

BATTLE REENACTMENTS

EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

TALKS BY LEADING HISTORIANS

THOUSANDS OF REENACTORS

1/4 OF A MILE OF CORRECT & AUHENTIC EARTHWORKS!!!

FOR REGISTRATION INFORMATION CONTACT:
Spotsylvania 140th Group
PO Box 1343
Spotsylvania, Virginia 22553
540-582-7469 • www.spotsylvania140th.com

Education • Preservation • Appreciation

VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 1

NORTH & SOUTH


LLOYD OSTENDORF COLLECTION

President Abraham Lincoln in August 1863.
("*Dark Union*: Bad History" page 12)

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

Union soldiers guard the entrance to a powder magazine dug into the parapet of Fort Brady.
("The Rifle Musket and Associated Tactics" page 32)



MAP GRAPHICS DLF GROUP ©2003

Detail from Lone Jack Map #3
("Shot to Pieces" page 58)

FEATURES

12 *DARK UNION*: BAD HISTORY

A new book on the Lincoln assassination resurrects and expands upon old myths on the basis of documents of doubtful authenticity. —*Ed Steers Jr. and Joan Chaconas*

32 THE RIFLE MUSKET AND ASSOCIATED TACTICS

How did tactics change during the Civil War, and how were those changes related to the introduction of the rifle musket? —*Brent Nosworthy*

44 ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SAVIOR OR TYRANT?

Was the sixteenth president the savior of the Union and the "Great Emancipator," or merely a power-hungry tyrant? A leading critic and a noted Lincoln scholar debate the question. —*Thomas DiLorenzo and Gerald Prokopowicz*

58 "SHOT TO PIECES"

The Battle of Lone Jack, Missouri, on August 16, 1862, was one of the most savage of the war. —*Matt Matthews and Kip Lindberg*

76 THE TRUCE AT COLD HARBOR

Who was responsible for the fact that the wounded lay unattended for days between the lines at Cold Harbor? —*Gordon C. Rhea*

DEPARTMENTS

4 Editorial
5 Crossfire
8 Knapsack
42 Civil War Society
43 Civil War Round Tables
54 Cover Story
56 *North & South* Back Issues
86 Briefings
87 Do You Know?
95 Market Place

VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 1 • JANUARY 2004

NORTH & SOUTH

EDITORIAL
PUBLISHER-EDITOR Keith Poulter
ASSISTANT EDITOR Terry A. Johnston, Jr.

ASSOCIATE EDITORS
Ted Alexander, Ed Bearss, Patrick Brennan, Peter Carmichael, Joan Cashin, John M. Coski, Richard DiNardo, David Eicher, William B. Feis, Ed Frank, William W. Freehling, James R. Furqueron, Gary Gallagher, Mark Grimsley, Todd Groce, James O. Hall, William C. Harris, Joseph L. Harsh, James M. McPherson, Rob Markham, Albert A. Nofi, William Garrett Piston, Gordon C. Rhea, Richard Rollins, Richard Sauers, Stephen W. Sears, William Shea, Jason H. Silverman, John Y. Simon, Edward Steers, Jr., Craig L. Symonds, Russell Weigley, and Steven Woodworth

ART DEPARTMENT
ART DIRECTOR Joyce Gusner
MAP GRAPHICS DLF Group, David Fuller
PICTURE ARCHIVES Anne Hobart-Lang and Rolf Lang
CARTOONIST Brian Kraus • WEBSITE Joy Richards

SUBSCRIPTIONS
For new subscriptions, address changes,
questions, or problems, contact:
NORTH & SOUTH, P.O. Box 1027, Escondido, CA 92033-1027
PH: (800) 546-6707 • Email: farwest.mktg@cox.net

EDITORIAL
NORTH & SOUTH
33756 Black Mountain Road, Tollhouse, CA 93667
PH (559) 855-8637 • FX (559) 855-8639
Email: publisher@northandsouthmagazine.com

MARKETING AND ADVERTISING
Keith Poulter, 33756 Black Mountain Road, Tollhouse, CA 93667
PH (559) 855-8637 • FX (559) 855-8639
Email: adspace@northandsouthmagazine.com

WEBSITE
www.northandsouthmagazine.com
Webmistress: Joy Richards

DISTRIBUTION
Curtis Circulation Company
730 River Road, New Milford, NJ 07646-3048

NORTH & SOUTH (ISSN 1522-9742) is published monthly except for February, April, July, September, and December, by NORTH & SOUTH MAGAZINE, INC., 33756 Black Mountain Road, Tollhouse, CA 93667. The average number of copies sold per issue during the last twelve months is 28,948. SUBSCRIPTIONS: US and Canada $39.99 for seven issues (US funds), overseas $49.99 (US funds). Periodical Postage paid at Tollhouse, CA and additional offices. Postmaster: send address changes to NORTH & SOUTH, P.O. Box 1027, Escondido, CA 92033-1027. SUBSCRIPTION QUESTIONS: US & Canada call (800) 546-6707, foreign (559) 855-8637. Unless expressly stated, NORTH & SOUTH neither endorses nor is responsible for the contents of advertisements in its pages. Opinions expressed in articles are those of the authors, and are not endorsed by *North & South*. Letters to the editor become the property of NORTH & SOUTH, and may be edited. NORTH & SOUTH accepts no responsibility for unsolicited manuscripts unaccompanied by return postage. Permission to reproduce the issue or parts thereof must be secured from the publisher.

PRINTED IN THE USA ISSN 1522-9742

Copyright ©2003 by North & South, Inc.
All rights reserved. *North & South* is a registered trademark of
NORTH & SOUTH MAGAZINE, INC.

For subscription information see page 75.
TELEPHONE ORDERS: (800) 546-6707

Editorial

A MATTER OF HERITAGE

THE LEAD ARTICLE IN THIS ISSUE is a review essay of a recently published book, *Dark Union: The Secret Web of Profiteers, Politicians, and Booth Conspirators That Led to Lincoln's Death* by Leonard F. Guttridge and Ray A. Neff. The book resurrects old myths concerning the Lincoln assassination, and augments them with much new detail based on documents said to be copies of originals that no longer exist or the whereabouts of which have been forgotten. These documents—the "Neff-Guttridge Collection"—are now housed in the Rare Books and Special Collections Division of the Cunningham Memorial Library at Indiana State University.

If the documents are genuine they stand a central event in the history of the United States on its head. If they are not genuine they constitute an assault on our heritage—an elaborate attempt to falsify the past. Either way it is important to establish beyond any reasonable doubt the authenticity or otherwise of these documents. Accordingly the Civil War Society has established a committee of leading scholars to examine the claims made in *Dark Union* and the critique contained in this issue. We are inviting Indiana State University to participate in the work of this committee, the findings of which will be published in a future issue of *North & South.*

* * *

NORTH & SOUTH DISCUSSION GROUP

We have formed an email discussion group open to executive members of the Civil War Society, that will allow readers of the magazine to exchange opinions about the Civil War in general and topics raised in *North & South* in particular. Members can expect lively debates and exchanges, as well as regular contributions from *N&S* authors. Subscribing takes only minutes and is free to executive members (it costs only $10.00 to convert a regular membership to executive status). For details on how to join see page 42.

IN MEMORIAM

Sadly we must record the deaths of two members of the Civil War community. William E. Gienapp, a Harvard history professor and noted Lincoln scholar, died on October 29 from complications related to cancer. He was fifty-nine. One of Bill's best known books was on the origins of the Republican Party, and we had been discussing a possible article on this topic with him. He is survived by his wife Erica and children William and Jonathan.

Regular readers of *North & South* will recall a recent article by Shannon Mallard on anti-Confederates in wartime Mississippi. Shannon, who was a doctoral student at Mississippi State University, was tragically killed in an automobile accident on November 3. He was thirty, and is survived by his wife Jennifer and their four-month-old son Nathan Cole.

Both scholars—one at the height of his career, the other just setting out—will be sorely missed.

Crossfire

TOP TEN GENERALS

Though the question of who the top ten generals were [*North & South*, vol. 6, #4] can probably never be definitively answered, I thought a few additional observations might be in order after reading (and greatly enjoying) last issue's "Crossfire" exchanges.

First, it's evident that many people continue to use a double standard when comparing Grant and Lee. The usual criticism of Grant is, of course, that he was successful only because he had "unlimited" numbers of men and resources at his disposal. But in the West, this was not the case, so his critics usually resort to the argument that the generals opposing him there were incompetent, that (as Clifford Dowdey asserted) "they [the Confederate commanders in the West] always did exactly what Grant wanted them to do." Even if this were true (it isn't), one could apply the same logic to Lee: most of the Union generals he faced—McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker—were either borderline incompetent or had such an aversion to risk-taking that they were unable to exploit the advantages they were given when Lee committed his own blunders. It's also often stated that Grant's tendency was to launch unimaginative frontal assaults against entrenched positions (with Cold Harbor the inevitable example), but this is exactly what Lee did at both Gettysburg and at Malvern Hill. Finally, it was not a foregone conclusion that Grant would ultimately be successful in the Overland Campaign simply because he had a manpower advantage. Having more men was not what enabled him to get his army across the James before Lee knew what was happening. And history is replete with situations where a larger force was not successful, especially when trying to subdue a rebellion or conquer a large territory.

The anti-Lee revisionism of recent years is also largely based on misconceptions. The claim that Lee was "too aggressive," that he should have conducted a "defensive war," misunderstands the nature of the conflict. Though the comparison is not often made, Lee's problem was very similar to that facing Napoleon nearly a half-century earlier during the Hundred Days. After his escape from Elba Napoleon knew the Allies were quickly remobilizing their armies and that if he took on a defensive posture they would eventually overwhelm him with their much larger resources, just as they had done in 1814. His only option was to go on the offensive and hope that a series of quick, massive victories would force the Allies to back off. It was a gamble, and he lost at Waterloo, though as Wellington himself realized, it could easily have gone the other way. The same is true of Lee's strategy. A protracted war of attrition would have only been to the advantage of the Union. (It's significant that those who claim this should have been Lee's strategy never give any specifics about exactly how such a war should have been conducted.)

WE WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS

Letters are often edited for length so we can include as many as possible. Write "Crossfire" via email: crossfire@northandsouthmagazine.com or mail letters to NORTH & SOUTH, 33756 Black Mountain Road, Tollhouse, CA 93667.



Top ten generals' ratings and scores, vol. 6, #4, pages 20-21. Inset: U.S. Grant.

Lee, like Bonaparte, gambled and lost, but it was not inevitable that this would happen. Perhaps if one or two details had gone differently during the first two days at Gettysburg the entire outcome would have been favorable to Lee and the disastrous charge of the third day would not have been attempted. Gettysburg, like Waterloo, was a "near run thing."

Grant or Lee were both incomparably great generals who, like all great commanders, made mistakes but did the best they could under the circumstances, and thus both deserve the continuing respect and admiration of their countrymen.

—Allan Arpajian
Huntingdon Valley, Pennsylvania

* * *

I wish to elaborate on a point made by Frank Hall in the November issue ["Crossfire," *N&S*, vol. 6, #7] concerning the top ten generals. He suggests that a more accurate assessment of Civil War generals should be made "under the premise of all-things-being-equal in terms of manpower and material." A valid point but I think Mr. Hall's yardstick is a foot short. Under Mr. Hall's analysis, Lee is clearly a superior choice to Grant. After all, Grant's bloody triumph in the 1864 Overland Campaign was ultimately a victory by attrition.

Yet in Grant's 1864 Overland Campaign, Lee enjoyed the advantage of defending from a series of strong positions, forcing Grant into costly attacks if he hoped to break through to Richmond. More significantly, Lee fought Grant with an army and command structure he had personally created, while Grant inherited the flawed Army of the Potomac when he came east. Even so, Grant immediately accepted the transfer though it meant leaving his own veteran army which had enjoyed comparable success out West to that of Lee's army in the East. Conversely, when President Davis inquired whether Lee would take command out West, where the North was winning the war, Lee declined.

So when Hall suggests comparing generals on an "all-things-being equal" basis, he should also factor in who is attacking, who is defending, and what army/command structure benefits were enjoyed by each general. I think that Lee's advantage in the 1864 Overland Campaign of fighting from a series of strong defensive positions and Grant's disadvantage in attacking Lee with the Army of the Potomac, rather than his own Army of the Tennessee, sufficiently offset Grant's manpower/material advantages. Just an opinion, of course. That's what makes these top ten lists so much fun.

—Jim Heenehan
Ardmore, Pennsylvania

QUILTS

Regarding the editorial "Oh, Academe!" in the September 2003 issue (Vol. 6, #6), I am a great fan of your magazine but was disappointed that you chose to sneer at quilting. A Civil War buff for quite a few decades, I am also a dedicated quiltmaker, and I do not consider these two interests as incompatible as you obviously do. There is an American Quilt Study Group in existence, and from time to time they publish tantalizing tidbits about quilting connected in one way or another with the Civil War, enough to suggest the possible availability of untapped sources whose bones have not already been picked clean by researchers.

Indeed, something of the sort has already been done. A very interesting book appeared a few years ago by Jacqueline L. Tobin and Raymond G. Dobard titled *Hidden in Plain View: A Secret Story of Quilts and the Underground Railroad.* The authors use oral history to suggest that the display of quilts was used as a code by the usually illiterate slaves and escapees before the Civil War. How interesting it would be if, for example, someone discovered a connection between quiltmaking or the display of quilts and the transmission of information by Union or Confederate spies—especially if a clever researcher were able to decipher the code.

Even many academics deplore the intellectual snobbery that hovers around universities, but political correctness is not the only reason why thesis topics might be veering into less military regions. A Ph.D. dissertation must be a contribution to original knowledge, which is difficult enough in history. Unlike science, which is constantly creating new information, history must depend upon what already exists, and in a crowded area such as the Civil War, it must be increasingly difficult to find information that has not already been used over and over—unless a researcher presents a new interpretation. I have long suspected that this difficulty, rather than genuine belief, is behind a great deal of the "revisionist" history that so often strains credulity!

Keep up the good work with your excellent magazine! Perhaps if someone offers you a well-researched article on quilts and the Civil War you might find it more interesting than you expect!

—Marcia Lowrie
Zürich, Switzerland

MUSKETS, RIFLES & SMOOTHBORES

In his discussion of the effectiveness of rifle and musket fire ["Small Arms and the Battlefield," *N&S*, vol. 6, #6] Brent Nosworthy uses the terms "hit rate" and "casualty rate" interchangeably. However, they are actually very different things. The number of shots needed to produce a 'casualty' is very different from the number of shots needed to produce a 'hit.' Many dead and wounded soldiers were found to have been hit multiple times so it would not be correct to say as Nosworthy does that Union troops fighting in the Wilderness fired 752,900 rounds inflicting 7,450 to 11,125 casualties for an average hit rate of 0.99 percent and 1.5 percent. The same holds for his discussion of Solferino losses on page 20. To get accurate calculations of hit rates one would have to examine each casualty to see how many times he had been hit.

—Andrew Wagenhoffer
Vancouver, Washington


Library of Congress

Hits and casualties are not the same.

* * *

The recent article by Brent Nosworthy is excellent. I would like to raise an issue Nosworthy may not have fully considered. I think you can tweak the available data a bit more in favor of the rifle over the smoothbore.

The balance of available data suggests that Civil War fire fights occurred at modestly longer range than smoothbore fire fights. If they were on average even twenty-five yards greater than smoothbore fire fights, the data would be strengthened that for a given range the rifle is more deadly. For example, even if further study shows that in the Mexican War the shots to casualties ratio was the same as that during the Civil War, the modestly longer average range of the Civil War fire fight would suggest that the Civil War era rifle was more deadly. This suggests that if Civil War rifles were used at identical ranges to smoothbores they would have scored more hits.

Civil War literature often mentions lines of battle opening up with long range and useless fire. I think this phenomena was less reported during the smoothbore era. Long range, useless fire would tend to deflate the shots to casualties ratio of the Civil War rifle relative to the smoothbore.

Finally, did carbine or revolver fire contaminate the data Nosworthy used to calculate his bullets to casualties ratio? Both weapons had potentially high rates of fire, but were far less accurate than rifles. Also, even the small number of Spencer rifles may have impacted the data; the greater rate of fire may have caused soldiers to aim less carefully—often the tactically correct choice, but not one that makes for a good bullets to hits ratio.

—Glenn Seliger, M.D., via email

* * *

I was delighted to read Brent Nosworthy's recent article in your fine magazine. Having been a student of the Second Empire for the past two decades, it was refreshing to see something of the influence French military tactics had on American military thought. The French military was extremely active during the period of 1852 to 1870, seeing service in Algeria, the Crimea, China, Italy, Lebanon, Mexico, and Indo-China, to name just the major campaigns and expeditions.

I would like to point out what I feel is an error concerning the Modèle 1859 carabine de chasseur, referred to as the carabine á tige in Mr. Nosworthy's article. The "elevating" backsight was not done away with. The 1859 carabine in fact featured an elevating sight capable of ranges of 250 to 1,100 meters. (To verify, please see *Tradition Magazine*, Hors Serie No. 2, "Du silex au piston. La grande aventure des fusil réglementaires français 1717-1865.") While the Emperor Napoleon III certainly favored the bayonet, he was no fool. These weapons were for issue to specialist light infantry troops, who were expected to disrupt the enemy's battle line and attack columns with accurate fire. To do away with the backsight would negate the purpose of this excellent rifle and the emperor certainly did not want that. I feel this was a case of the source, C. M. Wilcox, being uninformed of the actual changes in the rifle in question.

—Troy W. Thompson
Elizabethtown, Kentucky

* * *

Brent Nosworthy has some interesting thoughts but he ignores two important points. At the beginning of the war, about eighty percent of the muskets on both sides were smoothbores. Even as late as mid-1863 the Federals were issuing smoothbores (some were still flintlocks) to state volunteer units. Who knows what the South was up to. He also never mentions artillery. Depending on the battle, between five and twenty percent of casualties were from artillery. This is based on wound analysis and is probably low. A doctor cannot tell the difference between a musket, rifle, or case shot projectile wound.

I love your magazine. *—Bruce Krohn*
Los Lunas, New Mexico

ED. We have asked Brent to address the points raised in the four preceding letters in next issue's "Crossfire."

HOOKWORM

Dr. David Cross' article on hookworm at Andersonville [*North & South*, vol. 6, #6] is an important contribution, yet I wonder if it is not one more attempt to shift blame from the Confederate authorities. I have read Henry Wirz's correspondence with Richmond; Wirz was well aware of the grossly inadequate facilities, but the government gave him only excuses. The Union prisoners were fed cornmeal with the husks, cobs, and kernels all ground together. Corn-fed cattle receive only the kernels. Even the Georgia militia knew that husks and cobs were not food. The plan of the prison, combined with the diet-induced bowel disorders, meant that men slept and walked in a mixture of mud and feces. And scurvy? Its cause and cure were known seventy years before the Civil War. Confederate surgeon Joseph Jones' 1864 report made it clear that the camp was dangerously deficient in every respect.

Library of Congress

The diaries of the Confederate elite document a life of oysters and champagne right up to the end. The highest echelons of the Confederate government should bear the greatest share of blame, rather than the lowly hookworm.

My great-grandfather survived Andersonville. I am here today because of his endurance and strong constitution, with no thanks to the Confederate authorities.

—Thomas P. Lowry, M.D.
Woodbridge, Virginia

WADE HAMPTON

I read Eric J. Wittenberg's article "Giant in Gray" (vol. 6, #6) with great interest, but was disappointed to find that he relies heavily upon pro-Hampton southern sources and ignores conflicting eyewitness accounts from principal northern participants. As a result, it would appear that Wittenberg presents a one-sided, biased, and highly inaccurate account of the Fayetteville street fight. In the interests of objectivity the author should have consulted William H. Duncan, "With the Army of the Tennessee Through The Carolinas," *Minnesota Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion* (St. Paul, 1898), p. 517, and Dave Day's two accounts: *Durango Democrat*, August 22, 1907, and "Dave Day's Daring," in an undated article (probably from the *Denver Times*) that is part of the Ulysses Robert Brooks Papers at the Duke University Library.

According to Union accounts Duncan impetuously led a detachment of sixty-eight scouts into Fayetteville under the impression that it was only lightly guarded. Instead, the Federals encountered elements of Hardee's 3,700-man rearguard. The brief, hot fight that ensued left fifty-four of the Union scouts casualties. Duncan, Day, and several others surrendered after being overwhelmed by sheer force of numbers. General Hampton rode up after the prisoners were disarmed and cut down one unresisting young soldier in cold blood, and two other captives were shot. Duncan escaped shortly thereafter and filed charges against Hampton with Major Lewis M. Dayton, Sherman's adjutant general. The matter was not pursued because the war ended a few weeks later.

Wittenberg, in addition to ignoring important first-person accounts that refute Hampton's version of the street fight, also neglects other telling evidence. Dave Day, for example, in the 1890s submitted an application for the Medal of Honor for valor at Fayetteville. Day would not have risked an official investigation of the affair if it were to reveal that the Federals were routed by a force one-tenth their number.

The most damning indictment of Hampton's account and of Wittenberg's treatment of it, however, comes, ironically, from a high-ranking contemporary southern source. General Lafayette McLaws, who was well aware of Hampton's reputation for exaggeration, bombast, and self-promotion and who had also interviewed Confederate participants in the action, made this assessment:

"Report says he [Hampton] killed two with his own hand, but the chivalry have fallen so deep into the pit of 'want of chivalry' that they are constantly inventing Munchausen as to the prowess of those from that state [South Carolina], of defaming others in order that thereby they appear elevated by the contrast." (Lafayette McLaws Order Book 27, Lafayette McLaws Papers, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.)

—Mike Kaplan
Marina Del Rey, California

* * *

I read with interest in Eric Wittenberg's article on Hampton at Fayetteville that Wade Hampton promoted racial harmony. Did not Hampton command the Red Shirts who fought Reconstruction and took away the rights of black people after 1877?

—Bryce A. Suderow, via email

ERIC WITTENBERG RESPONDS:

Bryce is only party correct. The original purpose of the Red Shirts was to form an informal militia and to throw off Reconstruction, returning home rule to South Carolina. While it's true that the white supremacy movement eventually became a consequence of the Red Shirts, there were members of the Red Shirts who were freed slaves. See Edward L. Drago's 1998 book *Hurrah for Hampton!: Black Red Shirts in South Carolina During Reconstruction* for a discussion of this interesting phenomenon. There is no evidence that Hampton himself participated in any racist activity; quite to the contrary, the record is clear that Hampton was extremely popular with the black population of South Carolina and that he stood for racial harmony.

GRAVES

As usual, great issue. As to Gerry Nash's query regarding a book listing Confederate generals' burial locations ["Crossfire," *N&S*, vol. 6, #7] you left out Richard and James Owens' *Generals at Rest: The Grave Sites of the 425 Official Confederate Generals* (White Mane, 1997). The book features pictures of both the generals and their graves. A good reference volume. *—George K. Combs*
Archivist/Reference Librarian
Alexandria Library (VA), Special Collections

ED. Thanks to George and all the other respondents who pointed this out. One, David Callihan, editor/publisher of *Grave Matters* (a newsletter about Civil War burial sites), informed us that though the Owens list General John C.C. Sanders as buried in Richmond, his remains in fact were reburied in Greenwood Cemetery, Montgomery, Alabama, in 1918.

RELIGION

Thank you very much for the enlightening article by John P. Daly regarding the religious roots of the pro-slavery movement in the South prior to the Civil War [vol. 6, #6]! Now the G.W. Bush administration's policy in the Middle-East makes sense to me. Well, here it is: It seems that the Southern Baptists and their moral descendants like G.W. Bush, Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, John Ashcroft and William Boykins (yeah, that lieutenant general in charge of intelligence!!!??? in the Pentagon) have found their articles of faith *(continued on page 94)*



Albert A. Nofi

Knapsack A CIVIL WAR DIGEST

FROM THE GRAPEVINE

- Apparently, the last wartime volunteer unit on active duty was the 125th United States Colored Troops, which mustered out on December 20, 1867, at which time the regiment was down to only a few dozen men.
- During the Civil War the U.S. Army procured so many supplies that as late as 1890 troops were still being issued rations marked "1863."
- When his daughter Kate married millionaire Governor William Sprague of Rhode Island in 1861, Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase's wedding gift was a shawl worth $3,000, sufficient in 1863 to purchase draft exemptions for ten men.
- Arguably the first U.S. Marine to become a general ***not*** by brevet was William Whedbee Kirkland, who resigned his lieutenant's commission in the corps on the eve of the Civil War to join the Confederacy, and rose to brigadier general by August 1863.
- During the first year of the war military cadets from the University of Alabama reportedly trained some 12,000 troops for the Confederate army.
- The "Old Army" was a hard-drinking outfit, so much so that at a wake for Major Albert S. Miller, who died in 1852 of a surfeit of booze, Brevet Second Lieutenant George Crook, who would rise to some distinction during the Civil War, overheard Major Hannibal Day announce, "Well, fellows, Old Miller is dead and he can't drink, so let us all take a drink."
- Taking advantage of secession to clear up their finances, Southerners during 1861 reneged on debts owed to Northern creditors, New York bankers alone losing $160 million.
- In order to help fund the war, the Federal Internal Revenue Act of 1861 imposed a tax on beer of $1.00 a barrel, the equivalent of a day's wages for a common working man.

Note: We make every effort to check the accuracy of anecdotes published in "Knapsack," but many were written down years after the event and in some cases are undoubtedly folk tales rather than genuine reminiscences.

SHORT ROUNDS

The Army's "Gum Blanket"

During the Civil War Union soldiers were issued two blankets. One was an ordinary wool blanket, the other a rubber groundsheet. Concerned about the health of troops forced to bivouac in the open, the army had long experimented with a number of ways to help men sleep on the ground in relative comfort. The invention of the rubber vulcanization process in 1844 by Charles Goodyear (pictured right) led to the adoption of a rubber ground sheet, or blanket. Indeed, the army rubber blanket was one of the first items made from vulcanized rubber to see common use.

The rubber blanket was one of the most useful items prescribed for issue by



Library of Congress

War Debts . . . Repaid

In February 1865 Sherman's army, having completed its "March to the Sea," was driving northward through South Carolina, with several columns converging on Columbia, the state capital. The Confederacy had little with which to oppose the Union juggernaut as the XV and XVII Corps closed in on the little city. There were, however, a few veteran units, such as the 1st South Carolina Cavalry, and some scratch militia forces, such as the 1st South Carolina State Troops Junior Reserves. These put up some resistance, and there was a series of skirmishes between February 15 and 17, with light casualties on each side.

Elements of Sherman's forces entered Columbia on morning of the 17th. That night a great fire broke out in the town, so devastating that a thirty-six-block section of the heart of the city was burned out. Jefferson Moses of the 2nd Iowa wrote in his diary that Columbia "is nearly all destroyed." So devastating was the conflagration that even the local fire engine was burned. Local tradition ascribed—and ascribes—the fire to the Yankees, who supposedly went on a drunken rampage and interfered with efforts to fight the fires, even cutting the hoses. Of course the fire might just as easily have been started by looters, or perhaps by retreating Confederates, who were trying to destroy military supplies, as occurred in Atlanta the previous autumn (as noted in Margaret Mitchell's *Gone With the Wind*) and would happen in Richmond the following spring. In any case Columbia was long in recovering from the devastation.

In 1867 the New York Firemen's Association heard that Columbia was still using bucket brigades to fight fires. The Gothamite fire fighters, many of them Union veterans, collected $3,000 to buy Columbia a hose wagon. When the wagon was lost at sea during shipment, they took up another collection and bought yet another wagon. The new hose wagon was presented to Columbia by a delegation of New York City firemen on June 28, 1867. The gift so impressed the people of Columbia that Samuel Melton, a former Confederate colonel and prominent member of the local fire brigade, promised on behalf of South Carolina's capital to return the favor "should misfortune ever befall the Empire City."

And so time passed. Then came September 11, 2001. Thousands of lives were lost in the terrorist attacks on the Penta-

"The great truth, I repeat, upon which our system rests, is the inferiority of the African. The enemies of our institutions ignore this truth. They set out with the assumption that the races are equal; that the negro is equal to the white man. If their premises were correct, their conclusions would be legitimate. But their premises being false, their conclusions are false also."

—Alexander Stephens, Virginia Secession Convention, April 23, 1861

the army. Made of wool, one side of which was covered with a thin layer of rubber, the blanket measured forty-five by seventy-nine inches. Nicknamed the "Gum Blanket" by the troops, it was intended for use when a soldier had to sleep in the open. Laid rubber-side down, it helped protect a sleeping soldier from dampness in the ground. The rubber blanket proved very effective in this role, and was used by both armies, Confederate troops doing so courtesy of captured Union stocks.

Of course, soldiers are inveterate improvisers. Almost as soon as the troops received their rubber blankets, they began using them in creative ways. For example, several men could pool their blankets to form an improvised tent, a practice that seems to have been envisioned by the army, which had thoughtfully provided brass grommets along its edges. Men also quickly discovered that it could be used as an improvised raincoat, pulled over the shoulders and loosely fastened. Surprisingly, although the army provided cavalrymen with an even better version of the gum blanket, specifically designed to be used as a poncho, the logical conclusion—to issue real ponchos to all troops—does not seem to have occurred to anyone.

Even damaged rubber blankets had their uses. Soldiers would use undamaged pieces of blanket to line bullet pouches or haversacks, providing them with a little extra waterproofing.

Although the gum blanket passed out of use generations ago, the army still issues a ground sheet, though it has far fewer uses than the original.

Mrs. Hancock's Dinner Party

On June 15, 1861, Captain and Mrs. Winfield Scott Hancock gave a farewell dinner party at Los Angeles for several officers who had just resigned their commissions in order to join the Confederacy.

The guest of honor was Colonel Albert Sidney Johnston, a brevet brigadier general widely considered to be one of the most capable officers in the army, and late acting commander of the Department of the Pacific. Also present were Major Lewis A. Armistead, Captain Richard B. Garnett, and several other recently resigned officers.

Despite the somewhat awkward circumstances, the evening passed in good spirits and everyone parted on friendly terms, with Armistead, a close friend of the Hancocks, giving Mrs. Hancock a prayer book as a parting gift.


Frank & Marie-T. Wood Print Collection

On the night of February 17, 1865, a great fire broke out in Columbia, South Carolina.

gon and the World Trade Center. On that one day of disaster the New York Fire Department lost over three hundred fire fighters, as well as scores of fire trucks crushed or burned.

In the aftermath of the attacks, students from White Knoll Middle School in West Columbia (population 10,600) became "pen pals" with the fire fighters of Engine Company 101 in Brooklyn (population two million). The children decided to raise money to help their new friends replace the fire truck they had lost during the attack. Then, while researching the cost of a fire truck, Principal Nancy Turner stumbled across the story of the long-ago gift from New York's fire fighters to Columbia. This spurred the students to greater efforts, and inspired others to help them out. Columbia Fire Chief John Jansen, a native New Yorker, lent a hand with the fund-raising, as did New York attorney William Murray, a native South Carolinian, who pledged $100,000 to the campaign if the students could raise the remainder.

It took the students just fifty-six days to raise nearly $500,000. Even Principal Turner was surprised at how quickly the students were able to raise the money, though she said they never doubted that they could do it. In fact, Turner reported that when she told adults about the project their reaction was, "How much will it cost?" whereas all the students wanted to know was, "Who was going to drive?"

The children presented a check for $447,265 to Mayor Rudolph Giuliani during the Macy's Thanksgiving Day parade, a sum sufficient to buy a new $350,000 fire truck and leave a little left over for any other equipment that might be required.

White Knoll student Staci Smith said, "When we presented the check to Mayor Giuliani he just had the biggest smile on his face," and added, "The firemen were so proud of us and they were happy." Eighth-grader Laurin Huffstetler said, "It shows we care about people in New York.... It also shows we keep our promises."

It had been an unusual dinner in many ways, and the aftermath was to be even more so. Years later Mrs. Hancock observed that three of the officers present died at Gettysburg during Pickett's Charge, which broke against her husband's II Corps on Cemetery Ridge on July 3, 1863. Two of the officers were Armistead and Garnett, both of whom commanded brigades during the "High Tide of the Confederacy." Alas, she could not recall the name of the third, nor has his identity been established with any degree of satisfaction.

As for the guest of honor, Albert Sidney Johnston, he perished at the head of a Confederate army at Shiloh on April 6, 1862.

Mrs. Gertrude Janeway, the Last Union Veteran's Widow

One of the nation's few remaining living links to the Civil War passed from the scene on Friday, January 17, 2003, when the last surviving widow of a Union veteran, ninety-three-year-old Mrs. Gertrude Janeway, died in her three-room log cabin in Blaine, Tennessee.

Mrs. Janeway lived in Blaine, about thirty miles north of Knoxville, her entire life. Born in 1909, she met her future husband, John Janeway, a local boy, when she was sixteen and he was seventy-nine. In 1864 John, then a Grainger County farm boy of nineteen, ran away from home to enlist as "John January" in the 14th Illinois Cavalry, using an assumed name because "he was afraid his people would come and claim him," as Mrs. Janeway explained. John saw service in the Atlanta Campaign, during which he was captured and spent about two months as a prisoner-of-war, and in the Battles of Franklin and Nashville. After mustering out in mid-1865 he spent many years in California before returning to Blaine.

Because Gertrude's mother objected to the match the two waited until June 9, 1927, when Gertrude was a month shy of her eighteenth birthday and John was eighty-one, and were married in the middle of a road in Blaine. Gertrude never remarried, and continued to live in the cabin that John had purchased for them in 1932, and that did not have electricity until a few years ago. At the time of her death Gertrude was still collecting a $70 a month widow's pension; she was buried near her husband in New Corinth Cemetery.

There remains one surviving Confederate widow, Alberta Martin, ninety-five, of Elba, Alabama, who has her own website, http://lastconfederatewidow.com/. Under legislation enacted in the 1930s, Mrs. Martin collects a veteran's widow's pension. In addition to Mrs. Martin, Civil War pensions are still being paid to a small number of veterans' children.

"ALAS FOR ROMANCE": TALES OF THE CIVIL WAR THAT *AREN'T* TRUE

The "Silk Dress Balloon"

One of the most romantic tales of the Civil War is that of the "Silk Dress Balloon." Allegedly impressed by the performance of Union balloons in the early stages of the war, the Confederates, in the words of James Longstreet, decided "to gather all the silk dresses in the Confederacy and make a balloon. It was done, and soon we had a great patchwork ship of many and varied hues which ready for use in the Seven Days' Campaign."

The tale of the "Silk Dress Balloon" has become a staple of Civil War popular history. As is the case with many a romantic tale, it is quite bogus. The amount of stitching and glue required to fabricate a balloon from literally hundreds of tiny pieces of silk taken from dresses and other garments would have rendered it much too heavy to fly.

But if the traditional tale is false, the reality is by no means uninteresting.

It seems that after Confederate brigadier general Thomas F. Drayton observed Union balloons in action while district commander at Port Royal, South Carolina, he suggested to his superiors that the Confederacy ought to procure balloons of its own. Once the War Department concurred, Drayton selected Captain Langdon Cheves, an engineer on his staff, to direct the effort. Cheves (pronounced "Chi-vis") contacted Georgian Charles Cevor, a veteran aeronaut who had been offering his services to the Confederacy for months.

The principal stumbling block in making a balloon was the lack of silk. Given that the Union blockade had largely cut the South off from Britain, its primary source of the material, Cheves and Cevor had to figure a way to secure enough silk to build a balloon. They were fortunate enough to find a merchant in Charleston who had twenty bolts available, and could let them go for a mere $514—an enormous sum for the times. With this silk, Cevor was able to construct a 7,500-cubic-foot balloon dubbed *Gazelle. Gazelle* had a highly unmilitary appearance. The silk that Cheves had bought was, of course, originally intended to be used to make dresses and other garments. So the twenty bolts came in a variety of hues—black, white, red, blue, green, and so forth—giving *Gazelle* a festive appearance.

Although she leaked badly, and was rather on the small side, *Gazelle* rendered important service to the Confederacy during the Seven Days. Inflated at Richmond with "city gas" (produced by rendering coal), *Gazelle* was several times towed near the front by CSS *Teaser*, an eighty-foot long, sixty-four-ton screw tug, that carried a 32-pounder rifle and a 12-pounder rifle. At the front *Gazelle* conducted observation missions, providing General Robert E. Lee with much valuable intelligence on Union movements. But on the afternoon of July 4, 1862, soon after *Gazelle* had been deflated and stowed for the day, and prior to *Teaser's* return to Richmond, disaster struck. Although she drew only about seven feet, *Teaser* ran aground on a mud bank in the middle of the James River. To make matters worse, as her crew was trying to free *Teaser* from the mud, the USS *Maratanza*, a 786-ton paddle wheel "double-ender" gunboat, armed with two 100-pounder cannon, steamed up.

Although *Teaser's* crew thought of putting up a fight, a round from *Maratanza's* 100-pounder main gun that shattered the little ship's boiler convinced them otherwise, particularly since the even more powerful *Monitor* was also approaching. Torching their vessel, they abandoned ship. However, a boarding party from the Union vessel managed to put out the fire and secure a line. *Maratanza* then towed *Teaser* off the mud flat, and she was later commissioned under the same name in the U.S. Navy. *Gazelle*, still neatly folded up, was shortly cut up for souvenirs.

So where did the story about the "Silk Dress Balloon" come from? Apparently the tale *(continued on page 94)*

The Latest Civil War Books from Morningside

All printed on acid-free paper. These books are all published or reprinted by Morningside. All shipments are made in double-walled boxes, and in most cases we ship the same day the order is received. We ship via the Postal Service, UPS, FedEx. Ground(RPS), or 2nd Day Federal Express. We carry and keep in stock nearly all Civil War books in print.

MILITARY BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE CIVIL WAR - VOL. IV (Dornbusch)–compiled and revised by Silas Felton. 1063 pp., revised with books missed in Vols. I, II, and III, regimental publications, personal narratives, biographies, campaigns and battles, northern and southern. 9,700 entries. (Old Volume 4 was 424 pages). Status: 4 years in the making, compiled and indexed. Ready to mail. No serious Civil War historian can function without this book – a vade mecum – You can research the Civil War, but not completely unless the Dornbusch volumes are consulted. ......$75.00 – $6.00 to ship

◆

SHILOH: BLOODY APRIL–by Wiley Sword, New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1975. Illus., notes, bibliog., index. This book, completely revised **by Wiley Sword, now has 562 pages** ......Paperback – $22.50, Hardcover – $45.00

◆

HISTORY OF THE BUCKTAILS: KANES RIFLE REGIMENT–by Thomson and Rauch, 466 pages, acid-free paper, hardcover in real cloth, muster roll, reprinted 2001. 5th Corps at Gettysburg......$55.00

◆

FORREST AT BRICE'S CROSS ROADS AND IN NORTH MISSISSIPPI IN 1864–by Edwin C. Bearss. 382 pages, maps, acid-free paper, hardcover bound in real cloth. "Forrest's Finest Hour"......$45.00

◆

GETTYSBURG: THEN AND NOW–by John M. Vanderslice. 560 pp. Reprint of 1897 edition with 127 photographs, cloth/hardcover, printed on 60 lb. satin acid-free paper. Vanderslice served as chairman of the Gettysburg Battlefield Preservation Committee, a private organization which raised funds and governed the construction of 300 monuments on the field until the land was deeded to the Department of the Interior in 1895 ......$45.00

◆

HANCOCK'S DIARY: OR, A HISTORY OF THE 2ND TENNESSEE CAVALRY, C.S.A.–With sketches of the First and Seventh Battalions. Reprint of the Nashville 1887 edition, 667 pp., new index, cloth/hardcover $55.00

◆

LEE'S SHARPSHOOTERS, OR FOREFRONT OF BATTLE–by W.S. Dunlop. 448 pp., index, acid-free paper, cloth/hardbound, Confederate flags stamped on cover $55.00

◆

SONS OF OLD MONROE: A REGIMENTAL HISTORY OF PATRICK O'RORKE'S 140TH NEW YORK VOLUNTEER INFANTRY –Revised & expanded edition of Brian A. Bennett's unit history of this Little Round Top regiment. 718 pp., 96 photos, 13 maps, index, (Paperback - $30.00) cloth $55.00

◆

JOHN GIBBON'S THE ARTILLERIST'S MANUAL–Illustrated reprint of the 1863 revised edition. "Gibbon's The Artillerist's Manual is a classic in American artillery literature"–C. Peter Jorgensen, *The Artilleryman Magazine.* Printed on acid-free paper and hand-bound in "C" grade cloth. 480 pp., 281 illus., 20 folding plates, index $75.00

◆

THE BACHELDER PAPERS–David and Audrey Ladd, editors: Compiled by John Bachelder. The three cloth/hardcover volumes contain Bachelder's Gettysburg correspondence with both Confederate and Federal participants. 729, 587, and 690 fully-indexed pages, with a set of 7 maps shipped separately......$110.00

◆

THE BACHELDER MAPS–Consisting of 28 color maps showing the position of units on the Gettysburg battlefield for each hour of the action, 27½ x 37½ inches. Printed on 70 lb. patina matte acid-free paper. Shipped flat $250.00

◆

THE MISSISSIPPI BRIGADE OF BRIG. GEN. JOSEPH R. DAVIS–by T.P. Williams. The history of the 2nd, 11th, 26th, and 42nd Mississippi, the 55th North Carolina, and their leader–the nephew of President Jefferson Davis. 289 pp., 25 photos, 5 maps, index, cloth/hardcover......$34.95

◆

THE GETTYSBURG MAGAZINE–(Published by Morningside) Issues 1-29 printed. Issues 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 13 and 14 are out of print. Issue number 30, due January 2004, now in press. Each issue contains 128 pages and no advertising......Two year, four issue subscription $30.00. Single issue rate $7.95 + $4.00 to ship

◆

THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN–by Edwin C. Bearss. Exhaustive account of the fighting for Mississippi's primary fortress. Three volume set, 2,219 pp., cloth/hardcover, many photos and maps $125.00

◆

THE 16TH MICHIGAN INFANTRY OF LITTLE ROUND TOP–by Kim Crawford, 546 pages, cloth, dustjacket $45.00

"Where the black smoke of battle rolled heaviest," said Edward Hill of the 16th Michigan Infantry Regiment, "there could the 16th be found."

For decades, students of the Civil War have been able to read histories of other famous regiments that served with the 16th Michigan in the Army of the Potomac–the 83rd Pennsylvania, the 44th New York, and the 20th Maine. From the siege of Yorktown to Second Bull Run and Fredericksburg on to the final confrontation with Robert E. Lee at Appomattox Court House, Hill's regiment served with these commands in one of the most notable brigades in the Union army.

◆

Delivers the all too elusive "something new" craved by students of the campaign. Here is the often overlooked story of the real suffering and dying.

GRAPPLING WITH DEATH: THE UNION SECOND CORPS HOSPITAL AT GETTYSBURG–by Roland R. Maust, Morningside House, Inc., Dayton, Ohio, 2001, Illustrated, Index, 949 pages ......$60.00 – $5.00 to ship

Fighting a major battle during the Civil War involved much more than a few hours of combat. The involvement of men and resources to clean up "the mess" in the aftermath was often a prolonged ordeal that required even more effort than the actual fighting. As Roland Maust so capably documents here, dealing with the human carnage at Gettysburg compelled perhaps the most intensive commitment of all; the race of life with death – to save those who had given their all, yet lay wounded or dying amid the vast flotsam of the battlefield. Viewed from the perspective of one key Union hospital unit – the 2d Corps' facilities which gathered many of the stricken from "Pickett's Charge".

......**Book Review by Wiley Sword, Suwanee, GA**

◆

M. JEFF THOMPSON MEMOIRS–edited by Donal J. Stanton, Goodwin F. Berquist, and Paul C. Bowers. 310 pp., index, photos, maps, paperback......$22.50
WAR TALKS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, Petersburg Campaign, paperback $30.00
SHERMAN AT WAR by Joseph Ewing, paperback $20.00
HOOD'S TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN by Thomas Robson Hay, paperback $25.00
THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN by Jacob D. Cox, paperback $25.00

Our stock of new books and reprints are available, printed by Morningside and others. Over 2300 titles available.

Ohio residents add 7.5% sales tax. American Express, Discover, Mastercard and Visa, checks and money orders accepted. Shipping for retail orders over $100.00 is free, otherwise $5.00 for the first book, $2.00 each additional book. There is additional shipping on foreign orders. Catalogue #52 has been sent to customers who have bought since November 1999. Request a free catalogue with your order. Order toll-free (800) 648-9710 or FAX (937) 461-4260. Complete catalogue is available on the internet at http://www.morningsidebooks.com

Satisfaction guaranteed or your money promptly refunded.

Morningside Bookshop

260 Oak Street, Dayton, Ohio 45410 (800) 648-9710
We are located near Downtown Dayton in the South Park Historical District.
Contact us via E-mail at **msbooks@erinet.com** or visit us on the web at **http://www.morningsidebooks.com**

DARK UNION: BAD HISTORY

Edward Steers, Jr. and Joan L. Chaconas

IN 1961 *CIVIL WAR TIMES*, then in its third year of publication, featured a sensational article entitled "Was Stanton Behind Lincoln's Murder?"[1] The article was written by *CWT* editor Robert H. Fowler and supposedly based on "new discoveries" by Ray A. Neff, a chemist and avocational historian. Neff claimed to have found cipher messages written in the margins of a book originally owned by Lafayette C. Baker, head of the Union war department's "secret service," known as the National Detective Police (NDP). The messages, Neff claimed, were made by Baker and pointed to Abraham Lincoln's secretary of war, Edwin McMasters Stanton, as the mastermind behind the president's assassination.

According to the "Baker ciphers," Stanton headed a cabal of over fifty prominent people in the North who sought to remove Lincoln. One of the encrypted messages stated:

> There were at least eleven members of Congress involved in the plot, no less than twelve Army officers, three Naval officers and at least 24 civilians, of which one was a governor of a loyal state. Five were bankers of great repute, three were nationally known newspaper men and eleven were industrialists of great repute and wealth. There are probably more that I know nothing of. The names of these...known conspirators is presented without comment or notation in Vol. One of this series. Eighty-five thousand dollars was contributed by the named persons to pay for the deed. Only eight persons knew the details of the plot and the identity of the others. I fear for my life. LCB.[2]



Frank & Marie-T. Wood Print Collection

John Wilkes Booth assassinates President Abraham Lincoln at Ford's Theatre.

It was claimed that Baker, who was privy to Stanton's treasonous plans, later feared for his life because of what he knew, and after several scrapes with near death, he allegedly succumbed to arsenic poisoning in 1868.

Baker's statement that he "feared for his life," according to the article, stimulated Neff to take his research further. In an effort to confirm Baker's belief that he was going to be murdered, Neff located Baker's will in the Philadelphia City Hall archives, and hit paydirt. Neff found an "unprobated codicil" to Baker's will. Since the codicil was not filed until 1872, four years after Baker's death, it required a hearing before the Register of Wills to determine its validity. The hearing was held on October 14, 1872, at which time witnesses were called to determine the state of Baker's mind at the time he allegedly wrote the codicil. The testimony

"History is not history unless it is the truth."—*Abraham Lincoln*



confirmed that Baker not only feared for his life, but also was seen writing in code in a military journal just like the one Neff discovered nearly a hundred years later in a Philadelphia bookstore.

Neff's subsequent research purportedly resulted in the discovery of a treasure trove of documents, including: "secret service documents, an unpublished diary of a congressman, old letters, book manuscripts, deathbed confessions, secret cipher-coded messages, dozens of rare photographs, and correspondence secretly intercepted by Secretary of War Edwin Stanton."[3] The discovery of such a wealth of previously unknown material was virtually unprecedented in the annals of historical research. While most historians consider themselves lucky if they uncover one or two unknown documents of major importance in their professional lifetime, Neff purportedly located *hundreds*, totaling thousands of pages of previously unknown material.[4] Virtually all of these documents, however, were typescript copies of originals that no longer existed.[5]

Fowler's *Civil War Times* article served to bolster the earlier revisionist claims of another chemist-turned-historian, Otto Eisenschiml. In 1937 Eisenschiml published the first of two popular books that pointed an accusing finger at Stanton.[6] While Eisenschiml never directly accused Stanton of engineering Lincoln's murder, he filled his books with innuendo leaning heavily on the old maxim, "Where there's smoke, there's fire." In the case of Eisenschiml, however, it appears there was only a smoke *machine*. And in 1977 Neff's claims resulted in a paperback book and a motion picture that accused Stanton of Lincoln's murder and stated that John Wilkes Booth escaped capture and a substitute named James W. Boyd was killed in his place at Richard Garrett's farm on April 26, 1865.[7]

In the years following the 1961 article several historians presented evidence that the "Stanton did it" claims were based on poor research and on documents "exposed as ingenuine."[8] Through the efforts of James O. Hall, William C. Davis, and Peggy Robbins, the documentation relied on by the proponents of Stanton's treason and Booth's escape, including the Baker codicil and subsequent hearing, was shown to contain internal inconsistencies and major errors. Wrong names, wrong dates, wrong places, and wrong relationships challenged the documents' authenticity.

Between 1977 and 1981 the new *Civil War Times Illustrated* (the name had been changed under editor William C. Davis) ran a series of editorials retracting Fowler's 1961 article.[9] Davis wrote, "Rarely does a magazine print a retraction or refutation of one of its own articles, but this is precisely what we do now. It is a debt we owe to the cause of history."[10] As for the Baker documents, they were, according to Davis, "if not outright forgeries...so highly suspect as to make them inadmissible as evidence in any serious investigation."[11]

With that, the Lincoln community settled back, satisfied that the true history of Lincoln's murder was not the result of a treasonous conspiracy at the hands of his secretary of war, and that the man killed at the Garrett farm was John Wilkes Booth, not some substitute.

* * *

TWO DECADES HAVE PASSED since Davis' *Civil War Times Illustrated* editorials, and like Lazarus of old rising from the dead, the specter of Northern cabals and governmental cover-up involving Lincoln's murder has resurfaced in the form of *Dark Union: The Secret Web of Profiteers, Politicians, and Booth Conspirators That Led to Lincoln's Death* (Hoboken, New Jersey: John A. Wiley and Sons, 2003). Ray A. Neff is back, this time as author and joined by Leonard F. Guttridge, a writer whose prior works on naval history have received high praise.[12] Although dressed up in new clothes, *Dark Union* is the old corpse containing many of the same discredited claims published over forty years ago in *CWT*.

If there is a hero in *Dark Union* it is an individual by the name of Andrew Giles Potter. The authors claim Potter was a former detective in Lafayette Baker's NDP who, in the course of his investigations, is said to have amassed one of the most important archives in Civil War history—a significant part of which eventually wound up in Neff's possession. Following the publication of *Dark Union* Neff donated these documents, along with his other papers, to Indiana State University, where they now reside in the university's Rare Books and Special Collections Department. But like the phantom officer created during World War II by British intelligence, Andrew Potter appears to be "The Man Who Never Was."[13] And herein lies the real story of *Dark Union*.

* * *

DARK UNION presents such a revolutionary revision of history that it must be summarized at length. Powerful interests among Northern politicians, financiers, and powerbrokers engage in a scheme to trade Northern meat for Southern cotton. With Lincoln's war effort facing bankruptcy, the beleaguered president approves secret trade deals between Northern investors and Southern cotton owners. Lincoln needs the cotton profits to help pay the huge costs of his war. The Confederacy desperately needs meat to feed its starving armies. Driven by these two needs, a deal is struck.

With the impending collapse of the Confederacy, Lincoln's enthusiasm for the deal begins to fade, threatening the huge profits of the Northern investors. At the same time, Lincoln's policy of forgiveness toward the South enrages Radical Republicans. An "unholy alliance" is formed between the two groups, who plan to kidnap Lincoln and replace him with a junta, allowing the trade deals to go forward. Before long, dozens of secret agents, several sailing ships, and a squad of John S. Mosby's rebel guerrillas position themselves in readiness for the big moment.

Originally selected by forces under Stanton to head the abduction team, John Wilkes Booth falls from favor when it is decided that he is not up to the task. Stanton replaces Booth with James W. Boyd (initials J.W.B.), a Confederate army captain and secret service agent sitting out the war in a Union prison camp. Desperate to get out of prison, Boyd writes to Stanton offering to reveal details about smuggling operations in his home state of Tennessee. Stanton orders Boyd transferred to Old Capitol Prison as a possible replacement for Booth and soon learns of Boyd's special talents in clandestine activities. He cuts a deal with Boyd, offering him his freedom and passage to Mexico if he will take over leadership of the kidnap plot.

With Boyd running the kidnap operation, everything begins to fall into place. Borrowing from Booth's original scheme, the abduction is to take place outside a theater. The plan is to lure Lincoln from the theater to his carriage. Once outside, the president will be overpowered and whisked away by "guerrillas in Union garb." The plan collapses, however, after key Confederate plotters reason that "since the Confederacy had lost, nothing should be done to stain its reputation."[14] Booth, aware of Boyd's plot, decides to act on his own. He seizes the opportunity and kills Lincoln.

At this point in the story, the authors interject yet another new twist based on the supposed postwar investigations of "detective" Andrew Potter. Joining Booth in his escape is not David Herold, the faithful companion we learned about in the standard history books, but a man by the name of Edwin Hynson, "a pint-sized guerrilla scout for the South who had smuggled medicines for Booth."[15] Hynson had shown up at the theater that fateful night expecting Booth to kidnap the president. Hiding in the shadows behind the theater, he watches Booth gallop off in the direction of the Navy Yard Bridge. The faithful Hynson mounts his horse and rides after Booth, rendezvousing with him just outside the city. Together, the pair head south toward freedom.

And what of David Herold, the conspirator who history tells us accompanied Booth? It seems Herold was in southern Maryland carousing with a neighbor at the moment Lincoln was shot. As Union patrols spread over the countryside looking for suspects, Herold is discovered two days after the assassination and brought back to Washington in manacles. Because Herold is a known sidekick of Booth's and is knowledgeable about the backroads of southern Maryland, he is forced to accompany a Federal posse as a guide.

With Herold as their guide, the search party tracks Booth into southern Maryland, where they stumble onto James W. Boyd, who is scouting an escape route for the kidnap party. Boyd is told to join the pursuers now that his kidnap plan is dead. With Boyd and Herold in tow, the party resumes its hunt for Booth and Hynson. But Boyd, fearing for his life because he knows too much about the plot to abduct Lincoln, decides to make his escape at the earliest opportunity, which comes after the search party beds down for the night. Boyd and Herold slip out of camp and head south. As Booth and Hynson continue their escape south, Boyd and Herold run into three Confederate soldiers, who escort the pair to the Virginia farm of Richard Garrett. In the early morning hours of April 26 the pursuit party arrives at the Garrett farm, where Boyd is killed and Herold is taken prisoner. The stage is set for one of the greatest cover-ups in American history.

With Boyd dead instead of Booth, what happened to John Wilkes Booth? And what about his famous "diary" that history tells us was taken from Booth's body at the Garrett farm? Guttridge and Neff have an explanation. When Booth and Hynson crossed the Potomac River on Sunday, April 23, they landed near a place called Gambo Creek on the Virginia side of the river. While Booth rested in the high grass, Hynson sought help from a local Confederate agent. When the two men finally moved on, Booth left several items behind on the ground, including his little diary. The items were found later that day by one of Lafayette Baker's top scouts, a Pamunky Indian named Whippet Nalgai. Nalgai was scouring the countryside ahead of the Federal search party when he happened upon the site where Booth had rested. Imagine his surprise when he found Booth's items in the river grass. Included were "a blood-stained ulsterette [shortened overcoat or vest], a pistol, *a compass*, and two near-empty brandy bottles, as well as a wallet containing $2,100 in Union currency, several letters of credit on Canadian and British banks, and *a diary* with a small map and six pictures of women tucked into its inside pocket"[16] (emphasis added). The excited Nalgai turned the items over to the detectives, who rushed them back to



Library of Congress

Photograph of Abraham Lincoln taken by Alexander Gardner on February 5, 1865.

Washington where they were given to Stanton. Thus, as James W. Boyd and David Herold rested at the Garrett farm, and Booth and Hynson were making their escape west, Stanton had Booth's diary and pocket compass two days before their supposed owner was killed!

When Stanton realizes that James W. Boyd, not John Wilkes Booth, has been killed at the Garrett farm, he decides to cover up the mistake and let the whole world believe the body is Booth's. Booth, no longer sought, eventually makes his way to India, where he dies in 1883, but not before making out a will leaving over $160,000 to his alleged wife, children, and friends, including his faithful companion Edwin Hynson.[17]

With Booth's escape, the country is left with a cover-up of enormous magnitude. According to Guttridge and Neff the cover-up continues to this day, aided by inept historians: "Valuable papers in Federal archives have been ignored, wrongly interpreted, or discounted because of lack of context or have simply escaped notice.... What standard history books have to say about the assassination of Abraham Lincoln is substantially rooted in pure myth and faked or incomplete testimony."[18]

The authors end their book with a chastisement of those historians who do not accept their version of history: "[T]here are too many people who have a vested interest in preserving a standardized version of history. Instead of welcoming new discoveries, as genuine historians should, they ignore or even try to suppress fresh evidence that tends to contradict conventional accounts...."[19]

* * *

Polemics aside, let us examine the revisionist claims made by the authors. First, the book contains numerous errors of fact including, but not limited to, incorrect names (James Ward Boyd is James William Boyd; Lafayette Curry Baker, head of the NDP, appears as Lafayette Charles Baker), wrong regiments (the detail guarding the Navy Yard Bridge belonged to the 3rd Massachusetts Heavy Artillery not the 3rd Maine Volunteers), wrong dates (Booth met fellow conspirators Arnold and O'Laughlen in Baltimore in early August 1864 not September; Jefferson Davis ordered Confederate commissioners Jacob Thompson and Clement Clay to Canada in April 1864 not August), and wrong places (the Confederate soldiers met Booth and Herold at Port Conway, Virginia, not Port Royal; Thompson and Clay were in Toronto on October 19, 1864, not Montreal). While these errors are not substantive, they reflect a level of scholarship that falls below the acceptable standard for a work that attempts to rewrite history.

Library of Congress

Left to right: Luther Byron Baker, Lafayette Curry Baker, and Everton Judd Conger planning the capture of Booth.

Second, the "Notes on Sources" at the end of book are written in a way that makes it impossible to verify many of the book's important claims. For example, numerous citations are given simply as "LAS Files, NARA." Knowledgeable researchers will recognize this as "Lincoln Assassination Suspects File, National Archives Record Administration." These files consist of sixteen reels of microfilm (M599) containing literally thousands of frames. It is nearly impossible to find an individual item without reference to a specific reel and frame number. Other references simply appear as "Neff-Guttridge Collection."

Guttridge and Neff often provide citations for the most inconsequential statements while failing to support their most important claims. A good example is found in the notes to Chapter One. The authors refer to Secretary of War Stanton as "something of an enigma." This relatively unimportant statement is backed up with no fewer than seven specific references. A few paragraphs later they introduce the Potter brothers, Earl and Andrew, whom the authors claim "managed Baker's National Detective Police" and "ran the Secret Services Division," respectively. They fail to list a single reference in any public archive to support their claim that the brothers were detectives with Baker's NDP, let alone that they ran the operation. As we shall see later, there is no evidence outside of the Neff-Guttridge Collection to indicate that the Potter brothers ever existed.

Incorrect names, dates, places, and inadequate citations are the least of the book's flaws. *Dark Union's* most serious problem is its dependence on a large collection of transcribed documents, allegedly copies of originals that have been lost or destroyed. However, there is no credible evidence that any of the original documents ever existed. Moreover, the transcriptions are not subjected to critical analysis, and the authors ignore the vast body of evidence that contradicts them.



SURRAT. BOOTH. HAROLD.

War Department, Washington, April 20, 1865,

$100,000 REWARD!

THE MURDERER

Of our late beloved President, Abraham Lincoln,

IS STILL AT LARGE.

$50,000 REWARD

Will be paid by this Department for his apprehension, in addition to any reward offered by Municipal Authorities or State Executives.

$25,000 REWARD

Will be paid for the apprehension of JOHN H. SURRATT, one of Booth's Accomplices.

$25,000 REWARD

Will be paid for the apprehension of David C. Harold, another of Booth's accomplices.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.



SURRAT. BOOTH. HAROLD.

War Department, Washington, April 20, 1865.

$100,000 REWARD!

THE MURDERER

Of our late beloved President, Abraham Lincoln,

IS STILL AT LARGE.

$50,000 REWARD

$25,000 REWARD

$25,000 REWARD

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

* * *

IT WOULD TAKE A BOOK to enumerate all the errors of commission and omission in *Dark Union.* But a few examples of its more significant failings should suffice to give the reader enough information to judge which version of Lincoln's assassination is, in the authors' words, "rooted in pure myth and faked or incomplete testimony."[20]

DAVID E. HEROLD

Essential to the thesis of *Dark Union* is the claim that David Herold did not accompany Booth on his escape, but was captured in southern Maryland on Sunday, April 16, and returned to Washington. Forced to join the pursuit party as a guide, Herold then fled but was eventually recaptured at the Garrett farm on April 26.



Library of Congress

David E. Herold, photographed by Alexander Gardner on April 27, 1865, on board the USS *Montauk.*



Manacles of the type worn by David Herold. The T-shaped key is inserted into the socket located between the wrist cuffs. *National Park Service.*

Left top: Genuine reward poster issued by Lafayette C. Baker on April 20, 1865. Original in the Library of Congress' Rare Book Room.

Left bottom: Souvenir reward poster reproduced in *Dark Union.* Known as "variant D," this poster dates from the time of John H. Surratt's trial in the summer of 1867. Surratt was photographed in 1867; the photograph of Herold is that taken by Alexander Gardner in 1865.

In support of their claim that Herold did not accompany Booth during his escape, Guttridge and Neff offer as evidence a reward poster that includes photographic images of John Surratt, Booth, and Herold. Herold's image is cropped from a photograph that shows his wrists bound by iron manacles. The authors explain: "To keep secret the fact that he had been seized within forty-eight hours of the assassination, manacles were cropped from his photo to accommodate the reward poster five days later."[21] How, ask Guttridge and Neff, could a picture of Herold in manacles appear on a reward poster if he was still at large as historians have claimed? Their explanation is that Herold was not in Washington on the night of Lincoln's murder, but was in southern Maryland, where he was arrested two days after the assassination and brought back to Washington in manacles. They write:

> Herold was photographed at the NDP and hustled back out of town into the Maryland countryside.... His picture was sent with cartes de visite of Booth and John Surratt to the Army Medical Museum, staffed in part by hospital stewards.... When Lincoln was shot, the stewards were given the immediate task of working on pictures of suspects. The pictures were intended for reward purposes.... For a reward poster, with Herold's picture, soon issued, the manacles were cropped.[22]

The true explanation is quite different. The reward poster Guttridge and Neff use to support their case is in reality a souvenir poster produced for commercial purposes at least two years after the assassination! The photograph of John Surratt used on the poster was taken sometime after his trial in 1867;[23] David Herold's photograph was taken by Alexander Gardner on April 27, 1865, aboard the USS *Montauk.*[24] The actual reward poster issued on April 20, 1865, used photographs of Surratt and Herold obtained three days earlier by Lafayette C. Baker, who had them copied using the photographic facilities of the surgeon general's office.[25] One of the authentic posters is located in the Rare Book Room of the Library of Congress and has been reproduced in any number of publications.[26] The souvenir poster used by Guttridge and Neff appears in Theodore Roscoe's *Web of Conspiracy* with the appropriate caption: "Revised reward poster, faked for history, showing Herold after his capture, and John Surratt about 1867."[27] The authors of *Dark Union* make a fundamental mistake in using this discredited post-assassination souvenir poster in support of their claims.

Guttridge and Neff try to further bolster their claim that Herold was not in Washington the night of the assassination by stating that "not one person had positively identified Herold as the assassin's companion."[28] Not true. There is ample evidence that Herold was in Washington the night of the assassination and was identified as Booth's companion.

First, there is the testimony of conspirator George Atzerodt. Following his arrest on April 20 Atzerodt was placed aboard the monitor *Montauk* where he was interrogated by Colonel H.H. Wells. During his questioning Atzerodt told his interrogator what happened on the evening of the assassination:

> About half past five or near six o'clock, I went to the Kirkwood House, and they told me a young man had called there for me. I took a chair and Harold [sic] came in and said Booth and Wood [Lewis Powell] wanted to see me immediately.... We went to their house on 9th St. [Herndon House] and they there proposed the murder to me. Booth proposed that we should kill the President.

In this statement Atzerodt placed Herold at the Kirkwood House at 12th and Pennsylvania Avenues near six o'clock on the night of the assassination. The two of them went to the Herndon House at 9th and F Streets, where Booth discussed the plans for that night.[29]

According to the standard histories of the assassination, Herold accompanied Lewis Powell to Secretary of State William Seward's house located at Lafayette Park, then waited outside while Powell went into the house to kill Seward. When Herold heard the commotion inside, he fled the scene, leaving Powell to fend for himself. Herold was making his way down Fourteenth Street when John Fletcher, the manager of the stable where Herold had rented a horse earlier in the day, spotted him. Herold was overdue in returning the horse and Fletcher believed he was stealing it.[30] When Fletcher called to Herold to return the horse, the young man fled up Fourteenth Street, turned east on E Street, and headed for the Navy Yard Bridge. Fletcher returned to his stables, mounted his horse, and took off after Herold. At the Navy Yard Bridge Fletcher learned that two men had crossed just moments before. Told he could cross but not come back until morning, Fletcher returned to the city and went to General C. C. Augur's headquarters, where he reported his horse stolen. Fletcher tells what happened next: "General Augur asked me if I knew the man that I hired the horse to. I told him I did. I gave him *the name of Herold and his description*, and his age, as far as I could judge, and told him that I had pursued him to the Navy Yard Bridge" (emphasis added).[31] Under cross-examination during the conspirators' trial, Fletcher was asked by Herold's attorney, "Are you satisfied that it was the same man now in the box?" Fletcher answered, "Yes Sir: I am very well satisfied it was Herold."[32] The authors of *Dark Union* ignore this testimony.


James O. Hall Library and Research Center, Surratt House and Museum


Above: George Atzerodt, photographed by Alexander Gardner on board the USS *Saugus* in April 1865.

Right: William ("Willie") Jett, c. 1868. *James O. Hall Collection.*

Another eyewitness to identify Herold and place him in the company of Booth on the night of the assassination was John Lloyd, keeper of the Surratt Tavern in Surrattsville. It was close to midnight when the two men arrived at the Surratt Tavern and called Lloyd to the door. Lloyd was well acquainted with Herold, having seen him on numerous occasions at the tavern. When asked at the trial if he knew the prisoner Herold, Lloyd answered, "I know Herold. He has been in my house several times." Asked to explain what happened when the two men arrived at the tavern on the night of the assassination, Lloyd said, "Booth did not come in. Herold came into the house and got a bottle of whiskey, and took it out to him [Booth]; and Herold drank some out of a glass." Lloyd then added, "Just as they were about leaving, the man who was with Herold (Booth) said, 'I will tell you some news if you want to hear it'.... Well, said he, I am pretty certain that we have assassinated the President and Secretary Seward." [33] Since Lloyd was well acquainted with Herold, there can be no doubt that it was Herold who came to the tavern the night of April 14, and the admission by the man with Herold that "we have assassinated the President and Secretary Seward" rules out James W. Boyd.[34] The authors of *Dark Union* also ignore this testimony.

A third witness to testify concerning Herold and Booth traveling together was Willie Jett, the Confederate soldier who, along with two other Confederate soldiers, escorted Booth and Herold to the Garrett farm on Monday evening, April 24. Guttridge and Neff claim that on meeting the two men at "Port Royal" (they in fact met at Port Conway) Willie Jett asked one of the men the name of his lame companion. The response was, "If he told you his name was Boyd, he told you right."[35] The authors would have us believe that the two men encountered by Jett were David Herold and James W. Boyd.

But the authors fail to quote Jett's testimony in full. Had they done so they would have been forced to concede that Herold did not claim that the man with him was Boyd. At the trial Jett was asked, "Herold introduced Booth to you as his brother, by the name of Boyd, did he?" Jett answered, "Yes, sir." Then he was asked if he subsequently changed the name. Jett answered, "*He afterwards told us his name was Herold, and Booth's name was Booth*"[36] (emphasis added). This is further confirmed by Jett's statement given on May 6, prior to his testimony at the trial, in which he described the meeting at Port Conway: "Booth then walked up and Herold enquired our names and introduced us all around calling Booth by name."[37]

During the trial the prosecution asked Jett if he recognized any of the prisoners sitting in the courtroom. Jett answered, "Only one of them." When asked which one he replied, "Herold."[38] Jett then informed the court that Herold told him, "We are the assassinators of the President."[39] That description could only have pertained to *Booth,* not Boyd.

Further proof that Booth was the man with Herold is Jett's testimony that he identified a tattoo on the hand of Herold's companion: "Booth, I remember, had on his hand 'J.W. B.'"[40] The well-known tattoo was a distinctive identifier of Booth. According to Booth's sister, Asia Clarke, "He [Booth] had perfectly shaped hands, and across the back of one he had clumsily marked, when a little boy, *his initials in India ink*" (emphasis added).[41]

It becomes clear from Jett's testimony that the man Jett spoke to was David Herold, not Edwin Hynson, and that his companion was Booth, not Boyd.

Despite Guttridge and Neff's claim to the contrary, Herold never denied that the man he was with at the Garrett farm was John Wilkes Booth. During his interrogation by special judge advocate John A. Bingham on board the *Montauk,* Herold identified his companion as "Booth" on thirty-four occasions.[42]

Herold had every reason to deny that the man he was with was Booth. If Herold had been traveling with someone other than Booth, James W. Boyd for example, he could hardly be accused of aiding and abetting Booth's escape. And yet Herold repeatedly referred to his companion as "Booth," thus putting a rope around his own neck. Herold went to the gallows never once claiming his companion was James W. Boyd.

JAMES W. BOYD

There is no disagreement between the authors of *Dark Union* and serious historians that David Herold was the man captured at the Garrett farm. The disagreement is over the identity of his companion—whether it was John Wilkes Booth or James W. Boyd. The claim made in *Dark Union* that Booth was not the man killed in the Garrett barn first surfaced in 1907 in a concocted story told by Memphis attorney Finis L. Bates.[43] In a critical review that appeared in the *Century Magazine* in 1928, historian Lloyd Lewis dismissed the claim that Booth escaped as "a preposterous tale and one that has never withstood examination, but one that still lives on as part of the Lincoln myth."[44] Seventy-five years later the myth continues to live on, even though it is as preposterous as ever. The evidence is clear: the man who died at the Garrett farm was John Wilkes Booth, not James W. Boyd.

Who then is James W. Boyd, and if he did not die at the Garrett farm on April 26, 1865, where and when did he die? Those questions were effectively answered by William C. Davis in the series of editorials that appeared in *Civil War Times Illustrated.* The evidence Davis pre-



Library of Congress

Right: Lewis Thornton Powell on board the USS *Saugus* in April 1865. Powell used the alias "Lewis Paine" in signing his oath of allegiance. The government did not learn his real name until the third week of May, during his trial.



Below: Oath of Allegiance signed by James W. Boyd dated February 15, 1865. Note the description: light complexion, grey hair, blue eyes, six feet, two inches high. Boyd's characteristics clearly set him apart from John Wilkes Booth, who had black hair, dark brown to black eyes, and stood five feet, seven-to-eight inches tall.

United States of America.

I, James W. Boyd (Late Capt 6 Tenn Inf) of the County of Madison, State of Tennessee, do solemnly swear, in presence of Almighty God, that I will henceforth faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the Union of the States thereunder; and that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all acts of Congress passed during the existing rebellion with reference to slaves, so long and so far as not repealed, modified, or held void by Congress, or by decision of the Supreme Court; and that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all proclamations of the President made during the existing rebellion having reference to slaves, so long and so far as not modified or declared void by decision of the Supreme Court: So help me God.

Jas. W. Boyd

Subscribed and sworn to before me, at Old Capitol Prison, Washington D.C., this 15th day of Feby A.D. 1865.

James [illegible]

The above-named has light complexion, grey hair, and blue eyes; and is 6 feet 2 inches high.

sented was, in large part, based on the research of historian James O. Hall. It is worth repeating here.[45]

James W. Boyd is a real enough historical figure. Born in Hopkinsville, Kentucky, in 1822, he moved to Jackson, Tennessee, in the early 1840s. He married Caroline A. Malone in 1845 and together they had seven children (one died in infancy), all born between the years 1846 and 1862. At the outbreak of the war, Boyd enlisted in the 6th Tennessee Volunteers (CSA), in which he rose to the rank of captain. In July 1863 he was captured in Jackson and shuffled between several Union prison camps before winding up in the Old Capitol Prison in Washington, D. C. While there Boyd wrote to Stanton offering valuable information about smuggling operations in Tennessee in exchange for his freedom. After taking the oath of allegiance, Boyd was released on February 15, 1865. All of the above is a matter of record and not in dispute by the authors of *Dark Union*. Where they differ sharply with others is over what happened after Boyd was released.

According to *Dark Union*, instead of returning home to Tennessee Boyd agreed to help Stanton and his fellow conspirators by assuming Booth's role in the plot to kidnap Lincoln. The unlucky Boyd was killed in Booth's place and the real assassin escaped, eventually making his way to India. Concluding their story, Guttridge and Neff admonish us not to accept the standard version of history without asking questions. "Questions," they write, "imply doubts, as well they should. This fact should not silence the questioner." Fair enough. Let us begin by asking what really happened to Captain James W. Boyd.

The first thing we learn from the genuine documentary record is that James W. Boyd did not die on April 26, 1865, at the Garrett farm. He died in his hometown of Jackson on January 1, 1866, eight months after his alleged death in Virginia. On the Monday after his death the following notice appeared in a Nashville newspaper:

> On Monday before last, James W. Boyd, for more than twenty years a citizen of Jackson, Tennessee was shot and almost instantly killed by William Rowark [sic], a resident of McNairy County. The difficulty grew of an old grudge. Rowark [sic] was arrested, but managed to escape.[46]

Here we learn that a man named James W. Boyd, a resident of Jackson for over twenty years, was killed on January 1, 1866. How do we know this is the same James W. Boyd that appears in *Dark Union* and not some other James W. Boyd? In the Jackson-Madison County Public Library is a manuscript diary written by a local farmer named Robert Cartmell. The entry for January 1, 1866, reads in part:

> Before I got to town this morning a difficulty occurred between James W. Boyd who lived a long time in this place and a man whose name I forget. Did not know him. He was a Lieut. in one of the Companies of Newsome's Rebel Regmt, which resulted in the shooting & killing of Boyd.... Boyd leaves 5 or 6 children. His wife died last winter. Poor unfortunate man. Poor fatherless and motherless children.... He was a Lieut. In 6th Regmt of Tenn Vol.... was a prisoner on 2 occasions, for more than a year was confined in Northern prisons....[47]

Cartmell identifies the murdered man as "James W. Boyd," a member of the 6th Tennessee Volunteers, who lived "a long time" in Jackson, was a widower, left "5 or 6 children," and "for more than a year was confined in Northern prisons." While Cartmell's diary entry seems conclusive, it does not stand alone. Among Boyd's six surviving children was George H. Boyd, born December 13, 1853, in Jackson, Tennessee. Anne Boyd Withers, daughter of George H. Boyd and granddaughter of James W. Boyd, owned a manuscript journal written by her father. The following undated entry appears in George H. Boyd's journal:

> Father was murdered by a horse thief whose name was Bill Roark.... Father came home from war in September 1865 and had moved us from the Old Theus [?] house on Continental St. to South Royal St to our old house where we lived when he was killed in the front door of the old Fred Young grocery. He was keeping books for Fred Young. The murderer slipped in the store and cassed [cached] himself behind some stock of goods. Father was called to the door by some one outside and as [he] gained the front door the murderer slipped along behind him and hit father in the back with a four lb. Weight, and he shot father when he turned on his knees and fired over his shoulder at Roarke. Roarke shot three times 2 balls lodged in a pipe in father's overcoat pocket but one ball pierced his heart.[48]



The evidence is clear: the man who died at the Garrett farm was John Wilkes Booth, not James W. Boyd. This engraving from *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper* depicts Federal soldiers dragging Booth from the burning barn.

In *Dark Union*, Guttridge and Neff write, "Captain James Boyd's children never saw their father again. They were told—unofficially, as far as can be discovered—that he was among the almost two thousand Union veterans who perished when the steamboat *Sultana* sank ten days after Lincoln's murder."[49] George Boyd's statement shows otherwise. His father was killed after returning home from the war.[50]

There are two other eyewitness accounts that bear directly on the question of who was killed at the Garrett farm. Lieutenant Colonel Everton J. Conger and Lieutenant Luther B. Baker, detectives with the NDP and two of the officers who cornered Booth, made statements in their official reports describing the final moments of the man taken from Garrett's barn. Both Conger and Baker stated that the dying man said, "Tell *my mother* I die for my country" (emphasis added). Guttridge and Neff correctly write that James W. Boyd was "orphaned in infancy."[51] Why then would Boyd ask that his mother be told he died for his country?

And what about the assassin's broken leg, supposedly set by Dr. Samuel Mudd during the flight south? Booth, we know, broke his ankle when he sprang onto the stage at Ford's Theatre. Guttridge and Neff claim that Boyd too had an injured leg, having in 1863 "suffered a wound in his right leg that never healed."[52] They write, "Crossing the [Zekiah] swamp had caused his right ankle to swell, the old minie ball wound suppurating."[53] However, we have first-person contradiction of such an injury from James W. Boyd. In a letter to his wife dated July 6, 1864, Boyd, while still a prisoner at Johnson's Island, wrote, "I am very unwell at present and do not know when I will be better as I am suffering from Vaccination. My arm is well but I have a large rising in my side near my left breast. *Nothing else has ever troubled me in the way of sickness*"[54] (emphasis added). Clearly there was no "suppurating" minie ball wound to his ankle.

There is another item that bears on the question of who was killed in Garrett's barn. When James W. Boyd swore his oath of allegiance on February 15, 1865, he was required to do so in writing, and the form he signed included a description of his person. This document, located in the National Archives, lists the following details: "light complexion, grey hair, and blue eyes; and is 6 feet 2 inches high." John Wilkes Booth had black hair, dark brown to black eyes, and was five feet, seven to eight inches in height. Booth was twenty-six years old in 1865, while Boyd was forty-three. With such differences in physical characteristics, it is highly unlikely that anyone could have confused the identity of the two men.

According to the authors of *Dark Union*, James W. Boyd was born in Kentucky, orphaned in infancy, married a woman named Caroline who died in the winter of 1865 (January 5, 1865), and was the father of seven children. He served in the 6th Tennessee Volunteers, was captured at Jackson, Tennessee, in the summer of 1863, and was paroled from Old Capitol Prison on February 15, 1865, after taking the oath of allegiance.

The James W. Boyd who died on January 1, 1866, has all the vital characteristics of the James W. Boyd in *Dark Union*. He was born in Kentucky, orphaned as a child, lived in Jackson, Tennessee, for twenty years, married Caroline Malone, fathered seven children (one of whom did not survive infancy), served as a captain in the 6th Tennessee Volunteers, was captured in Jackson and eventually wound up in the Old Capitol Prison, from which he was released on February 15, 1865, after taking the oath of allegiance.

Neff gets around this by claiming to have located a *second* James W. Boyd (referred to as "Mad Dog" Boyd) who was killed on January 1, 1866! According to Neff, "Mad Dog" Boyd was an ex-sheriff from adjoining McNairy County who was murdered by "Billy Rowark" in Jackson to avenge a beating Boyd had given to Rowark's father.[55] Neff dismisses the Cartmell entry, writing, "the confusion was born of an error in the journal of



Signature from book owned by Baker.

Signature from Secret Service payroll.

Signature from Baker's will.

Signature from Chaffey and Biggs letter.

A Comparison of L.C. Baker Signatures

Among the handful of hand-written documents in the Neff-Guttridge Collection is a letter dated November 12, 1844, attesting to Lafayette C. Baker's position as a "general agent" for a shipping firm known as "Chaffey and Biggs," alleged to be located on Indian Island, New Brunswick, Canada. The document is signed by R. Biggs and L.C. Baker. The Baker signature on the Chaffey and Biggs letter appears above, along with three of Baker's authentic signatures. Several differences between the authentic signatures and that on the letter are evident. Characteristic of Baker's authentic signature is the connection of the initials "L" and "C" to Baker, the letter "a" which resembles a "u," and the slant of the characters. All these characteristics are absent in the signature on the Chaffey and Biggs letter, which strongly suggests that this signature is not genuine.

Robert Cartmell."[56] However, he offers no evidence as to Cartmell's alleged confusion. Neff's "evidence" for "Mad Dog" as the man who died on January 1 is contained in an unpublished narrative in the Neff-Guttridge Collection. It is said to be constructed from information supplied by members of different branches of the Boyd family with verification at important points from National Detective Police memoranda.[57] But no NDP memoranda are cited. Furthermore, the "Mad Dog" Boyd of Neff's narrative bears no resemblance to the James W. Boyd described in the original *CWTI* editorials. If the former sheriff of McNairey County known as "Mad Dog" Boyd ever existed, he was not a member of the 6th Tennessee, nor was he "confined in Northern prisons." There can be no confusing "Mad Dog" Boyd with the James W. Boyd killed on January 1, 1866.

GEORGE WASHINGTON JULIAN AND BOOTH'S DIARY

But what about Booth's famous "diary" that historians tell us was taken from the body at the Garrett farm? As previously noted, the Guttridge-Neff version has it that several of Booth's personal items including his diary and pocket compass were found near Gambo Creek and rushed back to Washington and delivered to Stanton on April 24.[58] The authors of *Dark Union* would have us believe that after examining the diary, Stanton summons three Radical Republican colleagues—Congressman George Julian of Indiana, Senator Zachariah Chandler of Michigan, and Senator John Conness of California—to his office. The scene in Stanton's office is constructed in *Dark Union* on the basis of a hitherto unknown "unpublished portion" of Julian's diary for April 24, which the authors claim to have discovered and that resides only in typescript form in the Neff-Guttridge Collection. Julian allegedly recorded that on entering Stanton's office he "sensed something was amiss." Stanton told him, "We have Booth's diary, and he has recorded a lot in it." Senator Conness, on scanning the pages "moaned repeatedly, 'Oh, my God. I am ruined if this ever gets out.'"[59] Stanton took the diary from Conness and asked Julian to look at it. Julian demurred: "I was better off not reading it," he is said to have written in his journal. Stanton pressed him in threatening language: "It concerns you for we either stick together in this thing or we will all go down the river together." Stanton gave the diary to Thomas Eckert, the officer in charge of the telegraph office, and told him to secure it in his iron safe, warning those in the room, "We cannot let it out."[60] Guttridge and Neff tell us this little scene proves that Booth's diary was in Stanton's hands before Booth was captured, and it ties Stanton and his cohorts to Booth.

What are the facts? Following Julian's death in 1899, his journals, which he kept throughout his political career, passed to his daughter, Grace Julian Clarke. In 1926 Clarke lent the journals to Indiana historian Claude Bowers, who was working on his anti-Radical Republican book, *The Tragic Era*.[61] According to an explanatory statement in the Neff-Guttridge Collection, Bowers "photographed the journal pages without Grace Clark's [sic] knowledge."[62] Guttridge and Neff claim that at some point before his death Bowers had the photographic copies transcribed in the presence of an Indianapolis businessman by the name of Hugh Smith, and a notary public. Bowers, they claim, for some strange reason then destroyed the photographs. According to the explanatory statement, "Smith took one [of the transcriptions] back to Indianapolis to show in [the] future that if anything arose that Bowers needed for support I'd have a copy."[63] In 1974, Guttridge and Neff allegedly met with Smith in Muncie, Indiana: "During our interview with Hugh Smith he showed us the Photostats [sic] and said he had decided to destroy them. He did, however, permit us to have them transcribed in the presence of a notary public." [64] The transcription contains the following statement: "I, a notary public, in and for the state and county above mentioned [Delaware County, Indiana], have proofread the above copy and declare this copy to be the exact copy of a photostatic copy of [a] diary by George M. [sic] Julian. Dated this 4th day of April 1974. Ray A. Neff, Witness. Signed Phyllis A. Ketcham, Notary Public. My commission expires June 12, 1974."[65] Smith then destroyed his copy, leaving Guttridge and Neff with the only surviving copy of Julian's "unpublished" excerpt. This is now part of the Neff-Guttridge Collection and is the sole "evidence" for the meeting in Stanton's office described in *Dark Union*.

As it happens, excerpts from Julian's journal appeared in 1915 in the *Indiana Magazine of History*. And fortunately the entry for April 24 is among those published. It reads:

> On Saturday last we had General Rosecrans before our committee, and his ac-

John Wilkes Booth's compass and the memorandum book he used as diary during his escape. Both were recovered from Booth's body at the Garrett farm on April 26, 1865. *National Park Service*



> count of the campaign of Western Virginia makes McClellan look meaner than ever. On last Friday went with Indianans to call on President Johnson. Governor Morton transgressed the proprieties by reading a carefully prepared essay on the subject of reconstruction. Johnson entered upon the same theme, indulging in bad grammar, bad pronunciation and much incoherency of thought. In common with many I was mortified.[66]

The "quoted" passages in the *Dark Union* version are missing from the *Indiana Magazine of History*. There is no mention of a meeting in Stanton's office, of Booth or his diary, or of a conspiracy. Did the editors of the *Indiana Magazine of History* edit the entry before publishing it? It seems unlikely, for if the editors had such important material, why would they withhold it from the public? Even more puzzling, why would Claude Bowers not use such anti-Radical information in his anti-Radical Republican book? The Neff-Guttridge narrative claims that Grace Clarke edited out the damaging portions before allowing the magazine to publish the excerpts, although they provide no evidence of this.[67]

Bowers was not the only historian to borrow Julian's journals during this period. Mabel Engstrom, a graduate student at the University of Chicago, used the journals in researching her masters thesis on George Julian, which she submitted in 1929. In 1977 Engstrom, now Mabel Herbert, wrote to the managing editor of *CWTI* concerning the alleged "unpublished" excerpt from Julian's journal: "I just cannot remember reading anything in the journal which stated that Julian was aware of any plot relating to the assassination of Lincoln. Of course, it has been fifty years or so since I read the journal. However, I think I would have remembered such an important statement if it had been in the journal."[68]

Historian James O. Hall attempted to locate the "unpublished" portion of Julian's journal at the Indiana State Library, where Julian's journals reside, and at the Lilly Library at the University of Indiana, where the Claude Bowers papers are housed. No "unpublished" portions of the journal, or correspondence pertaining to the "unpublished" version, were found in either library. No photographs, photostats, or photocopies, and no typescripts are part of either collection, and nothing in the Claude Bowers papers indicates that he made copies before returning the journals to Grace Clarke.[69] There is in fact no independent evidence that the "unpublished" portion of the diary ever existed outside of the Neff-Guttridge Collection.

In the *Dark Union* account, no one in Stanton's office that day bothers to ask how Booth's diary got there while he was still at large. It is an important question, because all of the evidence places the diary on Booth's body at the time of his death at the Garrett farm on April 26. Indeed, at least four witnesses reported seeing Booth and his diary south of the Potomac River after the date when Guttridge and Neff claim the diary was found in the grass along Gambo Creek.

The first witness is Booth himself. On the night of April 23, two men arrived at the summer home of Dr. Richard Stuart in King George County, Virginia, located ten miles south of the Potomac River. The two men, Booth and Herold, were escorted to Stuart's home by William Bryant at the direction of Thomas Harbin, a Confederate agent. Stuart allowed the two men into his house long enough to eat, but he refused them shelter. Instead, Stuart sent them a short distance away to the cabin of a free black by the name of William Lucas, where they spent the night. The next morning Lucas' son Charlie took Booth and Herold to the Rappahannock River crossing at Port Conway, where they ran into three Confederate soldiers.

While at the Lucas cabin, Booth, angered by Stuart's lack of hospitality in refusing shelter to him, decided to insult Stuart by offering to pay for the food they received. Booth tore a leaf from his diary and wrote a note offering Stuart $5.00. Then—deciding that was too much—Booth slipped the note back into his diary and tore out another page on which he wrote a second note for $2.50. He sent this note to Stuart, who had it in his possession when he was arrested and interrogated a few days later. The first note, offering $5.00, was found tucked in Booth's diary when it was recovered. Stuart told detectives that Lucas brought him Booth's note on April 24, the very day Guttridge and Neff claim the diary was handed to Stanton. In his statement, Stuart said, "It was a leaf from a memorandum book rolled around and the money rolled up in it."[70] The note, by the way, quoted a scene from Macbeth, one with which Booth the actor was very familiar. The note with its "Shakespearean quotation" is added evidence that the man at Stuart's home on April 24 was Booth, not James W. Boyd, and it proves the diary was still in Booth's possession on April 24.

The second witness is William Garrett, the oldest son of Richard Garrett. William stated that he saw Booth writing in his diary on Tuesday, April 25, at the Garrett farm: "The next thing I remember of him (Booth) he had taken his seat on the porch and I think he had *a small memorandum book* in his hand and was writing in it" (emphasis added).[71]



John Wilkes Booth, c. 1862.
Courtesy Richard and Kellie Gutman.

The third and fourth witnesses are two of the detectives who cornered Booth at the Garrett farm, Everton Conger and Luther B. Baker. Both men testified to recovering Booth's diary *and his pocket compass* from his body on April 26. The following exchange took place between Conger and Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt during the Lincoln conspirators' trial:

> HOLT: Look at this pocket-compass.
>
> CONGER: That was taken from Booth's pocket, just as it is now, with candle-grease on it and all.[72]

Luther Baker gave the following testimony:

> **BAKER**: We took all the papers from his pocket—as soon as we removed him from the barn, and delivered them to Colonel Conger.
> **HOLT**: Can you give any description of those papers?
> **BAKER**: They were a diary, three drafts or checks, and forty-five dollars in greenbacks.[73]

At the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson in 1868 Baker testified a second time:

> **BAKER**: While we were getting the diary out of his pocket, and turning him over so as to get at it—Conger being anxious to get to Washington as soon as possible—Booth groaned and said: "Oh, kill me."
> **PROSECUTION**: Who took the memorandum book from his pocket?
> **BAKER**: Colonel Conger. He looked at it and handed it to me. I looked at it, and then we put it in a handkerchief with other things.
> **PROSECUTION**: Did you open the book?
> **BAKER**: Yes.
> **PROSECUTION**: Did you make any examination of its contents?
> **BAKER**: Nothing, except to run the leaves over.
> **PROSECUTION**: What did you find in it?
> **BAKER**: I did not examine it, only to see that it was a diary.[74]



Post-mortem examination of Booth's body on board the USS *Montauk*, April 27, 1865.
From *Harper's Weekly*, May 13, 1865.

The pocket compass is important because it goes hand-in-hand with the diary. Both items were recovered from Booth's body and both items are alleged by Guttridge and Neff to have been in Stanton's office on April 24. Clearly, the diary and the pocket compass cannot have been in two places at the same time. Unless, and this is important, there were two diaries and two compasses. The authors of *Dark Union* claim there was a second diary, but ignore the compass. On page 178 of *Dark Union* the authors state:

> Everton Conger rode off with what he had taken from the dying man's pocket. The contents included a small *black book* in which the Garretts had seen him writing. (Booth's diary is bound in red, its entries ending three days before what the Garretts saw).

Guttridge and Neff allege the diary removed from the body was "black." Yet we know that Booth's diary (now on display at Ford's Theatre) was brown, edged in red. Where did the authors find a reference to a small black book? The source notes contain no citation to support their claim. As we have seen, Garrett referred only to "a small memorandum book" and said nothing about its color, and the various statements by Conger and Baker refer to a diary or memorandum book and again say nothing about its color.[75] The fact is that Booth's diary and pocket compass were removed from his body at the Garrett farm on April 26, and Guttridge and Neff have provided no credible evidence to the contrary.

THE POTTER PAPERS

Papers attributed to NDP detective Andrew Potter constitute the core of the Neff-Guttridge Collection. Space does not permit analysis of all these "Potter papers," but an examination of one of the many interviews supposedly conducted by Potter during a secret investigation authorized by President Ulysses S. Grant will illustrate the problem that the documents present.

Andrew Potter allegedly interviewed one of David Herold's sisters, Mary A. Nelson, in Denver, Colorado, on August 22, 1873.[76] The interview begins:

> Q. Mrs. Nelson, you were the sister of the late David Herold were you not?
> A. Yes.
> Q. And your husband *was* [emphasis added] Edward W. Nelson?
> A. That is true.

That in fact is not true. Mary Nelson's husband was Frederick Massena Nelson, not Edward W. Nelson. A District of Columbia marriage record shows the couple were married on July 23, 1860. In the "interview" Mary Nelson refers to her husband in the past tense, but in August 1873 he was alive and living with his wife in Charles County, Maryland. Census records for Charles County, Maryland, for 1870 show F. M. Nelson, white male, aged forty-two, farmer, and M.A. Nelson, white female, aged thirty-two, keeping house. The 1880 and 1890 census reports show them both living in Charles County. Frederick M. Nelson died on May 11, 1909, in Charles County and is buried in the Bumpy Oak Cemetery not far from his home. His tombstone bears the name Frederick Massena Nelson. Mary Nelson died on July 1, 1917, and is buried in the Herold family plot in Congressional Cemetery, Washington, D.C. Moreover, two surviving nieces of Mary A. Nelson, still living in 1974, stated in correspondence with historian James O. Hall, "she [Mary Nelson] never lived in Denver nor even went there.... We doubt that she ever went outside the District of Columbia or the state of Maryland." The Denver City directories for 1873 through 1875 do not list any person named Edward W. Nelson or Mary A. Nelson. Apparently the authors of *Dark Union* would have us accept as genuine the document in which Herold's sister does not know her husband's name, lives half a continent away from her actual abode, and wrongly believes herself a widow!

Later in the "interview," Mrs. Nelson is asked if she knew William A. Browning, Andrew Johnson's secretary and a principal figure in *Dark Union*'s alleged pork-for-cotton deals. Mrs. Nelson answers: "I've known him for many years and his brothers and sisters...."

William Browning had no sisters. He was one of nine boys born to Peregrine W. Browning and his wife Margaret Browning, both residents of the District of Columbia.

In response to another question Mrs. Nelson relates that William Browning married a girl from Maryland by the name of Priscilla Russell: "He got married just before the war.... She and Bill hit it off and they got married." Mrs. Nelson even talks of visiting with Browning's wife and calling her "Penny."

There is no record of William A. Browning's marriage among the District of Columbia marriage records. The 1860 census returns for the District of Columbia list a William W. Browning, age twenty-seven, born in 1833 in Maryland, and a Priscilla Browning, age twenty-five, also born in Maryland. William A. Browning was born in the District of Columbia (1835), not Maryland, and his middle initial was "A," not "W." According to Browning family genealogist Perry W. Browning, William Browning died a bachelor, having never married.[77] It appears whoever concocted the "interview" confused the William A. Browning of Washington with William W. Browning of Maryland.

In another part of the interview Mrs. Nelson is asked to tell what she knew about William Browning's death (Browning died on March 2, 1866). Mrs. Nelson answers: "Only what was told to me by his sister Kathleen.... Kathy told me that he was completely paralyzed and couldn't talk or move before he died." As stated above, William Browning did not have a sister. The 1840 and 1850 census records show no daughter in the Peregrine Browning family, nor does Peregrine Browning's will, probated in 1909, list a daughter. The only authenticated photograph of William Browning is a family picture taken in 1858. It shows mother, father, and nine boys—no girls.[78]



The Browning family, c. 1855. Front row, left to right: George, William, Theodore, Peregrine, Frank T., Arthur, Margaret, Livingston. Back row, left to right: Henry Clay, Warfield, Ringold Wood. *From Perry W. Browning, courtesy of James O. Hall.*

The "interview" continues, covering many topics. At one point Mrs. Nelson tells Andrew Potter that Davy (David Herold) and a young neighbor boy went down to southern Maryland the day of the assassination to see about a horse, and Davy got "roaring drunk." Subsequently Mrs. Nelson is quoted as saying, "You know, don't you, that Davy was arrested on the Sunday after the assassination?" So here we see the basis for the authors' claim that Herold was in southern Maryland on the night the president was killed, a claim we know to be false. The many errors in this "interview" of Mary A. Nelson leaves us no choice but to question its authenticity.

Another suspect document in the Neff-Guttridge Collection is an alleged interview of conspirator Michael O'Laughlen by Assistant Judge Advocate John A. Bingham. The interview is dated April 27, 1865, and takes place aboard the *Montauk*. At one point Bingham asks O'Laughlen, "Who else did you see in New York? Did you see Lewis Payne Powell there?" But at the time of the interview the government only knew Powell as "Paine," the name that appeared on his oath of allegiance.[79] His real name, Powell, did not become known until the third week of May, during his trial. That Bingham used the name "Powell" on April 27 points to this interview too being a fabrication.

ANDREW POTTER

According to autobiographical notes in the Neff-Guttridge Collection, Andrew Potter was the younger brother of Earl Potter. The claim is made that together the two men held important managerial positions in Lafayette Baker's NDP; Earl managed the organization while Andrew, who secured his job through Earl, was head of the Secret Service Division.[80]

By the end of the war, Guttridge and Neff tell us the brothers had amassed a considerable file on all sorts of people, including those in high positions within the United States government, and when they left the NDP in the summer of 1865 they managed to take their wartime files with them. In what purports to be an Andrew Potter autobiographical sketch located in the Neff-Guttridge Collection, it is stated that the brothers "merely changed hats and badges," joining a private agency known as the United States Detective Service.[81]

According to *Dark Union*, it was while working for the United States Detective Service that Andrew and his brother undertook their most important assignment. The tale goes as follows. After the deaths of several important people in government service, President Ulysses S. Grant secretly authorizes an investigation "to ascertain whether any of these deaths were from other than natural causes."[82] The man Grant allegedly asks to take charge of the investigation is former Union general Lew Wallace, one of the commissioners who sat in judgment of the Lincoln conspirators. Fieldwork is to be handled by the Potter brothers, and they travel about the country interviewing persons believed to have information relating to the deaths of the government officials. In the course of the interviews they came across information pertaining to the Lincoln assassination. The Potters, we are told, "logged more than two hundred interviews, over a four-year period," that, together with numerous other supporting documents and photographs, would eventually form the core of the Neff-Guttridge Collection.

At the end of their investigation the Potters turn their files over to Lew Wallace, who, after evaluating the information, concludes that the risk of proceeding with prosecution is too great. He writes Grant, "[W]ho knows what direction testimony might take and just what previously undisclosed secrets might be dislodged by an astute defense." Wallace recommends that "the report be sequestered," and Grant agrees.[83] As with the other documents in the Neff-Guttridge Collection, the Wallace letter is a typescript copy, the original having allegedly been destroyed.

Dark Union goes on to claim that, with the investigation completed, Wallace stores the report along with the Potter papers in the carriage house on his estate in Crawfordsville, Indiana. Here they remain until sometime in the 1920s when Andrew Potter decides to draw upon them for a book based on his life experiences. Potter forms a collaboration with an Indiana schoolteacher by the name of Edwin Stokes—Potter is to supply the information and Stokes to do the writing. But when Potter goes to access the papers he finds them in a deplorable condition. Neff's explanation runs as follows:



Neff-Guttridge Collection

The many faces of Andrew Potter. All these photographs in the Neff-Guttridge Collection are identified as "Andrew Potter."

Below: Pay roll ledger for Lafayette C. Baker's National Detective Police dated May 31, 1863. Of the thirty-seven employees listed, none is named Potter. *Secret Service Accounts, Record Group 110, entry 95, box 2, NARA.*



WE, the Subscribers, acknowledge to have received from John Potts, Disbursing Clerk, War Department, the sums opposite our respective names, in full of our salaries in the Provost Marshal's Office War Department for the Month ending May 31st, 1863.

NAMES.	CAPACITY.	AMOUNT. Annual Salary.	AMOUNT. Month. Dollars.	AMOUNT. Month. Cents.	AMOUNT TAXABLE.	AMOUNT OF TAX. 3 per cent.	NET AMOUNT.	SIGNATURES.
L. C. Baker	Provost Marshal	3600	300	00	250 00	7.50	292.50	L C Baker
Jona Brown	Deputy	1500	125	.	75 .	2.25	122.75	J. Brown
H. E. Stidfole	Clerk	1800	150	.	100 .	3.00	147.00	H E Stidfole
Henry W. French	"	1500	125	.	75 .	2.25	122.75	Henry W. French
N. T. Rossiter	"	1500	125	.	75 .	2.25	122.75	N T Rossiter
John S. Baker	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	John S. Baker
John Lee	Detective	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	John Lee
J. J. Camp	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	J J Camp
M. Trail	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	M Trail
S. M. Brant	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	S M Brant
J. S. Baker	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	J. S. Baker
Wm. H. Speers	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	Wm H Speers
T. T. Johnson	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	T T Johnson
John Odell	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	John Odell
Thos. Bowles	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	Thos Bowles
Thos. C. Speers	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	Thos C Speers
Jona Wright	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	J. Wright
S. K. Murdock	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	S K Murdock
Wm. S. Wilder	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	W S Wilder
Daniel Thayer	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	Daniel Thayer
L. B. Baker	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	L. B. Baker
Henry Phillips	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	Henry Phillips
P. B. Fauchelle	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	P. B. Fauchelle
Jacob Emerick	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	Jacob Emerick
N. Burnham	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	N Burnham
Wm. M. Raynor	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	Wm M Raynor
~~Robert Cowell~~	"							
A. F. Palmer	"	1200	100	.	50 .	1.50	98.50	A. F. Palmer
P. Bakeover	Captain	720	125	16	24 19	.73	144 43	P Bakeover
Chs. Peacock	Engineer	720	120	.	20 .	.60	119.40	Charles Peacock
Thomas Brant	Pilot	600	58	33	. .	. .	58.33	Thomas H Brant
Corwin Wilder	Deckhand	600	50	.	. .	. .	50.00	Corwin Wilder
Fredk. Moor	Messenger	240	20	.	. .	. .	20.00	Fredrick Moor
Ed. Wilson (Col.)	Cook	300	60	48	. .	. .	60.48	Ed his mark Wilson Witness H. W. French
Jos. Allen	Ostler	300	25	.	. .	. .	25.00	Jos his mark Allen " H. W. French
Barney Allen	"	300	25	.	. .	. .	25.00	Barney his mark Allen " H. W. French
Danl. Williams	"	300	25	.	. .	. .	25.00	Danl his mark Williams " H. W. French
Jos. Jackson	Bootblack	300	25	.	. .	. .	25.00	Jos his mark Jackson " H. W. French
			$3578	97	1719 19	51 57	3527 39	

Approved to be paid from Contingencies of the Army

By order of the Secretary of War.

Ed M Canby

> [T]here had been a fire in the carriage house and the roof leaked, making the records soggy, and pigeons had roosted over the records and a layer of pigeon manure covered them. Everything had to be mover [sic] to a farmhouse near Ladoga and the records washed and then transcribed. This was described by Herschberger in an interview with him; he had taken part in the operation and he said he walked the distance rather than ride on the wagon with the stinking records. The collection of papers which are in the Neff-Guttridge Collection are largely the transcriptions which have been t[h]oroughly researched since their acquisition.[84]

So Andrew hires a local woman, Susan Wade, to transcribe the records after which all of the originals are destroyed, leaving only typescripts. (Not a single word or punctuation mark is missing in the typescript copies, a remarkable piece of good luck considering the originals were subjected to fire, soaked by rains, and covered with highly corrosive pigeon manure!) Potter is not able to complete his project with Stokes, and having lost his considerable savings in the depression, he turns the papers over to an old friend, Gaylord McCluer, then heads west to Colorado where he dies three years later in 1932 at the age of ninety-two. Stokes dies in 1938 and the manuscript passes to Wallace Stokes, Edwin's cousin, who arranges with the "New Hoosier Press" of Terre Haute, Indiana, to print a two-volume limited edition of five hundred copies. In 1963 the press solicits orders but fails to complete the project. In 1968 Neff purchases the surviving Potter papers from an antiques dealer who has acquired part of the collection.[85]

Allegedly, then, it was Andrew Potter, through his investigations and interviews, who concluded that James W. Boyd was killed in Booth's place at the Garrett farm and that Booth escaped to India. Witness after witness is said to have provided Potter with enough scurrilous accusations to indict dozens of former Federal officials for complicity in a plot to kidnap Lincoln and the cover-up of his murder, and General Lew Wallace and President Ulysses S. Grant for obstruction of justice. Since the interview of Mary A. Nelson appears to be fabricated and the evidence shows that Booth was killed at the Garrett farm and Boyd died in Jackson, Tennessee, on January 1, 1866, the conclusions reached by Potter are clearly false. In fact, Potter's very existence is brought into question.

Accordingly, we undertook an intensive search of several record groups in the National Archives, where files pertaining to the persons and activities associated with Lafayette Baker and the


"William A. Browning."
Neff-Guttridge Collection


William A. Browning.
Courtesy Perry W. Browning

DR. BLACKBURN'S LETTER TO JUDAH BENJAMIN: FACT OR FICTION?

DURING THE CIVIL WAR, Kentucky physician Luke Pryor Blackburn twice traveled to Bermuda, collected effluvia-soaked bedding and clothing from yellow fever victims, packed them in trunks and had them shipped to Northern cities, hoping to infect thousands of soldiers and civilians with the deadly disease. Trial testimonies, newspaper accounts, and eyewitness statements corroborate Blackburn's attempt to launch bio-terrorist attacks. Historians, including Blackburn's official biographer, Dr. Nancy Disher Baird, have spent years sifting through voluminous primary source materials documenting Blackburn's actions.

While researching Blackburn, one of the primary subjects in my forthcoming book on covert operations in the Civil War, I came upon a startling quotation attributed to him by the authors of *Dark Union.* On page 20, Guttridge and Neff introduce a letter allegedly from Blackburn to Judah P. Benjamin, Confederate secretary of state, dated August 29, 1864, in which he expresses concern for the well-being of Northern prisoners: "If we hold them [Union prisoners] throughout the winter, at least 20,000 will die before June the first, 1865. We cannot justify this in the eyes of God or man." An astonishing sentiment from a man who by 1864 was engaged in an attempt to ship infected clothing north in an effort to kill the very men for whom he professed humane concern.

A source note on page 246 of *Dark Union* reads as follows: "For Luke Blackburn's concern over the plight of prisoners of war, see his letter to Judah Benjamin, August 29, 1864, *copy in the Filson Club, Louisville, Kentucky*" (emphasis added).

A query to the Filson Club in Louisville elicited a response stating that the document was not housed among the Filson's vast collections. Dr. David E. Vancil, head of the Rare Book and Special Collections Department, Indiana State University Library, graciously sent me a copy of the typed transcript of the reputed Blackburn letter, located in the Neff-Guttridge Collection. This is accom-

NDP reside. These files include all record groups that might be expected to contain documents pertaining to Lafayette Baker's day-to-day operation: the index of the Turner-Baker papers (Record Group 94); Lafayette C. Baker's Secret Service Accounts (Record Group 110, entry 95, seven boxes); the L.C. Baker Papers (Record Group 110, entry 105, four boxes); the yearly index to letters received by the Secretary of War, 1865 (Record Group 107, M495); the Union Provost Marshal's File of Papers Relating to Individual Civilians (M345, and index M416); correspondence and accounts relating to scouts, guides, spies, and detectives (Record Group 110, entry 31 and entry 36); unbound telegrams of the Secretary of War (Record Group 107, M504); Union Volunteer Records; and Military Records in the Indiana State Archives. In addition, U. S. Census Reports for Virginia (1840, 1850 and 1860), Indiana (1870), and Colorado (1930)—the states where Potter allegedly was born, lived, and died—were searched. As a control, the records were also explored for known individuals such as Lafayette Baker, and NDP detectives Luther B. Baker and John F. Baker.[86]


"Samuel A. Mudd."
Neff-Guttridge Collection


Samuel A. Mudd.
Courtesy Richard D. Mudd

Every single search proved negative, except for the control searches, which produced numerous references to the control individuals. Not one reference to Andrew (or Earl) Potter was found. While the mysterious Potter brothers might have "spirited" their own files away when they left government service, they could not have taken the files of other offices and agencies in the federal government. And yet no record could be found of these important men who *Dark Union* tells us ran Lafayette Baker's operation for three years! Furthermore, as part of his cover during the war, Potter allegedly received a commission from Indiana governor Oliver P. Morton.[87] A search for his commission was made of the military records in both the National Archives and the Indiana State Archives.[88] *Once again, no record was found.*

There is more. Five separate pay roll disbursement records for the years 1862-1863 were recently discovered at the National Archives in Record Group 110, entry 95, Secret Service Accounts. These accounts list the name of each employee of Baker's NDP along with their position, pay, and signatures. The number of detectives ranges from a low of twenty-one to a high of twenty-five. The name "Potter" is not among those listed.

In Andrew's "autobiography" in the Potter papers there are listed twenty-four men who supposedly served in the "Detective Division" under his supervision.[89] None of the twenty-four names appears on the pay roll disbursement records, and no reference was found to any of the twenty-four in the official L.C. Baker papers in Record Group 110, entry 105. In a separate document in the Neff-Guttridge Collection, "William P. Earle,"

---

panied by a statement that in June 1932 Mrs. Ann Mohler made the typescript for the Filson Club from the original letter located in the "War Department Archives in Washington, D.C." Neither Mrs. Mohler nor the Blackburn typescript are known to the Filson archivists. A search of RG 109 of the War Department Collection of Confederate Records; RG 94, the records of the Adjutant General's Office; and the *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* failed to produce the letter.


Kentucky Historical Association
Dr. Luke Pryor Blackburn

Further queries to Dr. Vancil were troubling. Abandoning the citation in *Dark Union*, Neff now claimed that he must have obtained the transcript from Blackburn's biographer, Dr. Nancy Baird. After searching through her notes and documents, Dr. Baird said that she was not the source. She added, "I think if I had ever seen a letter from LPB [Blackburn] to JB [Benjamin] that showed concern for the enemy, it would have sent up lots of red flags." *Dark Union* co-author Leonard Guttridge told me he knew nothing of the transcription's provenance. Dr. Vancil informed me that after discussing the document further with Neff, Neff told him he could not remember where he found the letter.

The question arises, did the original document ever exist? If so, where is it, and who furnished the transcript contained in the Neff-Guttridge Collection? After many years of research into the life and activities of Dr. Luke Blackburn, I am forced to conclude there is no credible evidence the letter ever existed.

—Contributed by Jane A. Singer, Venice, California

said to be a National Detective Police agent, is described as James W. Boyd's "control" officer.[90] As with the other individuals mentioned throughout the Potter papers, William B. Earle is missing from Baker's pay roll records and papers.

We can only conclude that the Andrew Potter of *Dark Union* does not exist outside of the Neff-Guttridge Collection. He is unique among even the most secret of secret service agents. It is simply beyond belief that so important an individual could go through life without leaving a trace of his existence in any public record. And if there is no Andrew Potter, the Potter papers, the core of the Neff-Guttridge Collection, cannot be genuine.

CONCLUSION

The overwhelming weight of evidence shows that the body in the Garrett barn was that of John Wilkes Booth. This evidence comes from a large body of primary documents available in public archives and whose provenance and authenticity are well established.[91] The bulk of the evidence that claims Booth escaped comes from secondary sources that have been found only in private collections and whose provenance is lacking. Many of these documents suffer from internal inconsistencies and errors of fact that call into question their authenticity. Leading the list are the papers of the fictitious Andrew Potter.

The conclusions presented in *Dark Union*, based on a collection of typed transcriptions of alleged original documents that no longer exist, cannot be accepted as having serious merit. In the end, *Dark Union* is a house of cards built on a foundation of questionable material. It quickly crumbles when the slightest wind of query strikes it. ☐

EDWARD STEERS, JR., is an acknowledged expert on the Lincoln assassination. He is author of *His Name Is Still Mudd* (1977), *Blood on the Moon: The Assassination of Abraham Lincoln* (2001), and *The Trial: The Assassination of President Lincoln and the Trial of the Conspirators* (2003).

JOAN L. CHACONAS specializes in the history of Washington D.C. and of the Surratt family. She has served as president of the Lincoln Group of the District of Columbia and the Surratt Society. Her discovery of George Atzerodt's "Lost Confession" in 1977 was a major contribution to the history of Lincoln's assassination.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: We would like to express our appreciation to James O. Hall for allowing us access to his extensive files and for providing invaluable advice. We also acknowledge and thank William C. Davis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute; John Y. Simon, Southern Illinois University; William Hanchett, Professor of History Emeritus, San Diego State University; Lynda Crist, Rice University; and Betty Ownsbey for their generous help and advice. We also wish to thank Michael Musick, Subject Area Expert, U.S. Civil War, NARA; Dr. Alan January, Indiana State Archives; and Richard Enochs for their help in document searches. We are especially indebted to David E. Vancil, head of the Rare Book and Special Collections Division of the Cunningham Memorial Library at Indiana State University, and his assistant Dennis Vetrovec for their invaluable help in providing materials from the Neff-Guttridge Collection. We would like to acknowledge Ray A. Neff and Leonard Guttridge for making their materials available, as well as discussing with us various aspects of their book.

NOTES:

1. Robert H. Fowler, "Was Stanton Behind Lincoln' Murder?" *Civil War Times*, vol. 3, no. 5 (August 1961): pp. 6-23.
2. Fowler, "Was Stanton Behind Lincoln's Murder?" 7.
3. David Balsiger and Charles E. Sellier, Jr., *The Lincoln Conspiracy* (Los Angeles, 1977), p. 8.
4. In one instance alone, Neff purchased the surviving papers of an alleged NDP detective named Andrew G. Potter that contained over two hundred separate interviews of major importance. These interviews are all typescript copies allegedly made from originals that no longer exist. Among Neff's other acquisitions are 1,500 tintypes, ambrotypes, daguerrerotypes, cartes de visite, and glass plates. See *Dark Union*, 16, 195. In addition to alleged typescript copies of documents, the Neff-Guttridge collection contains several handwritten items of doubtful provenance, and copies of several well-known authentic documents.
5. Among the many items obtained by Neff is a collection of documents known as the "Chaffey Papers." Included is an original (holograph) letterbook of James and John Chaffey whose contents date from 1831 to 1838 and have nothing to do with the Civil War or Lincoln's assassination.
6. Otto Eisenschiml, *Why Was Lincoln Murdered?* (Boston, 1937) and Otto Eisenschiml, *In the Shadow of Lincoln's Death* (New York, 1940).
7. Balsiger and Sellier, Jr., *The Lincoln Conspiracy*.
8. William C. Davis, "Behind the Lines," *Civil War Times Illustrated* (November 1981): p. 26.
9. William C. Davis, "Behind the Lines. Caveat Emptor," *Civil War Times Illustrated* (August 1977): 33-37; William C. Davis, "Behind the Lines. 'The Lincoln Conspiracy'— Hoax?," *Civil War Times Illustrated* (November, 1977): 47-49; William C. Davis, "Behind the Lines," *Civil War Times Illustrated* (November 1981): 26-28.
10. Davis, "Behind the Lines" (November 1981) : p. 26.
11. Davis, "Behind the Lines. Caveat Emptor" (August 1977): p. 37.
12. Leonard Guttridge's prior works include *Icebound:The Jeannette Expedition's Quest for the North Pole* (Naval Institute Press, 1986), *Mutiny: A History of Naval Insurrection* (Naval Institute Press, 1992), and *The Ghosts of Cape Sabine: The Harrowing True Story of the Greely Expedition* (Putnam Publishing Group, 1996).
13. In 1955 Twentieth Century Fox produced a movie starring Clifton Webb about a corpse dressed as a British officer placed off the coast of France with invasion plans as a brilliant scheme to fool the Nazis. Ronald Neame, dir., *The Man Who Never Was*, with Clifton Webb and Gloria Grahame, Twentieth Century Fox, 1955.
14. *Dark Union*, 137-38.
15. *Ibid.*, 144.
16. *Ibid.*, 175.
17. Guttridge and Neff repeat the discredited myth that Booth married a woman by the name of Izola D'Arcy Mills in 1859 and placed her and their daughter Ogarita on a thirty-six-acre farm near Harper's Ferry, Virginia.
18. *Dark Union*, 3.
19. *Ibid.*, 210.
20. *Ibid.*, 3.
21. *Ibid.*, 225.
22. *Ibid.*, 159.
23. According to the Copyright Record Books located in the Library of Congress, "on 5 February 1868, one John H. Surratt appeared at the Clerk's Office of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and deposited the 'title' for each of

three photographs, claiming proprietor." Letter to Joan L. Chaconas, 12 June, 1991, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

24. D. Mark Katz, *Witness to an Era: The Life and Photography of Alexander Gardner* (Nashville, Tennessee, 1991), p. 163.
25. Edward Steers, Jr., "Otto Eisenschiml, Samuel Mudd and the 'Switched' Photograph," *Lincoln Herald*, vol. 100, no. 4 (Winter 1998): p. 174; Lafayette C. Baker, *History of the United States Secret Service* (Philadelphia, 1867), p. 526. For a full discussion of the various reward posters see James L. Swanson, "Reward & Other Broadsides of the Lincoln Assassination," *Antique Trader Weekly* (April 11, 1990).
26. Champ Clark, ed., *The Civil War: The Assassination* (Alexandria, Virginia, 1989), p. 93; D. Mark Katz, *Witness to an Era*, p. 155; James L. Swanson and Daniel R. Weinberg, *Lincoln's Assassins. Their Trial and Execution* (Santa Fe, New Mexico, 2001), p. 50.
27. Theodore Roscoe, *The Web of Conspiracy: The Complete Story of the Men Who Murdered Abraham Lincoln* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1959), following 274.
28. *Dark Union*, 186.
29. Statement of George A. Atzerodt in Laurie Verge, ed., *From War Department Files* (Clinton, Maryland, 1980), pp. 67-70.
30. Testimony of John Fletcher, Poore, I: 328.
31. Testimony of John Fletcher, Poore, I: 330.
32. Poore, I: 335.
33. Testimony of John Lloyd, Poore, I: 115-34.
34. Testimony of John Lloyd, Poore, I: 115-34.
35. *Dark Union*, 174.
36. Poore, I: 310.
37. Statement of Willie S. Jett, NARA, M599, Reel 4, Frames 0086-99.
38. Poore, I: 308.
39. Poore, I: 309.
40. Testimony of Willie Jett, Poore, I: 310.
41. Terry Alford, ed., *John Wilkes Booth. A Sister's Memoir by Asia Booth Clarke* (Jackson, Mississippi, 1996), p. 45. Charles Dawson, a clerk at the National Hotel in Washington where Booth stayed when in town, confirmed that John Wilkes Booth had "india ink initials on his wrist which I frequently noticed." See James O. Hall, "Unsolved Mysteries Revisited," in *The Body in the Barn: The Controversy Over the Death of John Wilkes Booth* (Clinton, Maryland, 1993),p. 16.
42. Statement of David E. Herold, NARA, M-599, reel 4, frames 0442-0485.
43. Finis L. Bates, *Escape and Suicide of John Wilkes Booth* (Memphis, Tennessee, 1907).
44. Lloyd Lewis "The Glory-to-God Man," *The Century Magazine*, vol. 116, no. 4 (August 1928): pp. 445-50.
45. We are especially indebted to William C. Davis and James O. Hall for sharing their research, much of which goes well beyond the evidence that appeared in Davis' editorials in *Civil War Times Illustrated.*
46. *Daily Press and Times* (Nashville, Tennessee), 12 January 1866, page 2, column 2.
47. Robert H. Cartmell, diary entry, 1 January 1866, Manuscript Division, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, Tennessee.
48. Transcript taken from the journal of George H. Boyd, son of James W. Boyd. Copy in the James O. Hall Research Center and Library, Surratt House and Museum, Clinton, Maryland.
49. *Dark Union*, 190
50. According to the U. S. Census reports for 1870, George H. Boyd was twelve years old at the time of his father's death.
51. *Dark Union*, 80.
52. *Ibid.*, 80.
53. *Ibid.*, 161.
54. James W. Boyd, letter to Caroline A. Boyd, 6 July 1864, in possession of Boyd family, copy in James O. Hall Research Center, Surratt House and Museum, Clinton, Maryland.
55. Appendix Four, *James W. Boyds*, Neff-Gutridge Collection, Rare Book and Special Collections, Cunningham Memorial Library, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Indiana, 536-52.
56. Neff, *James W. Boyds*, 544.
57. *Ibid.*, 542-43.
58. *Dark Union*, 175.
59. The version in *Dark Union* differs slightly from the version in the Neff-Guttridge Collection, where Conness is quoted as saying, "Oh my God, Oh my God."
60. *Dark Union*, 175-76.
61. Grace Julian Clarke, letter to Claude Bowers, 22 July 1926, Manuscript Department, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
62. Appendix Four, *George Julian's Diary*, Neff-Guttridge Collection. See also *Dark Union*, Sources on Notes, Chapter 13, p. 258: "Claude Bowers, preparing his book, The Tragic Era, borrowed the 1865 diary and photographed its pages without Grace Clark's [sic] knowledge."
63. Appendix Four, *George Julian's Diary*, Neff-Guttridge Collection.
64. Although the explanatory document refers to the presence of both Guttridge and Neff, Guttridge stated in a telephone conversation with one of us (E. S., Jr., October 15, 2003) that he was not in attendance at the Smith interview or during the transcription of the alleged Smith copy.
65. Neff-Guttridge Collection.
66. "George W. Julian's Journal—The Assassination of Lincoln," *Indiana Magazine of History* vol. 11, no. 4 (December 1915).
67. Appendix Four. "George Julian's Diary," Neff-Guttridge Collection.
68. Mabel M. Herbert, letter to Charles Cooney, 12 September 1977, photocopy in authors' files.
69. In addition to a search of the Julian and Bowers papers, the curator in charge of the Claude Bowers papers wrote the following: "we keep very complete-use files and we have no record of Mr. Neff making use of our materials, either in person or through correspondence." Saundra Taylor, letter to James O. Hall, 26 May 1977, Manuscript Collection, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
70. Statement of Richard Stuart, NARA, M599, reel 6, frame 0209.
71. Statement of William Garrett, NARA, M619, reel 457, frames 0499-0525.
72. Testimony of Everton J. Conger, Poore, I: 312-322.
73. Statement of Luther B. Baker, aboard the *Montauk*, April 26, 1865.
74. Testimony of Luther B. Baker, Johnson Impeachment investigation, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 478-90.
75. Statement of John M. Garrett, NARA, M619, reel 457, frames 0500-0525.
76. *Dark Union*, 295. I am indebted to historian James O. Hall for providing me with his analysis of this alleged interview.
77. Personal communication from Perry W. Browning to James O. Hall, 1974.
78. Photocopy in the James O. Hall Research Center, Surratt House and Museum, Clinton, Maryland.
79. Betty J. Ownsbey, *Alias "Paine"* (Jefferson, N.C., 1993).
80. *Dark Union*, 14
81. *Ibid.*, 194.
82. *Ibid.*, 195.
83. Lew Wallace, letter to Ulysses S. Grant, 7 February 1877, Neff-Guttridge Collection, Cunningham Memorial Library, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Indiana. This letter is a typescript copy

of alleged original. Queries to Professor John Y. Simon, editor of the Ulysses S. Grant Papers, Ulysses S. Grant Association, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University, concerning correspondence between Grant and Wallace that might corroborate Wallace's alleged role in heading up a private investigation ordered by Grant, proved negative. Dr. Simon wrote: "Wallace wrote to Grant three times in 1872 about a diplomatic appointment to Bolivia. He wrote again on August 13, 1873, to send Grant a copy of his novel, *The Fair God*, and he wrote in January 1875 about a judicial appointment. Finally, in December 1876, he was in Florida observing the contested election and telegraphed Grant about the vote count. Following this alleged 1877 letter, he did not write to Grant for years. In other words, there is nothing that Wallace wrote in this period that even vaguely supports the unusual item you faxed to me."

84. Undated typed statement of Ray A. Neff entitled "The Potter Papers" in the Neff-Guttridge Collection, Rare Book and Special Collections Department, Cunningham Library, Indiana State University.
85. Ray A. Neff, *Valley of the Shadow* (Terre Haute, Indiana, 1989), p. 220; personal communication, Ray A. Neff, August 12, 2003.
86. The authors are indebted to Michael Musick, Subject Area Expert, U. S. Civil War, NARA, for his expert assistance in these searches.
87. In 1863 Andrew Potter was allegedly sent to Indiana to investigate contraband activity in that state. The authors of *Dark Union* claim that Stanton persuaded Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton to confer a commission on Andrew Potter in the Indiana militia to protect him if captured by Confederates; no military record of Potter can be found in the Civil War records in the National Archives or in the military records of the Indiana State Archives.
88. The authors are indebted to Dr. Alan January, Indiana State Archives, for conducting this search.
89. Andrew Potter, Untitled autobiography, undated, Neff-Guttridge Collection, Rare Book and Special Collections Department, Cunningham Memorial, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Indiana.
90. Appendix Four, *James W. Boyds*, Neff-Gutrridge Collection, undated.
91. *The Body in the Barn. The Controversy Over the Death of John Wilkes Booth* (Clinton, Maryland, 1993).

Legendary Arms, Inc.
P.O. Box #197, Califon, NJ 07830
PH: (908) 832-0185 • Fax: (908) 832-0812
Special Sale Items -- This Month Only

K002-- Arkansas Toothpick **$20.00**
B004 -- Springfield Bayonet & Scabbard **$37**
L010 -- C.W. Leather Holster **$18.00**
L006 -- C.W. Cartridge Box w/Tins & Strap **$50.00 + $5.00 S/H**
C026 -- Officer's Embroidered White Gauntlets (Specify Branch) **$80.00**
C019 -- Officer's Silk Sash **$45.00**
C015 -- C.W. White Muslin 4-button Shirt (S, M, L) **$20.00**
L007 -- Cap Pouch **$12.00**

Include $4.00 shipping and handling for one item, and $3.00 for each additional item. AZ,NY,NJ,OH,WI residents, please include applicable state sales tax. MC/VS/Amex/Discover Cards accepted. Check and Money Orders accepted. Send $5.00 for 24-page color catalog of reproduction swords, knives, bayonets, period clothing & miscellaneous accessories.

THE BLOODY CRUCIBLE OF COURAGE
— a groundbreaking achievement in Civil War scholarship

"Here, for the first time under one cover, is the story of the evolution of weaponry and tactics in the Civil War era that puts those military developments in historical perspective. **Mr. Nosworthy challenges a host of misconceptions that have clouded our understanding of America's bloodiest conflict.** I have learned much and only wish that *The Bloody Crucible of Courage* had been available years ago."
–**Gordon C. Rhea**, author of *Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26 – June 3, 1864*



For readers eager to learn how the Civil War was really fought, and the most dedicated re-enacters, acclaimed military historian Brent Nosworthy explains the doctrine, technology, and actual battlefield experience in a frontal attack on the many myths about how the North and South fought. No other book covers the variety of Civil War combat methods like this single monumental volume.

"As military re-enacters, we study with great interest the military tactics of the time period we re-enact. Brent Nosworthy has given us a valuable reference, citing not only drill manuals, but also first person accounts of how they were used. **This should prove to be a most valuable resource to re-enacters** in particular, and to the student of military history in general. **I highly recommend it.**"
–**Leonidas Jones**, Lt. Colonel, Liberty Greys, 6th Battalion, 1st Division, Army of Northern Virginia

768 pages • Cloth, $35.00
Over seventy diagrams, maps, and period illustrations

Carroll & Graf Publishers
An Imprint of the Avalon Publishing Group

Available from all chain, independent, and online booksellers


THE ILLUSTRATED
BATTLE CRY of FREEDOM
THE CIVIL WAR ERA
WINNER OF THE PULITZER PRIZE
James M. McPherson
WINNER OF THE PULITZER PRIZE FOR HISTORY

A Beautifully Illustrated Edition of the Definitive History of the Civil War

"Bright with details and fresh quotations, solid with carefully-arrived-at conclusions, it must surely be, of the 50,000 books written on the Civil War, the finest compression of that national paroxysm ever fitted between two covers."

—*Los Angeles Times Book Review*

A must-have purchase—and a magnificent gift—for everyone who has ever been swept away by this classic history of the Civil War. And for those new to *Battle Cry of Freedom,* this lavishly illustrated edition will be a revelation in words and images.

FEATURES:

- More than 700 illustrations, including a hundred and fifty in full color, ranging from rare contemporary photographs and period cartoons to etchings, woodcuts, and paintings
- 24 full-color maps depicting the major battles of the war
- Extensive captions (some 40,000 words in all), many of which add new information and interpretations that significantly enhance the text

To preview the book—including sample pages, maps, and an interview with James M. McPherson—Visit www.battlecryoffreedom.com

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Available in bookstores everywhere

BRENT NOSWORTHY

THE RIFLE MUSKET

In previous articles "Small Arms and the Battlefield" (*N&S*, vol. 6, #6) and "Where Have All the Bullets Gone?" (*N&S*, vol.6, #7), Brent Nosworthy looked at the debate on small arms and tactics that preceded the American Civil War, and at the performance of the rifle musket on the battlefields of 1861-1865. In this concluding article he considers the tactical changes that occurred during those years, and their relationship to the new small arms.

RECENT ANALYSIS HAS SHOWN that after the introduction of the Prussian needlegun and French "stem gun" in the 1840s a progressive cadre among the European military began to explore the need for new battlefield tactics. The Prussian military in particular stressed that in future battles firefights would take place in the six hundred to one thousand yard range, and that battalion-sized columns would have to be replaced by smaller, company formations. It was also thought that cavalry charges would no longer be viable, and to remain useful cavalry would have to become "mounted infantry." In France and Britain a very thorough training regimen, known as the "scientific method of firing," was established to compensate for the low initial muzzle velocity of the new rifle musket and to promote accurate long-range fire. However, by the mid-1850s Napoleon III had abandoned this school of thought and called for a return to traditional formations and methods, especially the quickly delivered bayonet charge in which infantry abstained from firing during the assault. Opinion among Americans was divided. Captain John Gibbon, who taught artillery tactics at West Point, felt that the new small arms had been over-rated and that their introduction would produce less change than predicted; Captain Cadmus Wilcox, a small arms expert, demurred.

Although successful French infantry charges during the Crimean War and the Italian War of 1859 seemed to vindicate the French emperor's tactical conservatism, this did not end the debate. On the eve of the Civil War, there were advocates of both types of tactics in America. One might therefore expect to find examples of each in the numerous engagements that occurred during the conflict of 1861-1865.

However, the scientific method of firing, with its emphasis on deliberate aiming and careful range estimation, was almost entirely absent from the Civil War battlefield. In 1862 Union authorities did republish Captain Henry Heth's *A System of Target Practice*, a translation of the French *Instruction provisoire sur le tir* that explained in detail how to estimate ranges and fire the rifle musket "scientifically."[1] The system was effectively utilized by both northern and southern sharpshooters. However, these men fought not in formations but *individually*, were generally concealed, always chose who to fire at, and when. They had also spent months laboriously mastering the "scientific" system of estimating range accurately.

There is little evidence that the mass of Civil War infantry used such techniques. A search of the *Official Records* in CD-ROM format by this author yielded only two reports mentioning men adjusting their "guidesights" or "leaf sights" (i.e., backsights) for range. Colo-

AND ASSOCIATED TACTICS

nel Joseph R. Hawley of the 7th Connecticut Infantry reported that during an engagement at Olustee, Florida, on February 20, 1864, his men first set their backsights for six hundred yards, then for four hundred, producing a sufficiently accurate fire to drive back the enemy.[2] Hawley also mentioned instructing his "marksmen" to adjust their "leaf sights" to hit at five hundred yards.[3] These are the only such references found in the 128 volumes of the *Official Records*, which suggests that men in formation rarely adjusted their backsights. It also to some degree vindicates Napoleon III's argument that under the stress of combat the ordinary soldier armed with the rifle musket could not be counted on to perform all the steps required for long-range accurate fire. The noisy and aggressive French-style attack, with its reliance on the bayonet, seems to have fared better on American soil.

At the beginning of the war, infantry on both sides were issued almost identical tactical instructions. General P.G.T. Beauregard's General Orders No. 41 of July 17, 1861, proclaimed that:

> Great reliance will be placed on the bayonet at the proper juncture, but above all it is enjoined upon officers and men to withhold their fire until directed....In firing, each man should take aim, and never discharge his piece without a distinct object in full view.[4]

Preparing his men for the stubborn fight that was sure to come, Major General George B. McClellan issued similar instructions just before his army's advance up the Peninsula toward Richmond in 1862. As they neared the enemy, the infantry must:

> Preserve in battle perfect coolness and confidence, the sure forerunners of success. They must keep well together; throw away no shots, but aim carefully and low, and above all things rely upon the bayonet.[5]

Union generals such as Sherman, Burnside and Rosecrans, and Confederate generals such as Longstreet, Magruder and Hardee, issued similar injunctions throughout the war in a series of circulars and general orders. These tactical instructions can be reduced to the following elements: withhold fire until presented with a good target; aim low with deliberation; and, when circumstances permit, charge with lowered bayonet.

Officers on both sides also emphasized the importance of self-control, discipline, and willingness to obey orders. Just prior to the Confederate counterattack that precipitated the Seven Days battles, General James Longstreet stressed that his men, especially those entering battle for the first time, must "preserve a quiet demeanor and self-possessed, temper." Although admitting that the "fiery noise of battle [appears] indeed most terrifying," the recruits would find the needed strength if they realized that they could rely on their fellow soldiers and did not lose sight of their comrades.[6] Brigadier General James G. Blunt, commander of the I Corps of the Union Trans-Mississippi Army of the Frontier, offered similar words of advice before the Battle of Prairie Grove, Arkansas, on Decem-

Below: Bombproofs, trenches, and traverses are seen in this interior view of Fort Sedgwick, Virginia. The landscape of war had changed forever. *Library of Congress* ber 7, 1862. The men were not to shout, but to keep quiet in order to hear orders; neither were they to fall victim to "idle rumors or the words of unauthorized persons"—useful advice as it was not unknown for a successful line to waver and break because of a false rumor that they had been flanked.

The various instructions and circulars also cautioned soldiers against firing prematurely, firing because others around them started to do so, or because they happened to see the enemy.[7] As late as May 1864, for example, Major General James B. McPherson found it necessary to explain to his men that:

> It is not the rapid, continuous roll of musketry, delivered in a hasty manner, which shakes an enemy, checks his advance, and drives him from the field, but the accuracy with which it is given.[8]

At first glance, McPherson's instructions appear to suggest that he and his officers stressed deliberately aimed fire and accurate range estimation, i.e., the "scientific method of firing." However, this advice was in the context of *volley* rather than individual fire. A few months later the Army of the Potomac's Major General Gouverneur Kemble Warren in Circular No. 109 explained that "one good volley well put in will render the enemy's line powerless."[9]


Frank Leslie's Illustrated Weekly, September 21, 1861

Sharpshooters decided who to shoot at, when to shoot, and at what range. This was not true of the bulk of Civil War infantry, who fought in formations.

EUROPEAN SYSTEMS OF AIMING

De Brack (1830's) *(paces)*	Lallemand (1820) *(yards)*	Instruction (1822) *(toises)*
—	320 .... 5' above	—
195 .. hat plume	200-250 ... 1-3' above	90-100 .... upper head dress
170 .. head	140-200 ... head	70-90 ...... head
130 .. shoulders	100-140 ... shoulders	50-70 ...... shoulders
100 .. chest	0-100 .... middle body	0-50 .... chest

Duane (1808) *(yards)*	Guide officier *(toises)*
600 ..... "above enemy battalion"	—
400 ..... 1.5 feet above head	—
300 ..... hat	100-120 ...... head
200 ..... middle of body	90-100 ...... neck
100 ..... knees	80-90 ...... chest
—	60-80 ...... belt
—	30-40 ...... feet

There was considerable variation regarding what type of volley should be used, however. In order that each volley deliver a substantial punch, some officers believed that half of each battalion (rather than individual companies) should fire at a time; Rosecrans, for example, preferred "fire by wings,"[10] where the left and right half of the battalion fired alternately. General Warren, on the other hand, ordered that fire be delivered by alternate ranks.[11] Many officers wanted their men to avoid "file fire," even though this had often been the favored method of delivering fire during the Napoleonic Wars. (File fire was that which proceeded two-man file by file from right to left along a company, and then devolved into individual fire.) Beauregard argued in a series of circulars issued to the soldiers of the Army of the Mississippi during 1862 and 1863 that file fire "excited the troops and renders their subsequent control difficult," and recommended the use of *fire by wing* or *fire by company* instead.[12] Testifying before the military commission set up to investigate the evacuation of Maryland Heights and subsequent surrender of Harper's Ferry during Lee's Maryland Campaign, Major William H. Baird explained that it was "almost impossible" to get inexperienced troops to fire by volleys when under fire; regardless of the officers' efforts, they usually fired by file instead.[13]

Volley fire, by definition, is inimical to aimed fire. In volley fire the officer, not the individual soldier, chooses the moment to fire. The soldier can do little but point his weapon more or less toward the enemy. It appears that the overwhelming majority of officers on both sides not only rejected the method of firing that had been specifically created for the new rifle muskets, but returned to a system that had been introduced during the mid-eighteenth century. This was the practice of getting the men to "aim low," pointing their weapons at a particular point on their target's body. The exact point would depend upon the range. The chart[14] opposite shows various European systems of aiming.

A "toise" is over two yards, so French infantry was instructed to aim slightly higher than their British counterparts. Americans during the Civil War seemed to follow British practice. Rosecrans recommended that troops aim at the enemy's shins when firing[15] while Hindman's instructions ordered the men to fire at their knees.[16] In a circular issued to the Army of the Frontier in January 1864, Colonel William Phillips urged his men to fire at the knees of the enemy infantry. However, if the enemy were on horseback, the men were to fire at the rider's lower body.[17]

Although there was general agreement that the men should fire at "short range," there was no unanimity as to what was meant by this term. In a letter to Brigadier General E. B. Brown dated October 6, 1864, Rosecrans prescribed that men withhold their fire until the distance between adversaries had been reduced to a "deadly range."[18] A few days earlier, in a letter to Colonel John McNeil at Rolla, Rosecrans appears to have provided an empirical definition of a "deadly range," calling for his men to reserve their fire "till they can see the whites of the enemy's eyes."[19] Confederate major general T.C. Hindman, in his instructions to the First Corps of the Trans-Mississippi Army, told his men to "wait till you are certainly within the range of your gun, then single out your man, take deliberate aim."[20] This, however, was a far cry from the accurate estimation of range required by the "scientific" method of firing.


Frank Leslie's Pictorial History of the War, 1862

Artillery supports an attacking column. The low-lying smoke that shrouds the defenders' line indicates that they have opened fire at long range—probably with little effect.

CAUSE OF WOUNDS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, MAY - JULY, 1864[24]

	Wilderness	Spotsylvania	North Anna	June 15-30	July
Shell	231	712	95	639	435
Cannon-shot	6	37	3	38	4
Bullet	7,046	8,218	959	6,693	2,538
Bayonet	4	14	1	3	14
Sword	2	1	—	1	1

EDGED WEAPONS REVISITED

Many historians consider the continued dependence upon pre-rifle era tactics to have been absolute folly, an absurd holdover from a time when less effective weapons had made reliance upon such crude methods unavoidable. The use of edged weapons—the infantry bayonet, the cavalry sabre—in particular is singled out as obviously obsolete, and those who advocated their use are often derided as backward. Such criticism, however, fails to address how soldiers act in combat and how edged weapons were actually employed on the battlefield.

The Bayonet

The mention of the bayonet on the Civil War battlefield often conjures up an image of a long series of futile charges involving excessive loss of life. The brave but ultimately hopeless attack of the Irish Brigade against Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg, and Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg, are among the examples that come to mind. We also occasionally encounter in some veteran memoirs a theme that has been picked up by a number of modern Civil War historians. Confederate staff officer Heros von Borcke, for example, observed:

> accounts of bayonet-fights are current after every engagement, and are frequently embodied in subsequent "histories," so called; but as far as my experience goes, recalling all the battles in which I have borne a part, bayonet-fights rarely if ever occur, and exist only in the imagination.[21]

In his memoirs Captain John William De Forest of the 12th Connecticut Infantry recalled that early in the war his men had yet to learn that bayonet fighting "occurs mostly in newspapers and other works of fiction."[22]

Modern historians who question the wisdom of relying upon the bayonet often cite the widespread absence of bayonet wounds as conclusive proof of the weapon's ineffectiveness. At first glance, some compelling evidence appears to substantiate this argument. After an engagement in the Lookout Valley (October 28-29, 1863) that had been characterized as "a hand-to-hand contest," Daniel G. Brinton, the medical director of the Army of the Cumberland, expected to find bayonet wounds among the killed and wounded. But there were none.[23] Surgeon Thomas A. McParlin, Brinton's counterpart in the Army of the Potomac, came to a similar conclusion in his own report a year later. (See table above.)

"Bayonet Fighting" versus "Bayonet Charges"

The infrequency with which the bayonet was used to inflict wounds did not diminish the weapon's standing in the eyes of professional officers, who had long realized that its effectiveness was not to be measured by the casualties it inflicted. Writing before late nineteenth century historians created the myth that the long string of British successes against the French arose from the superiority of British firepower, British general John Mitchel, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, declared that the single most important factor that accounted for these victories was:

> a charge of bayonets,—a thing that hurt nobody, but was out of the conventional rules of European warfare,—invariably put the whole to flight, though generally with what might be deemed a trifling loss. This was the constant tale from Vimiera to Waterloo, whenever the British were the attacking party....[25]

Many modern military historians have failed to appreciate the psychological impact of edged weapons and have confused the idea of "bayonet charges" with "bayonet fighting," terms that are often used interchangeably. A "bayonet fight" properly refers to hand-to-hand combat in which individuals attempt to stab their opponents with lunging bayonets or perhaps club them with their muskets. A "bayonet charge," on the other hand, is a formal tactic whereby infantrymen "charge bayonets," that is, extend their muskets in front of them and rush upon the enemy, threatening to "run in" whoever stands up to them. However, unaware that the power of the bayonet lay in its psychological impact, most soldiers—recruits and officers alike—thought that a "bayonet charge" was only the prelude to "bayonet fighting." These expectations were heightened as the men spent hours in bayonet drill learning how to block an opponent's thrust and execute their own lunge.

How a Bayonet Charge Works

When properly orchestrated, physical acts can have a momentary positive effect on troop morale. Cavalry officers long knew, for example, that the simple act of drawing one's sabre and standing up in the stirrups with outstretched weapon buoyed a cavalryman's spirits, if but for a moment or two. The act of rushing in with lowered bayonets was one of the most positively psychotropic motions available. When properly executed, a bayonet charge buoyed the morale of those delivering it, while it so intimidated the enemy that they turned and fled.

In his memoirs, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars described the effect of a cavalry charge on its participants:

> No movement in the field is made with greater confidence of success than that of the charge; it affords little time for thinking, while it creates a fearless excitement, and tends to give a fresh impulse to the blood of the advancing soldier, rouses his courage, strengthens every nerve, and drowns every fear of danger or of death; thus emboldened amidst shouts that anticipate victory, he rushes on and mingles with the fleeing foe.[26]

In later years Civil War veterans would recall experiencing similar feelings during a bayonet charge. Isaac Herman, a Confederate veteran, remembered that the excitement of the charge evoked a "careless, reckless indifference."[27] Alonzo F. Hill, who fought with the Army of the Potomac, recollected that the exultation was so profound that it induced men to face death without a "thought of fear."[28]

Of course, a bayonet charge had the opposite effect on defenders. In the final moments, those who stood awaiting a charge would in most cases panic when it became apparent that the onrushing enemy were determined to resolve the affair with cold steel. This panic would set in at about the moment when the defenders had just enough time to retire and save themselves. But if the attackers became convinced that the defenders were determined to stand and fight, the charge would generally stall and a lengthy firefight ensue.

Although all bayonet charges conformed to these general psychological dynamics, two distinct styles of bayonet charge developed after the introduction of the weapon in the late 1600s. Each employed a different set of psychologi-


Frank Leslie's Pictorial History of the War, 1862

The Battle of Dranesville, Virginia, December 20, 1861. The infantry are attacking in open columns.


Frank Leslie's Illustrated History of the War, 1862

The 51st New York Infantry executes a bayonet charge *a la Zouave*, i.e., running forward at one hundred and eighty paces per minute.

cal dynamics. The first, which may be called the "all-out aggressive school," was used by many French regiments during the eighteenth century and the Napoleonic Wars. It required the attacker to charge as quickly as possible, all the while doing everything to intimidate those receiving the charge. The men were encouraged to shout and yell, and officers ran in front, swords drawn, to serve as an example. The second type of charge was used by the British during the Peninsular War (1809-1814). Initially the troops would advance slowly, the officers cautioning their men to remain steady. The formation would advance to within forty to eighty paces of the enemy and deliver a crushing volley. Then, while the enemy was still recoiling from the shock, the attackers rushed in with lowered bayonets. The enemy, staggering from their casualties and totally overawed by a ferocious charge delivered in a moment of vulnerability, in most cases turned and fled.[29]

Both these techniques were used frequently throughout the American Civil War. Perhaps the most successful bayonet charge during the first year of the war occurred at the Battle of Mill Springs on January 19, 1862.[30] Three months later at Shiloh, the 32nd Indiana Infantry deployed into a "double column on the center" and worked its way through the two lines of Union infantry. As soon as it had advanced to within two hundred yards of the Confederates, the latter turned and retired without awaiting the charge.[31] And during the Battle of Winchester, Stonewall Jackson's division sprang forward with bayonets and overwhelmed the Union forces on the higher ground in front of them.[32] One can list successful bayonet charges *ad nauseam.*

There appears to be a minor difference between the way northern and southern infantry conducted a charge. Confederate troops usually employed what became known as the "Rebel Yell." According to a Confederate veteran, the men opened their mouths as wide as they could and yelled their loudest, over and over again, as long as their breath lasted. The result was "one continuous shout of mingled voices, without any intermission, unison or time...a commingling of shrill, loud sounds, that rent the air and could be heard for a distance of two miles or more." Union infantry of the Army of the Potomac used a very different type of cheer, shouting, "hip, hip, huzza, huzza, huzza" in unison.[33] Thus the type of charge employed by Union troops (at least in the East) was similar to that used by the British, while the Confederates emulated the French.

CAVALRY VERSUS INFANTRY

Low opinion of edged weapons has also clouded our understanding of how Civil War cavalry operated. It is natural to attribute the lack of formal cavalry charges against infantry to the increased range and accuracy of the new small arms. According to this view infantry could now decimate cavalry before it was able to close. However, the cavalry's performance was probably much less restricted by the new weapons than is commonly believed. Conventional wisdom assumes that infantry would continue to fire throughout a cavalry charge, except for the final few seconds when it would "guard against cavalry."

But contemporary tacticians generally believed that once a cavalry charge began, the defending infantry would be able to fire only once or twice. Several trials conducted to determine the length of time needed to execute a charge revealed that a cavalry regiment required about seven minutes to attack an enemy one thousand yards distant. The first four hundred yards were covered at a trot in about four and one-half minutes, the next four hundred at a "round trot" in two minutes, and the last two hundred at a gallop in thirty seconds.[34]

There was less agreement about the best method that infantry could employ to defend themselves. In the late 1700s many military thinkers accepted as fact that Frederick the Great's Prussian infantry had been able to fire three rounds per minute in volleys and five rounds per minute when firing individually. But by the end of the Napoleonic Wars experienced officers realized that this rapid rate of fire was impossible to maintain under battlefield conditions. Two schools of thought emerged. Some believed it was best for infantry to attempt to fire three volleys at approaching cavalry.[35] Others believed this was not feasible and that infantry should withhold their fire until close range and then unleash one deadly volley.

There is some indirect evidence that as long as the infantryman was armed with a muzzle-loading weapon the second tactic was generally more effective. For example, Thomas Bugeaud, who served as a sergeant during the Napoleonic Wars but rose to the rank of marshal by the later stages of the Algerian War, wrote a perceptive memoir chock full of anecdotes and analyses. One of his most intriguing and seemingly counterintuitive observations concerned the distribution of casualties during an infantry versus infantry engagement. The number of casualties suffered by the attacker, observed Bugeaud, gradually increased as he approached the enemy, reaching a climax when he had closed to within one hundred to one hundred fifty paces. However, if the attacker remained resolute and continued to advance, the

Below: Infantry repulse a cavalry attack. Here the defenders are supported by artillery on one flank and friendly cavalry on the other.


Frank Leslie's Pictorial History of the War, 1862

casualty rate *declined* during the last stages of the assault.[36]

A passage in a mid-eighteenth century military scientific treatise, *Essai sur la tactique de l'infanterie* (Geneva, 1761), not only confirms Bugeaud's observation but provides a compelling explanation. Its author maintained that once enemy infantry had advanced to within one hundred twenty paces, a regimental commander was best advised to have his men withhold their fire until the last moments. In theory, there was enough time to fire, reload, and fire again, for it would take the enemy forty to fifty seconds to advance the remaining distance, and it took only about twenty seconds to reload a flintlock musket. However, theory was not borne out in practice. Regardless of what they were ordered to do, as soon as the enemy advanced to within about eighty paces the men stopped whatever they were doing and prepared themselves to face the enemy with their bayonets. The instinct for survival overpowered both training and doctrine.[37]

This was even more true of cavalry charges: anyone who has studied the experience of battle during the eighteenth century and the Napoleonic period knows that the sight of a fast approaching enemy cavalry formation was many times more intimidating than the sight of oncoming infantry. One of the most vivid descriptions of just how psychologically trying it was to brave a cavalry charge was provided by British cavalryman William Thomkinson, who survived the Peninsular Wars (1808-1814).

> It is an awful thing for infantry to see a body of cavalry riding at them at full gallop. The men in the square frequently begin to shuffle, and so create some unsteadiness. *This causes them to neglect their fire* [emphasis added].[38]

This reaction certainly was not limited to European infantry. In his remembrances of the Battle of Corinth, for example, Oscar Jackson recalled that many Union infantrymen had similar reactions as they awaited a Confederate infantry assault. Many of the men along the line seemed to bounce, as they stood first on one foot then on the other.[39]

The new rifle musket used the same general method of loading and possessed a potential rate of fire roughly comparable to the older smoothbore. The reaction of infantry to a cavalry charge would therefore be similar, irrespective of which type of firearm they were equipped with.

This did not mean that charging cavalry could break through a defending line of infantry with impunity. During the Napoleonic Wars, though cavalry was often able to approach defending infantry, the latter with their serried ranks of outstretched bayonets were usually still able to hold the horsemen at bay. Many Civil War cavalry regiments, however, enjoyed a distinct advantage over their Napoleonic predecessors, who had been armed with single shot flintlock pistols. Union and Confederate troopers armed with Colt revolvers, instead of retiring could unleash a sufficient volume of fire to cause numerous casualties. As soon as large gaps appeared, the defending line was doomed.

An example of just how deadly this tactic could be is provided by the massacre of a detachment of the 39th Missouri State Militia by a group of rebel guerrillas led by Bill Anderson and George Todd. Spotting a small band of bushwhackers, the Unionists gave chase and were led into a trap. When half a mile from the blueclad militia, the guerrillas split into three groups. Todd and about sixty-five men worked their way around the left, while another group went to the right. Anderson and the remainder attacked frontally. As soon as he spotted the rebels advancing, the Union commander, Major A.V.E. Johnston, ordered about ninety of his men to dismount and form line with fixed bayonets along the crest of a hill, while thirty-five troopers, the "fourth men," held the horses in the rear. Anderson and his men charged as soon as they cleared the forest. The defenders fired a volley, but only three attackers were hit, most of the shots going high. Many years after the incident Frank James vividly recalled the final moments of the fight:

> Up the hill we went yelling like wild Indians. Almost in a twinkling of an eye we were on the Yankees' line. They seemed terrorized. Hypnotized might be a better word....Some of the Yankees were at "fix bayonets," some were biting off their cartridges, preparing to reload. Yelling, shooting our pistols upon them we went. Not a single man of the line escaped. Every one was shot through the


Frank Leslie's Illustrated Weekly, August 31, 1861

Caption: Cavalry often had to work its way through difficult terrain. However, it was not terrain but prevailing doctrine and lack of training that prevented the *arme blanche* from playing a major battlefield role in the first two years of the war.

> head....My brother, Jesse James... killed the commander of the Federal troops. Only several men holding the horses were able to escape.[40]

We should not think, however, that the popularization of six-shooters meant that cavalry could automatically defeat infantry. There were other developments that worked against the effectiveness of the traditional cavalry charge. Although infantry with rifle muskets rarely fired at enemy more than four hundred paces distant, a deep formation might prove to be too much of a temptation and entice the defender into a long-range but still effective fire. The longer range of the rifle musket, as well as the proliferation of rifled artillery, made it difficult to set up carefully prepared attacks, and it became increasingly impractical to use true columnar formations. Moreover, by 1864 soldiers on both sides and in most theatres routinely erected "hasty entrenchments" whenever they had an opportunity. The appearance of these *ad hoc* defensive works afforded greater protection to the defending infantry and made cavalry charges less likely to succeed. Finally, there was the appearance of breech-loaders and repeaters. Infantry armed with these more rapid firing shoulder arms could beat back any cavalry charge with ease.

It is ironic that before the advent of hasty entrenchments and repeaters the cavalry was insufficiently trained to conduct traditional charges, and by the time they had gained the experience to do so, the infantry had acquired new tactical assets.

THE IMPACT OF DEFENSIVE WORKS

Although commanders had occasionally resorted to fortifications throughout the war, reliance upon their use intensified in 1863 around Vicksburg. Officers and men on both sides became adept at constructing these defensive works, and began to appreciate their virtues. Thereafter there was sufficient migration of officers and men between the western and eastern theatres to ensure a kind of conceptual cross pollination.

It is widely believed that during the Overland Campaign of 1864 the rank and file, perceiving the folly of traditional methods, took matters into their own hands and began as soon as possible to build "hasty entrenchments." There is mounting evidence, however, that the overall trend toward increased reliance upon field fortifications and defensive works was just as much a reflection of a change in military scientific thinking among senior officers.

On May 5, for example, at the very outset of the Overland Campaign, Major General Winfield Scott Hancock ordered his divisional commanders to construct breastworks as soon as they completed their advance.[41] Elements of the Second Division of Getty's VI Corps had taken similar precautions even before the arrival of Hancock's men.[42] Major General Benjamin Butler took exactly the same steps after his forces crossed the James River and landed at Bermuda Hundred. In both cases the Union commander halted a general advance in order to build precautionary defensive works, even though the situation called for an immediate advance against a relatively unprepared defender. So commonplace had fortifying become that on May 7 Lieutenant Josiah Favill of the 57th New York Infantry recorded in his diary:

> We immediately went into position, relieving Gregg's division of cavalry, and commenced at once, *as is usual now-a-days*, to throw up a breastwork of logs and rails, and dug a ditch behind them...the enemy was discovered to be entrenched on the opposite shore and opened fire as soon as our party showed themselves [emphasis added].[43]

Similar precautions are found again during the fighting along the North Anna on May 24, where Union forces constructed a strong defensive position eight hundred yards from the rebel line.[44]

The increase of field works obviously strengthened the defense and increased the number of casualties inflicted upon attackers. But it also had a far more profound long-term effect. It altered the frequency with which opposing armies engaged, and influenced how combatants conducted themselves both on the battlefield and during day-to-day operations for the remainder of the war. During the campaigns of 1861-1863 it had been rare for an army to remain close to its enemy for any extended period, other than during a siege. When opposing armies approached one another they either clashed in a large engagement, or one side quickly withdrew. When a battle did occur the defeated side retired out of harm's way to gather up its scattered men and await reinforcements. All this changed as soon as an army routinely built field fortifications



Frank Leslie's illustrated weekly, July 12, 1862

Left: Assaults on fortifications sometimes led to hand-to-hand combat. But more often that not the attackers were thrown back.
Below: General Fremont's bodyguard is shown delivering close-range pistol and carbine fire from horseback.



Frank Leslie's Illustrated History of the War, 1862 slightly behind the expected point of contact with the enemy or at the end of each day's march. Now it was possible to maintain the army close to the enemy's forces *indefinitely*. In his *The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865*, Major General Andrew Humphreys characterized the new tenor of the fighting:

> The marching was done mostly by night, and the contact so close as to require constant vigilance day and night, and allow but little time for sleep. The firing was incessant. The fatigue, the loss of sleep, the watchfulness, taxed severely the endurance of both officers and men. Usually, in military operations, the opposing armies come together, fight a battle and separate again, the strain lasting only a few days. In a siege it is only a small part of the opposing armies that are close together. But with these two armies it was different. From the 5th of May, 1864, to the 9th of April, 1865, they were in constant close contact, with rare intervals of brief comparative repose.[45]



Frank Leslie's Illustrated Weekly, June 7, 1862

The 6th U.S. Cavalry battle Confederate horsemen led by J.E.B. Stuart.

This was the most obvious impact of field fortifications on the conduct of war. There was another change, much more subtle, which at first escaped detection by all but the most astute observers. This change was in the attitude of the men. Defensive works not only introduced an element of pragmatism, but by their very nature suggested the acceptability of taking measures to protect oneself. This is the very opposite of the tradition that emphasized the necessity of ignoring the instinct for survival and doing whatever it took to win, such as coolly advancing amid the proverbial hail of bullets. In stark contrast, those ensconced in rifle pits or behind breastworks were not only expected to take every precaution to protect themselves, but could be censored for taking needless risks. On picket duty the infantryman would cautiously peer over the entrenchment; an artilleryman, suspecting that he was still vulnerable to small arms fire, would add a few extra sand bags to the earthworks in front of his gun emplacement. Repeated for several weeks, this routine, so different from that of the earlier period of the war, necessarily had a permanent impact on the psyche of the American soldier, who by "nature" (i.e., because of socially inculcated values) was already a pragmatist.

The new rhythm of warfare also effected a deeper, more significant psychological transformation, one that changed how the typical soldier felt about going into battle and the risks that he was willing to take. Previously, the episodic nature of battle provided periods of recuperation. Weeks of physically demanding but relatively uneventful campaigning would suddenly be interrupted with the "opening of the ball," as the men often referred to the commencement of battle. All routine was immediately set aside and the adrenaline flowed freely as every man exerted himself to the utmost to best his opponents. Then, almost as suddenly as it began, the battle was over, and whether beaten or victorious routine would reassert itself after a few days, allowing soldiers to recover from the trauma of battle. Combat thus served as an epic punctuation in the martial saga; unconsciously it could be viewed as an "heroic" experience in which many were willing to make a supreme effort and possibly the ultimate sacrifice.

However, almost all heroism is based upon the conviction that the greatest personal risk can lead to the greatest collective gain. As long as there are periodic battles, as opposed to continuous fighting, men cling to the expectation or hope that the next fight will be decisive and lead to the end of the war. However, continuous proximity of the armies forced men to concentrate on personal survival, and thus undermined the heroic aspect of battle. It is therefore not surprising that, when the two opposing armies confronted each other on more open terrain after fighting in the Wilderness and Spotsylvania, the men whenever possible started to dig ad hoc entrenchments without waiting for orders to do so.

Fighting methods had undergone a profound and irrevocable transformation. ☐

BRENT NOSWORTHY is a professional writer who has spent over two decades studying the evolution of weapons technology and its impact on tactics and fighting methods during the age of the flintlock. His latest book is *The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War* (July 2003).

NOTES

1. Thomas Vernon Mosely, *Evolution of the American Civil War Infantry Tactics* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1967) p. 297.
2. *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and the Confederate Armies* (henceforth abbreviated "OR") 128 volumes (Washington, 1880-1891), Series I Vol. 35 Pt. 1, p. 308.
3. *OR*, I, 14, p. 1008.
4. *OR*, I, 51 (2), p. 175.
5. *OR*, I, 14, p. 192.
6. *OR*, I, 14, p. 606.
7. *OR*, I, 22 (1), p. 83.

8. *OR*, I, 38 (4), p. 42.
9. *OR*, I, 42 (2), p. 344.
10. *OR*, I, 41 (3), p. 412.
11. *OR*, I, 42 (2), pp. 343-44.
12. *OR*, I, 10 (2), p. 326.
13. *OR*, I, 19 (1), p. 608.
14. Fortuné De Brack, *Cavalry Outpost Duties* (New York, 1893), p. 37; William Duane, *The American Military Library or Compendium of the Modern Tactics Embracing the Discipline, Manoeuvres, & Duties of Every Species of Troops* (Philadelphia, 1809), p. 176; Guide de l'officier particular en campagne cited in *Recherches sur le feu de l'infanterie* (Paris, 1826), p. 13; extract from Chapter VIII of the Guide de l'officier no 426; Instruction of 1822 cited in Recherches, 18-19, extract from the Instruction pour l'infanterie, March 30 1822, Chapter 4; H. Lallemand, *A Treatise on Artillery* 2 Volumes (New York, 1820), I, p. 85.
15. *OR*, I, 41 (3), p. 412.
16. *OR*, I, 22 (1), p. 83.
17. *OR*, I, 34 (2), p. 190.
18. *OR*, I, 41 (3), p. 663.
19. *OR*, I, 41 (3), p. 412.
20. *OR*, I, 22 (1), p. 83.
21. Heros von Borcke, *Memoirs of the Confederate War for Independence* 2 volumes (New York, 1938), I, pp. 64-65.
22. John William De Forest, *A Volunteer's Adventures; A Union Captain's Record of the Civil War* (New Haven, 1946), pp. 65-66.
23. *OR*, I, 31 (1), pp. 99-101.
24. *OR*, I, 36 (1), pp. 225-26, 237-38, 251-52, 261-62.
25. John Mitchell, *Thoughts on Tactics and Military Organization* (London, 1838), pp. 64-65.
26. James Anton, *Retrospect of a Military Life* (Edinburgh, 1841; reprint, Cambridge, 1991), pp. 107-08.
27. I. Hermann, *Memoirs of a Veteran* (Atlanta, 1911), p. 70.
28. Alonzo F. Hill, *Our Boys: The Personal Experience of a Soldier in the Army of the Potomac* (Philadelphia, 1864), p. 384.
29. For a more thorough treatment of the difference between French and British bayonet charges, see Brent Nosworthy, *With Musket Cannon and Sword* (New York, 1996), pp. 235-41.
30. *OR*, I, 7, pp. 79-80, 94; Lippett, *Tactical Use of the Three Arms*(New York, 1865), p. 25; Judson Bishop, *The Story of a Regiment, Being a Narrative of the Service of the Second Regiment, Minnesota Veteran Volunteer Infantry* (St. Paul Minn., 1890), p. 41.
31. *OR*, I, 10 (1), p. 318.
32. G.F.R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War* (New York, 1889), p. 340.
33. W.H. Morgan, *Reminiscences of the War of 1861-65* (Lynchburg, Virginia, 1911), p. 70.
34. U.S. Army, *Instructions for Field Artillery* (Philadelphia, 1860), p, 42.
35. Andrew Steinmetz, "Musketry Instruction for the Cavalry Carbine and Pistol," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute*, Vol. V, No. 19 (London, 1861): pp. 484-85.
36. Bugeaud de la Piconnèrie, "Instructions to the Fifty-sixth Regiment," *Practise of War* (Richmond, Va., 1863), p. 177.
37. Gabriel Pictet, *Essai sur la tactique de l'infanterie* (Geneva, 1761), Book I, pp. 275-76.
38. William Thomkinson, *Diary of a Cavalry Officer in the Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns 1809 -1815* (London, 1894), p. 280.
39. Oscar J. Jackson, *The Colonel's Diary* (Sharon, Penn. 1922), p. 71.
40. Edward Leslie, *The Devil Knows How to Ride: The True Story of William Clarke Quantrill* (New York, 1996), 324-326.
41. *OR*, I, 36 (1), p. 319.
42. *OR*, I, 36 (1), p. 696.
43. Josiah Marshall Favill, *The Diary of a Young Officer: Serving with the Armies of the United States during the War of the Rebellion* (Chicago, 1909), p. 292.
44. Edward Porter Alexander, *Fighting for the Confederacy* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1987), pp. 354, 390, 392.
45. Andrew A. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865* (New York, 1995), p. 117-18.

It's an American Classic!
DIXIE GUN WORKS'
CATALOG

Since 1954...***whether you're whistling "Dixie" or "Yankee Doodle"***... the **Dixie Gun Works'** catalog has been **A MUST** for any blackpowder enthusiast or history buff. Positively the most comprehensive source of blackpowder firearms and period accessories available, the **NEW 2003 EDITION** is loaded with the best in blackpowder shooting supplies, antique gun parts, and accouterments. More than 10,000 items, including:

- Authentic reproduction rifles, pistols, revolvers, military firearms and kits
- Civil War arms and accessories
- Clothing, patterns, uniforms
- Cannons, swords, knives
- Books, period music
- Military and primitive camp gear
- Cowboy action shooting

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE and EXPERTISE is guaranteed!

Put this classic on your shelf today!

DIXIE
GUN WORKS, INC.
Chuck Yeager
Inside:

ORDERS ONLY
(800) 238-6785
CATALOG $5
SHIPPED C.O.D. $8.50

INFO: (731) 885-0700 FAX: (731) 885-0440
www.dixiegunworks.com info@dixiegunworks.com
DIXIE GUN WORKS
GUNPOWDER LANE, DEPT 27, PO BOX 130,
UNION CITY, TN 38281

INTRODUCING A CAPTIVATING
NEW CIVIL WAR BATTLE SERIES

MANASSAS
SHILOH
Reasoner
ANTIETAM
Reasoner
CHANCELLORSVILLE
Reasoner
VICKSBURG
Reasoner
James Reasoner

Available for Purchase or Rental on Cassette, CD, and MP3-CD

"*Manassas* is a detailed work of historical fiction written by a gifted author." — *Bookwatch*

"This story climbs into the hearts and minds of the people who lived it and portrays vividly the volatile political situation as state after state secedes from the Union....The listener can almost feel the heat of battle."—*Victoria (Tex.) Advocate*

1-800-729-2665 • www.BlackstoneAudio.com

BLACKSTONE AUDIOBOOKS, INC.
THE VOICE OF CHOICE IN AUDIOBOOKS, SINCE 1987

ROB HODGE JOINS *NORTH & SOUTH*

Civil War education—the main goal of the Civil War Society—and battlefield preservation are inextricably linked. Quite recently we initiated an exchange with the Civil War Preservation Trust, whereby each organization receives space in the other's magazine. Now we take another step. Robert Lee Hodge is perhaps the best known figure in the reenactment community, having among other things been featured on the cover of *Confederates in the Attic*. He has also organized events that have raised tens of thousands of dollars for battlefield preservation. For some time Rob has authored a preservation column in *America's Civil War*, a magazine published by Primemedia. As of our next issue, Rob will instead contribute a column to *North & South*. Rob will also represent us at various events around the country.

NORTH & SOUTH DISCUSSION GROUP

As mentioned in this issue's editorial, we have launched a *North & South* email discussion group to enable readers and authors to discuss issues relating to the Civil War. So far the following *N&S* contributors have signed up: Matt Matthews, Pat Brennan, Laurie Schiller, Chuck Teague, Ed Steers, Gordon Rhea, Thomas DiLorenzo, Gerry Prokopowicz, and Brent Nosworthy. Participation is free to executive members of the Civil War Society (and regular members need only pay another $10.00 upgrade their membership), and it takes only a few minutes to sign on. For more details, including directions on how to join, visit the following website: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/cwsociety/

If you have questions, please email Terry Johnston at: tjohnston@northandsouthmagazine.com

SOCIETY EVENTS

The 2003 annual convention in Richmond was a well-attended, lively weekend in which John Simon, Steve Newton, and Steve Woodworth weighed in with their "worst ten generals" of the war, and Keith Poulter spoke on "What Makes a Good General?" Other contributors were John Coski of the Museum of the Confederacy and Bill Obrochta of the Virginia Historical Society. A future article in *North & South* will pick up the theme of "the worst ten."

We hope to hold the 2004 annual convention in Gettysburg in October, in conjunction with a battlefield tour. We also plan another one-day Gettysburg tour hosted by Mike Miller. Details of both these events will be available in our next issue, and will also be posted soon on our website: northandsouthmagazine.com. Additionally, we are co-sponsoring an event with tour company "Civil War Weekend." (See below.)

CIVIL WAR WEEKEND PENINSULA CAMPAIGN TOUR, MAY 15-17, 2004

In partnership with *North & South* and the Civil War Society, Civil War Weekend will sponsor a trip back in time to 1862 and the Peninsula Campaign in eastern Virginia.

The Peninsula tour will visit a number of sites related to the early stages of Union general George B. McClellan's grand scheme to capture Richmond.

The *N&S*-CWW tour will tell the story of the Peninsula Campaign by tracing McClellan's steps from disembarking his troops at Fort Monroe, to early contact, siege on the Warwick River, concluding at the savage rearguard Battle of Williamsburg.

The tour will include visits to Fort Monroe and its impressive Casemate Museum, the well preserved earthworks of the Confederacy's Warwick River lines near Dam #1, the headquarters of Confederate generals John B. Magruder and Joseph E. Johnston at the restored Lee Hall Mansion, and fortifications at Yorktown and across the York River at Glouchester Point. We will conclude by vising sites related to the often overlooked Battle at Williamsburg.

Additionally, we will take a water tour of Hampton Roads, visiting the sites where the CSS *Virgina* created havoc, then was checked by the USS *Monitor*.



Tour Guide: Robert Freis with historians John Quarstein of the Virginia War Museum at Newport News, and Michael Moore and Ron Furqueron of Lee Hall Mansion.

For more information call:

(540) 268-4300

A share of this event's proceeds will benefit the Virginia War Museum Foundation, which supports historic preservation and education in the Hampton Roads region.

CIVIL WAR ROUND TABLE DIRECTORY

DENMARK

SCANDINAVIAN AMERICAN HISTORICAL SOCIETY
Contact: c/o The Danish American Civil War Society and Roundtable
Aarhusgade 99, 5.tv.
2100 Kbh 0 / Copenhagen, Denmark
Website: www.sahs.dk • Phone: + 45 39 27 44 86
email: trpetersen@mail.tele.dk

* * *

CALIFORNIA

Geographic Locale: North Bay
NORTH BAY CWRT
Contact: John Waller
640 Zinnia Court, Sonoma, CA 95476
(707) 938-0497 • Johncon@earthlink.net

D.C.

Geographic Locale:
Washington D.C. / Northern Virginia / Maryland
CAPITOL HILL CWRT
Contact: Valerie Cannady, President
Valerina.Cannady@sbcglobal.net
11409 Bayard Drive, Mitchellville, MD 20721
(301) 262-3768 • www.chcwrt.org

GEORGIA

Geographic Locale: Northeast Georgia
NORTHEAST GEORGIA CWRT
Contact: Steve Narrie, President
c/o Gwinnett History Museum
455 South Perry Street, Lawrenceville, GA 30045
www.negacwrt.org

HAWAII

Geographic Locale: Honolulu
HAWAII CWRT
Contact: Raydeen Kimura
399 Kuliouou Road, Honolulu, HI 96821
(702) 281-0282
hicwrt@hotmail.com

TO ASK ABOUT A CWRT CONTACT AD AND ACCESS TO THE *N&S* MAILING LIST CALL (559) 855-8636

ILLINOIS

Geographic Locale: Chicago
CWRT OF CHICAGO
Contact: Janet Linhart
1465 McCormick Pl., Wheaton, IL 60187
(630) 752-1330 • janetlinhart@att.net

Geographic Locale: West Suburban Chicago
SALT CREEK CWRT
Contact: William J. Hupp
P.O. Box 4873, Wheaton, IL 60189
wjhupp@aol.com

INDIANA

Geographic Locale: Indianapolis
INDIANAPOLIS CWRT
Contact: Ms. Nikki Scholfield
7929 Hunters Path, Indianapolis, IN 46214-1535
N/SCHOFIELD@aol.com

MASSACHUSETTS

Geographic Locale: Boston / South Shore
OLDE COLONY CWRT
Contact: William J. Bernache
10 Liberty Road, Bridgewater, MA 02324
WJBKJB@aol.com

MICHIGAN

Geographic Locale: Kalamazoo
KALAMAZOO CWRT
Contact: David Jordan
6804 E. Hickory Point Drive, Portage, MI 49024
(269) 323-3757

MISSOURI

Geographic Locale: Springfield
CWRT OF THE OZARKS
Contact: John Purtell
P.O. Box 3451, Springfield, MO 65808
jc_pd@msn.com

NEW JERSEY

Geographic Locale: Northern New Jersey
PHIL KEARNY CWRT
Contact: Mary Kuczek
P.O. Box 183, Lincoln Park, NJ 07035
email: info@philkearnycwrt.org
(973) 686-1887

NORTH CAROLINA

Geographic Locale: Morehead City
FORT MACON CWRT
Contact: Jack Little
P.O. Box 1862, Morehead City, NC 28557
fmcwrt@yahoo.com

NEW YORK

Geographic Locale: Hudson Valley
ULSTER COUNTY CWRT
Contact: Joel Craig
P.O. Box 120, Stone Ridge, NY 12484
uccwrt@hvc.rr.com

Geographic Locale: Binghamton
BINGHAMTON CWRT
Contact: Eileen Patch, Newsletter Editor
3656 Lott Street, Endwell, NY 13760
e-mail: epatch@stny.rr.com

OREGON

Geographic Locale: Portland
PORTLAND CWRT
Contact: Tom Edwards
7401 SE 36th Avenue, Portland, OR 97202
(503) 774-6911

OHIO

Geographic Locale: Marion County
MARION COUNTY CWRT
169 E. Church Street, Marion, OH 43302
(740) 387-4255

Geographic Locale: Central Ohio
CENTRAL OHIO CWRT, COLUMBUS
Contact: Pete Zuhars
P.O. Box 471, Lewis Center, OH 43035
(740) 363-9542 • zeteman@yahoo.com

TENNESSEE

Geographic Locale: Nashville
BATTLE OF NASHVILLE PRESERVATION SOCIETY & CWRT
Contact: R.W. Henderson
BONPS, P.O. Box 121796, Nashville, TN 37212
(615) 780-3636 • www.bonps.org

TEXAS

Geographic Locale: Houston
HOUSTON CWRT
Contact: Roland Bienvenu
P.O. Box 4215, Houston,TX 77210-4215
(281)-438-2907
Roland.Bienvenu@cityofhouston.net

WASHINGTON

Georaphic Locale: Puget Sound
PUGET SOUND CWRT
Contact: Clarke V. Harrison
3921 108th Avenue NE, Bellevue, WA 98004
(425) 822-2267 • clarkeh@nwlink.com

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SAVIOR OR TYRANT?

THOMAS DILORENZO AND GERALD PROKOPOWICZ

ED. In recent years a good deal of criticism has been leveled at Abraham Lincoln, calling into question his widespread image as one of the nation's greatest presidents. We invited leading detractor Thomas DiLorenzo to argue his case with noted Lincoln scholar Gerald Prokopowicz.



Frank Leslie's Budget of Fun, February 1862

"The Pet Lamb and the Black Sheep; or, the Unhappy Shepherd" represents Lincoln as having to give attention unwillingly to the "black sheep" of abolition.



Comic News, November 26, 1864

"The Vampire" by British cartoonist Matt Morgan depicts Lincoln in November 1864 perpetuating his grip on office at the expense of the nation, represented by a cowering Columbia.

THOMAS DILORENZO: In *Lincoln, the South, and Slavery* Robert W. Johannsen remarked that anyone who embarks on a study of Abraham Lincoln "must first come to terms with the Lincoln myth. The effort to penetrate the crust of legend that surrounds Lincoln . . . is both a formidable and intimidating task." Let's try to penetrate some aspects of this myth.

Myth #1: Lincoln Invaded the South to Free the Slaves. This is another way of saying that slavery was the sole cause of the war, but Lincoln himself never said it or believed it. On March 2, 1861, two days before Lincoln's inaugural, the U.S. Senate passed a proposed constitutional amendment that read: "No Amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State." The House of Representatives had passed the proposed amendment on February 28.[1]

Two days later, in his first inaugural address, Lincoln referred to the proposed amendment, stating that "holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable." Thus, on the day of his inauguration Lincoln was perfectly willing to see Southern slavery exist long past his own lifetime.

Lincoln clearly stated the purpose of the war on numerous occasions, including his famous August 22, 1862, letter to Horace Greeley, in which he said "my paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and it is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it." The U.S. Congress concurred, issuing a declaration on July 22, 1861, that the purpose of the war was not "interfering with the rights or established institutions of those states" but to preserve the Union "with the rights of the several states unimpaired." Thus, according to both Lincoln and Congress, *the conflict over state rights was the sole cause of the war.* The Confederates believed the Union was voluntary; Lincoln insisted that it was not and that total war was justified to coerce any state to remain in it.

Myth #2: Lincoln "Saved the Union." In reality, Lincoln did more than anyone to *destroy* the *voluntary* Union of the Founding Fathers. In all the founding documents—the Declaration of Independence, Treaty of Paris, Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution—the states are referred to as "free and independent." That is, free and independent of any other government, including the federal government. The states delegated certain enumerated powers to the federal government, which was to serve *as their agent,* but reserved sovereignty to themselves. The federal Constitution was created by a voluntary association of states and three of them—New York, Rhode Island, and Virginia—explicitly reserved the right to secede from the Union if it ever became destructive of their citizens' liberties.

The New England Federalists of Jefferson's time, many of whom had fought in the Revolutionary War, plotted to secede for over a decade, never questioning the voluntary nature of the Union or the right of secession.

This was an uncontroversial view in early 1861. Newspapers throughout the North echoed the opinion of the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle,* which editorialized on November 13, 1860, that the Union "depends for its continuance on the free consent and will of the sovereign people of each state, and when consent and will is withdrawn on either part, their Union is gone."



Abraham Lincoln, c. February 1865.
Library of Congress

Lincoln "saved" the federal Union in the same sense that a man who has been abusing his wife "saves" his marital union by forcing his wife back into the home, chaining her to the bedpost, and threatening to shoot her if she leaves again. The Union has been preserved!

Myth #3: Lincoln was a Champion of the Constitution. George Orwell himself would be shocked by this assertion. If one reads *Constitutional Problems under Lincoln* by James Randall, *Freedom under Lincoln* by Dean Sprague, *Constitutional Dictatorship* by Clinton Rossiter, and *The Fate of Liberty* by Mark Neely Jr., it is obvious that Lincoln exhibited reckless disregard for constitutional liberty. "Lincoln's amazing disregard for the Constitution was considered by nobody as legal," wrote Rossiter.

Lincoln launched an invasion without the consent of Congress. He suspended the writ of habeas corpus and jailed without charges between 13,000 and 30,000 Northern political prisoners (that's the range of estimates in the literature). Mussolini only convicted 1,624. Literally hundreds of opposition newspapers were shut down, and some of their editors and owners were thrown into dungeons. In some cases Republican Party mobs or gangs of soldiers physically destroyed opposition printing presses. Telegraph communication was censored, a number of Northern elections were rigged, and some twenty members of the Maryland legislature, along with Congressman Henry May of Baltimore and the city's mayor, were imprisoned despite the fact that the Constitution requires that each state be allowed a republican form of government.

The new "state" of West Virginia was illegally created (the Constitution requires a vote of the state legislature as well as Congress). The most outspoken member of the Democratic Party opposition, Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio, was taken from his home in Dayton, Ohio, in the middle of the night by armed soldiers and imprisoned. He was ceremoniously sent to Tennessee to help spread the lie that all advocates of peace were "traitors." But the Tennessee Confederates wanted nothing to do with him. He fled to Canada, where he was the Ohio Democratic Party's gubernatorial nominee. (This would be the equivalent of President George W. Bush deporting Democratic Senator Tom Daschle to Iraq.) The rest of the political opposition got the message: Shut up, or this could happen to you.

The border states were systematically disarmed, in violation of the Second Amendment. Indeed, the entire invasion of the South was a repudiation of that amendment. James Madison's case for the Second Amendment was that an armed populace could hopefully deter or fend off any invasion by a federal army. Private property in the North was also seized under two confiscation acts.

Lincoln's complete disregard for constitutional liberty established a dangerous precedent for future presidents who would also ignore the Constitution with the excuse that if the sainted Lincoln could to it, so could they.

Myth #4: Lincoln was Devoted to Equality. Lincoln's words and, more importantly, his actions, repudiate this myth. "I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and black races," he stated in his August 21, 1858, debate with Stephen Douglas. "I, as well as Judge Douglas, am in favor of the race to which I belong having the superior position . . . . We cannot, then, make them equals." "What I would most desire would be the separation of the white and black races," he said in Charleston, Illinois, on September 18, 1858.

Lincoln was strongly opposed to inter-racial marriage; he supported the Illinois constitution, which prohibited the emigration of black people into the state; he supported the Illinois Black Codes, which denied blacks any semblance of citizenship; as president of the Illinois Colonization Society he supported the use of state tax funds to deport black people from the state; he supported the Fugitive Slave Act, which compelled Northern states to round up runaway slaves; and he was a lifelong advocate of "colonization." He even held a meeting with free blacks in the White House to implore them to lead by example and leave the country and live in Liberia.



Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, October 12, 1861

Right: "I'm Sorry to Have to Drop You, Sambo" appeared after the president had nullified General John C. Fremont's August 30, 1861, order to free the slaves in his jurisdiction.



American Antiquarian Society

"Black Draught" from *Frank Leslie's Budget of Fun*, August 1, 1860. The caption reads: "UNCLE SAM—'Columby, dear, I've brought in Drs. Lincoln and Hamlin—maybe they can do you some good?' COLUMBIA—'Oh, dear, do take them away! I can't bear those black draughts; they—heh—they—heh—kill me!'" The 1860 Republican ticket was clearly seen as anti-slavery.

As syndicated columnist Joseph Sobran has remarked, Lincoln believed that African Americans could be "equal" all right, but not in America. He unequivocally did not believe that all men are created equal despite his occasional political rhetoric to the contrary.

Myth #5: Lincoln was a "Great Statesman." Imagine that California decided today to secede and an American president responded with the carpet bombing of Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco that destroyed ninety percent of the structures in those cities (as was the case with Sherman's bombing of Atlanta). He then evicts the remaining residents from their homes and destroys their industries and burns or confiscates the California food supply. He wages a total war that ends up killing one out of four adult California males of military age while maiming an even larger number. Would this American president be considered a "great statesman" or a war criminal?

The answer to this question is obvious. In 1860 a great statesman would have negotiated a peaceful settlement with the disaffected states, even if it meant allowing the seven states of the lower South to secede, and then worked diligently to persuade them to rejoin the Union. Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Arkansas originally voted to remain in the Union, changing their minds only after Lincoln launched his invasion of their sister states. He refused to meet with Confederate commissioners to discuss peace—something a genuine statesman would have done—and even rebuffed Napoleon III of France, who offered to try to negotiate a peace. A great statesman does not manipulate his own people into the bloodiest war in history.

Myth #6: Lincoln was a "Great Humanitarian." Great humanitarians do not micromanage the waging of total war on civilians, including the burning of entire towns populated with civilians; massive looting and plundering; and even the execution of civilians, and then express his personal thanks and "the thanks of a nation" to the generals who carry out such atrocities. Lee Kennett was right when he wrote in *Marching through Georgia* that had the Confederates somehow won, they would have been justified in "stringing up President Lincoln and the entire Union high command" as war criminals.

In sum, the power of the state over the citizenry ultimately rests on a series of myths about the alleged benevolence and munificence of government. Nothing serves this purpose better than the Lincoln myth. America's court historians have made it almost impossible for he average citizen to understand the real Lincoln.

GERALD PROKOPOWICZ: As Thomas DiLorenzo points out, Abraham Lincoln is shrouded in myth. I agree that it is "formidable and intimidating" to challenge these myths, and I respect DiLorenzo's intention of penetrating them. Whether his attempt succeeds in bringing us closer to the "real" Lincoln, or simply substitutes an alternate set of myths, is another matter.

Myth #1: Lincoln Invaded the South to Free the Slaves. Lincoln expressly denied, at the outset of the war, that the federal government had any intention of ending slavery. Lincoln believed that whatever his "oft-expressed *personal* wish that all men every where could be free,"[2] ending slavery in the South was beyond the constitutional authority of the government in 1861.

No serious scholar has argued otherwise in the past twenty years. Readers who are interested enough in Lincoln and the Civil War to have an opinion on the subject are likely by this time to be familiar with the current historical orthodoxy. People who have no interest in the subject are unlikely to care. One might ask, then, if there is anyone who maintains this particular "myth," other than writers interested in discrediting Lincoln by beating dead horses.

Myth #1.1 "This is another way of saying that slavery was the sole cause of the war." DiLorenzo states that Myth 1.1 is a restatement of Myth 1. Logically, this is not so. The "myth" that Lincoln intended to end slavery does not require that slavery be the Civil War's "sole cause." Certainly Lincoln never said that it was, as DiLorenzo points out. Lincoln did, however, state the obvious fact that slavery was the underlying source of the conflict. In his Second Inaugural Address, he observed that slavery constituted a "peculiar and powerful interest," that the interest was concentrated in the South, and that "all knew that this interest was, somehow, the cause of the war."[3]

There is another logical fallacy in DiLorenzo's argument. The premise that Lincoln had no objection to the widely held view that the federal government was powerless to ban slavery in Southern states does not logically lead to the conclusion that Lincoln "was perfectly willing to see Southern slavery exist long past his own lifetime." Lincoln, like most Americans in 1861, believed that slavery would wither away if denied the opportunity to expand into the Western territories. The restriction of slavery from the West, and thus its eventual demise, was



New York Illustrated News, March 14, 1863

Secretary of State William Seward, taking his stand upon the "Union Rock and the Constitution," repels "the polite intercession of the wily Machiavel of modern monarchy, whose eager right hand holds the torch of anarchy."

the sole guiding principle of the Republican Party in 1860. Was Lincoln willing to see slavery continue past his lifetime, on the condition that he could be assured that it would eventually disappear? Perhaps; he was never given the choice. Was he willing to fight rather than to allow the institution to spread? Yes.

Myth #2: Lincoln "Saved the Union." This is surely a myth, in the sense that Lincoln alone did not save the Union. It took the efforts of millions of Union soldiers, Northern civilians, and loyal Southerners (both free and enslaved) to bring about this great consummation. As to the argument that the original Union was one bound by ropes of sand, dissolvable at the will of any state, there is no profit in going over this ground. Even DiLorenzo's simile of a marriage is ill chosen, for as Lincoln noted on February 11, 1861, in the secessionists' view "the Union, as a family relation, would not be anything like a regular marriage at all, but only a sort of free-love arrangement."[4]

Myth #3: Lincoln was a Champion of the Constitution. This is a straw man, pure and simple. From James Randall to Mark Neely to Michael Vorenberg, scholars have recognized that Lincoln bent the Constitution dramatically at times. He did so not for the aggrandizement of personal power (unlike Mussolini, to whom DiLorenzo compares Lincoln unfavorably), but to restore the Union. Lincoln made this point in July 1861 when he was accused of violating the constitutional provision regarding the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: "Are all the laws, *but one*, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?"[5]

While Lincoln did violate the Constitution at need, the examples offered range from exaggerated to silly. Neely's *The Fate of Liberty*, which DiLorenzo cites, makes clear that many "political prisoners" were in fact guerillas fighting in Kentucky and Missouri. The idea that disarming rebels is a violation of their Second Amendment rights requires no comment. And the suggestion that Vallandigham's banishment would be like President Bush sending Tom Daschle to Iraq is again logically incorrect; it would be like sending him to South Dakota, and doing so only after he had begun to express an open desire for the triumph of the nation's enemies.

On one point, I agree with DiLorenzo. The very fact that Lincoln's constitutional excesses were committed for a good cause and were limited in extent only increases the danger that other chief executives may attempt to justify more malignant violations, on the ground that "if the sainted Lincoln could to it, so could they."

Myth #4: Lincoln was Devoted to Equality. It is true that Abraham Lincoln did not support full "political and social equality between the white and the black races," a value which we have come to take for granted today. On August 21, 1858, when Lincoln spoke those words, no one but a few despised radicals considered such equality possible or even desirable. Most white Americans shared the racial attitudes expressed that day by Lincoln's opponent Stephen Douglas:

> I do not regard the negro as my equal, and positively deny that he is my brother or any kin to me whatever....He [Lincoln] holds that the negro was born his equal and yours.... Now, I do not believe that the Almighty ever intended the negro to be the equal of the white man. ("Never, never.") ... He belongs to an inferior race, and must always occupy an inferior position.[6]

It was in response to this that Lincoln issued the rejoinder that his critics are fond of quoting. Unfortunately, they are also fond of omitting the rest of Lincoln's response, an omission that verges on intellectual dishonesty. Lincoln went on:

> I have never said anything to the contrary, but I hold that notwithstanding all this, there is no reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. (Loud cheers.) I hold that he is as much entitled to these as the white man. I agree with Judge Douglas he is not my equal in many respects—certainly not in color, perhaps not in moral or intellectual endowment. But in the right to eat the bread, without leave of anybody else, which his own hand earns, *he is my equal and the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man* [emphasis in original].[7]



University of Minnesota Libraries

"Niagra Doves," *Fun*, August 13, 1864. As Lincoln had foreseen, newspaperman Horace Greeley (perched on the president's finger) returns empty handed from his meeting with Confederate representatives in Canada.



Harper's Weekly, October 1, 1864

"Rally Round the Flag Boys" depicts soldiers and sailors flocking to Lincoln's support during the run-up to the 1864 presidential election.

Lincoln's commitment to political and social equality may not meet current standards, but it is ahistorical to apply them. Frederick Douglass summed it up best: "Viewed from the genuine abolition ground, Mr. Lincoln seemed tardy, cold, dull, and indifferent; but measuring him by the sentiment of his country, a sentiment he was bound as a statesman to consult, he was swift, zealous, radical, and determined."[8]



Harper's Weekly, February 18, 1865

In this cartoon, repentant Confederate peace commissioners are received by Lincoln with open arms; in fact, they were unwilling to consider either restoration of the Union or the abolition of slavery.

Myth #5: Lincoln was a "Great Statesman." DiLorenzo asks us to imagine California seceding today, followed by carpet bombing and mass slaughter. I can't do it; Lincoln's victory over the Confederacy has made secession unimaginable. But that achievement does not make Lincoln a "Great Statesman," according to DiLorenzo, because he failed to accomplish this without widespread bloodshed. Lincoln should have let the South go and worked for gradual reunification, we are told; but would this not have made him guilty of the same tolerance of slavery's continuation for which DiLorenzo earlier condemned him? (See Myth #1.)

Myth #6: Lincoln was a "Great Humanitarian." Great humanitarians, DiLorenzo notes, "do not micromanage the waging of total war on civilians." By 1864, Lincoln's administration deliberately targeted civilian property as part of its strategy. If this constitutes "total war on civilians," what are we to call the widespread twentieth century practice of targeting not only property but civilian lives, through strategic bombing? All war is hell, but there are degrees of hell. It does violence to the language to link indiscriminately the twentieth century policy of killing civilians with the nineteenth century one of destroying their belongings.

Lincoln's humanitarianism was sorely tested by the pressures of war. His counterpart in the South, Jefferson Davis, spared no invective in reviling Lincoln and the North. In 1863 Davis asked a Richmond audience, "if the question was proposed to you whether you would combine with hyenas or Yankees, I trust every Virginian would say, give me the hyenas."[9] Lincoln never replied in kind. In 1861 he said to Southerners, "We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies." After four bloody years of warfare, his attitude was unchanged, as he called for peace "with malice toward none; with charity for all."[10]

It is one of Lincoln's most remarkable accomplishments that he nerved his people to continue the fight to its conclusion without once attempting to incite their hatred against the enemy. Indeed, in his view there was no enemy, only once and future fellow citizens. In the Gettysburg Address he inspired the public by his vision of the good that might emerge from the war, not by cataloging the other side's atrocities. To lead a life unmarked by rancor is an unusual achievement for any individual; to lead a nation through a civil war without hatred seems to me the work of a great humanitarian.

Conclusion: If on nothing else, DiLorenzo and I agree that it is important to look beneath the mantle of saintliness that has descended upon Abraham Lincoln. The last ten years have brought a wealth of fresh scholarship: the works of David Donald, William Lee Miller, Allen Guelzo, Douglas Wilson, Harold Holzer, even the angry assault of Lerone Bennett (to name only a few) have all brought new ideas and interpretations to the fore. DiLorenzo's views do no more than echo (both in style and substance) the anti-Lincoln rhetoric of Jefferson Davis, Alexander Stephens, and other nineteenth century Confederate apologists. To those unfamiliar with the originals, this too may seem a fresh approach.

THOMAS DILORENZO: By admitting it is only "in the past twenty years" that Lincoln scholars have conceded that Lincoln did not launch an invasion to free the slaves, Professor Prokopowicz *supports* my argument in Myth #1. *Some* scholars may have only recently embraced this truth, but the American public has not, since it takes at least twenty years for such knowledge to become widely used in textbooks at all levels. Most Americans still believe in the myth.

The National Park Service has recently begun to *perpetuate* this myth with a new program that will emphasize slavery at battlefield parks. As Gettysburg National Park Superintendent John Latschar told the *Washington Times*, "We want to get away from the traditional descriptions of who shot whom and where and enter discussions of why they were shooting one another." And slavery will be highlighted as the main reason "why they were shooting one another." Latschar is being assisted in this campaign of political correctness by Congressman Jesse Jackson Jr., James McPherson, and Eric Foner, among others.

Prokopowicz's denial that Lincoln was willing to see slavery exist in the South past his own lifetime rings hollow. Lincoln supported the "first Thirteenth Amendment," which would have prohibited the government from *ever* interfering with Southern slavery, and when he did comment on how slavery would eventually whither away he said it would take until about the turn of the century.

Prokopowicz's theory that opposition to slavery in the territories would somehow lead to the destruction of slavery everywhere makes no sense at all. Slavery was profitable in 1861 despite the fact that it had not spread to the new territories. It didn't need the territories to be profitable. And this fanciful theory wasn't the reason Lincoln and the Republicans gave for their opposition. One reason was, as Lincoln said on October 16, 1854, "We want them [the territories] for the homes of free white people." The second was to water down the Three-Fifths Clause of the Constitution, which inflated the congressional representation of the Southern Democrats by counting every five slaves as three persons for purposes of determining the number of congressmen in each state. Republican opposition to the extension of slavery was based on politics, not morality. Furthermore, the tariff plank was the keystone of the Republican platform of 1860, not the slavery-in-the-territories plank (see Richard Bensel, *Yankee Leviathan*).

Prokopowicz is silly and flippant in his remarks about the voluntary nature of the Union. The founding documents all referred to the states as "free and independent," i.e., sovereign. The New England Federalists who attempted to secede after Jefferson's election never questioned the right of secession; New York, Rhode

Island, and Virginia explicitly reserved the right to withdraw from the Union as a condition of ratifying the Constitution; there was an active secession movement in the Middle States in the 1850s; many abolitionists believed the North had a right to secede from the slave-owning South; and most opinion makers in the North and South in 1860 believed there was a right of secession. Lincoln's novel and false theory that the Union was older than the states, which were supposedly never sovereign, was "proven" correct at gunpoint. Court historians like Prokopowicz perpetuate this myth.

The assertion that "many" of Lincoln's political prisoners were guerillas is equally as silly, if not dishonest. It has been well documented that Lincoln had his army imprison dissenters of all kinds, including opposition newspaper editors and politicians. Among their number were some twenty Maryland state legislators, the mayor of Baltimore, and Congressman Henry May, who were most certainly not "guerilla fighters."

As for Lincoln's opposition to racial equality, it is important to focus on his actions as well as his words. Yes, Lincoln said pleasant things about natural rights. But at the same time, he endorsed policies (the Illinois Black Codes, Fugitive Slave Act, colonization, etc.) that would deprive blacks of any semblance of those rights in the U.S.

A great statesman would not only have tolerated peaceful secession and worked to reunite the two sections; he would also have done what the British Empire, the Spanish Empire, and dozens of other countries did with regard to slavery in the nineteenth century—ended it peacefully through compensated emancipation. Lincoln offered only talk.

Prokopowicz's "defense" of waging total war on Southern civilians is absurd, if not immoral. If killing civilians is wrong, it is wrong whether it is five hundred or five million. The bombing of Southern cities did not just target "civilian property," as Prokopowicz falsely asserts. In *Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men* Jeffrey Hummel estimated that some 50,000 Southern civilians were unaccounted for at war's end.

Lincoln's "malice toward none" language was spectacularly hypocritical: at around the time he was using such words, he was profusely thanking Sherman and Sheridan for the acts of destruction they were perpetrating against Southern civilians.

Prokopowicz's assertion that Lincoln led a nation through a civil war "without hatred" and led a life "without rancor" is surreal and laughable. The hatred that was stirred up by Lincoln's invasion and conquest of the Southern states was so deep-seated that it is still felt today. This statement is so bizarre that it leads one to question the validity of everything else he says.

GERALD PROKOPOWICZ: In searching for common ground, I am pleased to see that DiLorenzo agrees that scholars have long since abandoned the myth that Lincoln intended to end slavery when the Civil War began. Unfortunately, DiLorenzo continues to conflate the demolition of this myth with his conclusion that slavery was not the primary cause of the Civil War. The two are not the same.

Clearly, we disagree on the importance of slavery as a cause of the war. The idea that slavery needed to expand into the West in order to survive is not my theory, contrary to DiLorenzo's generous attribution, but was a common assumption among Southerners and Northerners alike in the 1850s. Most Americans agreed, as Lincoln stated in 1858, that if slavery were confined to the South, "the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction."[11] Such confinement was the focus of the Republican platform in 1860, which explicitly or implicitly opposed slavery in the territories in six out of seventeen planks, while only one called for a revision of the tariff.

The tariff was an important issue, but it was not central to the Republicans. They consisted of former Whigs (who supported high tariffs), former Democrats (who favored low tariffs), and former Know-Nothings. Opposition to



Harper's Weekly, March 18, 1865

"President Lincoln Taking the Oath at His Second Inauguration."

the extension of slavery, and not the tariff, was the one political principle on which Republicans agreed. As DiLorenzo notes, many Republicans did so for selfish political or economic reasons, not out of tenderness for the slaves, but the result was the same: Republicans opposed the expansion of slavery, and expected the institution eventually to wither away.

Slavery was likewise the primary issue of the secessionists. As each state seceded in the winter of 1860-61, it sent commissioners to other slave states to urge them to secede as well. These commissioners' speeches focused overwhelmingly upon slavery and the threat posed to the institution by the election of Lincoln.[12] Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens reinforced the centrality of slavery in an 1861 address that referred to the "corner-stone" of the Confederacy as being "the great truth, that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery... is his natural and normal condition."[13] It was not until after the war that the tariff replaced slavery in the writings of Davis, Stephens, and other former Confederates as the primary justification for secession.



Punch, December 3, 1864

"The Federal Phoenix" emerges triumphant as the fire consumes "STATE RIGHTS," "HABEAS CORPUS," "FREE PRESS," etc.

On the question of the nature of the Union, I would like to assure DiLorenzo that I was not being "flippant," and that I meant it seriously when I said that there is nothing to be gained by going over this issue. To me, it seems nonsensical that a single state could legally dissolve the Union in defiance of the rights of the other states to maintain it, but I recognize that DiLorenzo believes in good faith that secession was legal, and that he is unlikely to change his mind on the issue.

In 1861 there were many patriotic and intelligent Americans who considered secession legal, and many others who regarded disunion "as denying the vital principles of a free government, and as an avowal of contemplated treason, which it is the imperative duty of an indignant People sternly to rebuke and forever silence."[14] As a nation, we could find no way to resolve the difference between those views short of a trial of arms, and we paid an awesome cost for that resolution. The decision, reached at Shiloh, Gettysburg, and a thousand other hallowed grounds, was that the American people would not tolerate the destruction of the Union, whatever may have been the intentions of the Founding Fathers. I am at a loss to understand the motives of those who seek to resurrect the arguments of the secessionists today. Surely no one would want to sacrifice another 600,000 American lives to re-adjudicate the question?

Regarding hate, of course the Civil War was not without hatred. One of the most pervasive myths among Civil War enthusiasts is the idea that it was a "gentleman's war," devoid of real hatred. Those who hold such views delight in reading passages like the one in Joshua Chamberlain's memoirs that describes the chivalrous exchanges of salutes between victor and vanquished at Appomattox. But (in a much less often quoted passage) when Chamberlain offered his wishes for future peace to a Confederate officer, he was rebuffed: "There is a rancor in our hearts which you little dream of. We hate you, sir."[15]

I am fully aware that deep hatred existed in the hearts of many Americans, and apparently still does in some. My point was that Lincoln's heart was not among them.

THOMAS DILORENZO: Prokopowicz incorrectly states my position: I said *some*, but not necessarily even a majority of historians have finally conceded that Lincoln did not initiate his invasion to free the slaves. The only "evidence" he offers in support of the notion that most Americans believed that keeping slavery out of the territories would lead to its demise is a single sentence from one of Lincoln's political speeches. This is not convincing, and it still does not make economic sense. The price of slaves was rising in the years before the war and the system was quite profitable despite the fact that it had not yet spread to the territories. Indeed, one of the main arguments that is made for why the war was supposedly necessary is that slavery's profitability would guarantee its long-term survival. (In fact, the high price of slaves was *undermining* its long-run profitability by encouraging planters to seek out substitute, free labor—which is always more productive—and turn to mechanized agriculture.)

Contrary to Prokopowicz's assertions, Lincoln himself believed that the tariff was *the* most important issue in early 1861. He told a Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, audience on February 15, 1861, that "the tariff is to the government what a meal is to the family," explicitly endorsed his party's tariff plank in the same speech, and concluded that "*no subject* should engage your representatives more closely than that of the tariff" (emphasis added).

He owed his nomination to the protectionists in New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, after guaranteeing them in writing before the nominating convention that he was a lifelong protectionist. In his First Inaugural Address he promised an invasion of any state that failed to collect the newly increased federal tariff: "there will be no invasion—no using force against—or among the people anywhere" as long as the tariff is collected, he said. And the reason he gave for his naval blockade of the Southern ports on April 19, 1861, was "the collection of the revenue cannot be effectually executed" in the seceded states.

The House of Representatives passed the Morrill Tariff, which more than doubled the average tariff rate (from fifteen to thirty-two percent) in the 1859-60 session, before Lincoln's nomination and Southern secession. The vote was 105-64, with only *one* "yes" vote from a secessionist state (Tennessee). Thus, Prokopowicz's contention that the North was more-or-less equally divided on the issue of the tariff is incorrect. U.S. Senator John Sherman (brother of William Tecumseh Sherman) said that Lincoln was elected to sign the tariff bill, subsidize the transcontinental railroads, and preserve the territories for white workers.

Alexander Stephens' "cornerstone" speech was an unofficial oration, its accuracy is disputed, and Stephens was an eccentric figure. If he was a white supremacist, so what? So was Lincoln and nearly the entire white population of the North in 1861. "I, as much as any other man, am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race," Lincoln said in one of his debates with Douglas. There is no reason why this one statement by Stephens should represent the argument for secession. In his First Inaugural Address Jefferson Davis restated Thomas Jefferson's dictum from the Declaration of Independence about government's just powers coming from the consent of the governed. And there were other prominent secessionists, especially among the clergy, who proposed plans for gradual abolition.

What is really "nonsensical" is not the right of secession, but the supposed "right" of one state to kill one in four adult males in any other state that decides to withdraw from the *voluntary* compact of the states while bombing, pillaging, and plundering that state's towns and cities and generally waging war on civilians as well as combatants.

It is not true that "we" could "find no way" to resolve the differences between the sections peacefully in 1861. It was *Lincoln* who decided upon a full-scale invasion of the Southern states. A real statesmen would have tolerated peaceful secession and then devoted himself to bringing the two sections together through compromise while pursuing compensated, peaceful emancipation, just as the British empire had accomplished a mere decade earlier.

Prokopowicz is dumbfounded over the motives of those who would make secessionist arguments today. How about the quest for historical truth, Professor Prokopowicz? I thought this was something historians were supposed to be interested in.

GERALD PROKOPOWICZ: I apologize for mistakenly crediting DiLorenzo with recognition of the current scholarly consensus. Whatever his views, the fact is that the overwhelming majority of professional historians of the period (Donald, Current, Boritt, Paludan, Long, Miller, Guelzo, Neely, Gienapp, Burlingame, Vorenberg, and many others) have long since agreed that Lincoln in 1861 did not intend to end slavery.

As I did not mean to misstate DiLorenzo's position, I am sure that he did not mean to misstate mine in claiming that I said "the North was more-or-less equally divided" on the tariff issue. What

THE TRUTH ABOUT TARIFFS

ED. Regular readers of *North & South* will appreciate that as I read the DiLorenzo-Prokopowicz debate I itched to jump in with my own comments, for the length of the contributors' responses was necessarily restricted and some points went unanswered. No doubt next issue's "Crossfire" column will address many of them. However, there was one point made (about the percentage of the tariff paid by Southerners) that I felt needed an immediate rebuttal if we were not to mislead our readers. Accordingly I asked James McPherson to set the record straight. Here is his response:

DILORENZO IS ESSENTIALLY CORRECT that the tariff supplied ninety percent of federal revenue before the Civil War. For the thirty years from 1831 to 1860 it was eighty-four percent, but for the 1850s as a decade it was indeed ninety percent.

But the idea that the South paid about seventy-five percent of tariff revenues is totally absurd. DiLorenzo bases this on pages 26-27 of Charles Adams, *When in the Course of Human Events*, but Adams comes up with these figures out of thin air, and worse, appears to be measuring the South's share of exports, and then transposing that percentage to their share of dutiable imports. Exports, of course, are not subject to taxation and never have been, because such taxes are prohibited by Article I, Section 9 of the US Constitution—which Adams appears not to know. In any case, Adams claims that about eighty-two percent of exports from the U.S. were furnished by the South—he cites no source for this, and it is in fact wrong—the true figure was about sixty percent on the average, most of that cotton—and then by a slight of hand claims that this proves the South paid a similarly disproportionate share of tariffs. But of course the tariffs were only on *imports*.

The idea that the South would pay a disproportionate share of import duties defies common sense as well as facts. The majority of imports from abroad entered ports in the Northeastern US, principally New York City. The importers paid duties at the customs houses in those cities. The free states had sixty-two percent of the US population in the 1850s and seventy-two percent of the free population. The standard of living was higher in the free states and the people of those states consumed more than their proportionate share of dutiable products, so a high proportion of tariff revenue (on both consumer and capital goods) was paid ultimately by the people of those states—a fair guess would be that the North paid about seventy percent of tariff duties. There is no way to measure this precisely, for once the duties were paid no statistics were kept on the final destination of dutiable products. But consider a few examples. There was a tariff on sugar, which benefited only sugar planters in Louisiana, but seventy percent of the sugar was consumed in the free states. There was a tariff on hemp, which benefited only the growers in Kentucky and Missouri, but the shipbuilding industry was almost entirely in the North, so Northern users of hemp paid a disproportionate amount of that tariff. There were duties on both raw wool and finished wool cloth, which of course benefited sheep farmers who were mostly in the North and woolen textile manufacturers who were almost entirely in the North, but it was Northern consumers who ultimately paid probably eighty percent of that tariff (woolen clothes were worn more in the North than the South, for obvious reasons). Or take the tariff on iron—it benefited mainly Northern manufacturers (though there was an iron industry in the South as well), but sixty-five percent of the railroad mileage and seventy-five percent of the railroad rolling stock were in the North, which meant that Northern railroads (and their customers, indirectly) paid those proportions of the duties on iron for their rails, locomotives, and wheels. One can come up with many more examples. □

I actually said was that the Republican party contained both high-tariff and low-tariff factions. DiLorenzo's misstatement actually strengthens my point, however, in that the North (which included many low-tariff Democrats) was even more divided than the Republicans.

DiLorenzo supplies several quotations from Lincoln on the importance of the tariff. I agree fully that Lincoln considered the tariff an important issue, as evidenced by the fact that (according to a text search of Lincoln's collected works) he used the word "tariff" sixty-nine times in documents written between 1824 and his inauguration in 1861. He also referred to other issues of the day: "temperance" (12 times), "internal improvements" (11 times), and "railroad/s" (100 times). In the same period, he made 1,688 written references to "slavery" (add another 786 if the word "slave" is also counted).[16] There is no question as to which issue Lincoln regarded as the most important, from 1854 to the end of his life.

Slavery was overwhelmingly the central political problem of the 1850s, not just for Lincoln but for the country. It is possible to take selected pieces of evidence out of context to support an alternate interpretation, but doing so is practicing advocacy, not history. DiLorenzo objects to my citation of Alexander Stephens as an isolated piece of evidence, and implies that an impartial interpretation of the Confederacy must be based on a preponderance of the evidence. He cannot have it both ways; the same standard should be applied to all historical topics, including Lincoln.

DiLorenzo asserts confidently that high prices for slaves prove that slavery was profitable in the 1850s. The modern historical debate over the profitability of slavery began with Conrad and Meyer's seminal 1958 article, and has never been definitively resolved.[17] Further, since the 1970s many historians have argued that the slaveholders themselves could not have been certain of the long term profitability of their institution, given that modern economic historians using sophisticated analytical tools still cannot agree on the matter.[18] It is noteworthy that it was not on economic but on moral and social grounds, buttressed by Biblical quotations, that many slaveholders justified their actions.

DiLorenzo argues that slavery was profitable in the late 1850s "despite the fact that it had not yet spread to the territories." But it had; slavery was allowed into the Kansas and Nebraska Territories in 1854, and into all U.S. territories in 1857 by the Dred Scott decision. The Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Lincoln-Douglas debates, the Dred Scott case, indeed the entire national conflict over slavery, all focused on the question of whether to allow slavery in the territories. The belief that slavery could not thrive if it could not expand was widespread, both because of the tendency of cotton planters to use up the fertility of their land for quick profit, and because territories that became free states would send senators to Washington who would contest the slaveholding states' control of that body. These threats led slaveholders to fight bitterly for the right to extend the institution westward, as well to explore the possibility of annexing Cuba or Nicaragua.

DiLorenzo's last remarks bring out a fundamental difference between our views of history. The "historical truth" of secession is that in 1860-61 it was attempted, with various justifications, and it was defeated in the war that followed. What those justifications were, and why they were advanced, are historical questions of real importance. Whether those justifications were "right," in a political sense, is a political question that was settled by the war. If DiLorenzo wishes to discuss that political topic, and to treat the past as a grabbag from which to extract bits of evidence supporting his views, he is free to do so, but no one should mistake such activity for the practice of history.



Harper's Weekly, February 24, 1866.

"President Lincoln Entering Richmond, April 4, 1865."

GOT LINCOLN?

The Papers of Abraham Lincoln seeks to identify, capture high-quality images of, transcribe, and annotate all documents written by or to Abraham Lincoln. Ultimately, the project will publish both a comprehensive on-line electronic edition and a selective print edition. If you have uncovered or are aware of Lincoln documents in unexpected places such as small repositories, museums, or archival and private collections, please contact the project by phone at (217) 785-9130, by mail at Papers of Abraham Lincoln, #1 Old State Capitol Plaza, Springfield, IL, 62701-1507, or by e-mail at: *survey@papersofabrahamlincoln.org*

COVER STORY



"THE BLACK KNIGHT"

This issue's cover painting by John Paul Strain depicts Colonel Turner Ashby as commander of the cavalry of Stonewall Jackson's division in January 1862. A superb rider, Ashby had won many riding contests in peacetime Virginia. Although he was renowned for his dash and personal bravery, Ashby's cavalry was noticeably ill-disciplined. He was killed in a minor action at Harrisonburg, Virginia, on June 6, 1862.

For more information call
(817) 560-2143
or visit
www.johnpaulstrain.com

THOMAS DILORENZO: Prokopowicz's word count of Lincoln's speeches is meaningless because he provides no context or mention of what exactly was said. Besides, when it comes to politicians—and Lincoln was a master politician—actions are more important than words. Lincoln promised in his First Inaugural that he would wage war on any state that failed to collect the newly doubled Morrill tariff, and he followed through on his promise. In all of his pre-1861 speeches he only opposed slavery in principle. He tolerated it in practice and was vigorously hostile to the abolition movement.

The Republican Party had grandiose plans to create an American empire, starting with a government-subsidized transcontinental railroad. This Mother of all Internal Improvement Schemes would provide endless opportunities for patronage and corruption (which of course it did) that would guarantee the long-term success of the party, and of hyper-ambitious politicians like Lincoln.

By tax historian Charles Adams' calculations of tax incidence (in *When in the Course of Human Events*), the export-dependent South was paying about seventy-five percent of the federal tariff in 1860, and the tariff accounted for ninety percent of all federal revenue. Most of this money was being spent in the North, and the tariff benefited primarily Northern manufacturers who were the economic backbone of the Republican Party. Upon gaining power, Lincoln and the Republicans effectively said to the South: "We now have the votes to double or triple the tariff rate, and intend to plunder you with it. And if you refuse to collect it, there will be an invasion." Without Southern taxes there could be no Republican patronage empire.

Lincoln and the Republicans clearly stated that they opposed the extension of slavery because it would artificially increase the congressional representation of the Southern Democrats, which would further stand in the way of their empire-building plans. (Yes, it was legal for slavery to exist in the territories as of 1857, but it had not yet become a significant part of the economy of those regions.)

Abraham Lincoln espoused the false and ahistorical notion that the Union was older than the states and that the states, therefore, never exercised any sovereignty over the central government. This is the most spectacular lie in all of American political history. Lincoln then waged the bloodiest war in history to "prove" his theory. Amazingly, Prokopowicz states that this question "was settled by the war," as though "might makes right" is an acceptable dictum in civilized societies. It is most unlikely that had the Confederates prevailed, Prokopowicz would then be arguing that the Jeffersonians were right all along: the Union was a voluntary compact of the free, independent, and sovereign states, and Lincoln's alternative theory was pure sophistry.

GERALD PROKOPOWICZ: DiLorenzo's arguments, originally merely provocative, have now wandered into another realm. It is clear that he does not share the philosophy of the Republican Party of the 1850s, which favored the idea of government action to expand the economy. The Transcontinental Railroad, like the Erie Canal before it, was an example of a state-supported enterprise that brought enormous economic benefits to the nation as a whole (as well as riches to a few), and Lincoln would have been proud of it.

From Lincoln's support of Whiggish economic policies, DiLorenzo has deduced a grand and sinister scheme to use the minuscule federal government to "plunder" the South for the benefit of the industrial North. Where to begin to respond? With the fact that the North was still overwhelmingly rural in 1860? With the fact that impoverishing the South with a costly and destructive war would have run directly counter to the supposed goal of plundering that region? With the observation that the South, if truly aggrieved, could have reduced its tariff payments by importing fewer goods? (Note that DiLorenzo's description of the South as "export-dependent" is irrelevant, since the tariff was paid on imports, not exports.) The federal government in 1861 had no income tax, almost no bureaucracy, a tiny army, and no daily presence in the lives of most Americans, rendering it an impractical instrument for DiLorenzo's hypothetical Republican plot. Had not the secessionists triggered a war in 1861, it is likely that the federal government would have remained relatively insignificant for decades.

A final word regarding secession: In 1692, a series of trials took place in Salem, Massachusetts, that resulted in the hanging of nineteen women for the crime of witchcraft. Today, historians continue to try to understand this important episode, but they do not argue over whether the judges' verdicts were right. Only those who believe in the existence of witches could find such a debate meaningful.

Likewise, secession (and Lincoln's response to it) is a vital historical topic, and it is worthwhile to ask why Lincoln and his contemporaries acted as they did. It is another thing altogether to argue that the secessionists were right, in an abstract political sense, and Lincoln and the North wrong. Only those who continue to believe in secession as a valid policy option could find such an argument meaningful. But secession is as dead as witchcraft, and it is long past time for its advocates to move on.

THOMAS DILORENZO is the author of *The Real Lincoln: A New Look at Abraham Lincoln, His Agenda, and an Unnecessary War* (Prima Forum/Random House, 2002) and a professor of economics at Loyola College in Maryland.

GERALD J. PROKOPOWICZ is a professor of history at East Carolina University and the author of *Abraham Lincoln* (Eastern National, 1999).

NOTES

1. US. House of Representatives, 106th Cong. 2nd Sess., *The Constitution of the United States of America: Unratified Amendments, Doc. No. 106-214* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov. Printing Office, January 31, 2000).
2. Unless otherwise specified, all citations are to the *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, ed. by Roy P. Basler (NJ, 1953). Letter to Horace Greeley, August 22, 1862, vol. 5, p. 389.
3. Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1865, vol. 8, p. 332.
4. Speech at Indianapolis, February 11, 1861, vol. 4, p. 195.
5. Message to Congress, July 4, 1861, vol. 4, p. 430.
6. First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas, Ottawa, Ill., August 21, 1858, vol. 3, p. 10.
7. Ibid., p. 16.
8. Frederick Douglass, "Oration in Memory of Abraham Lincoln," April 14, 1876, in P. Foner, ed., *The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass* (NY, 1950), vol. 4, p. 311.
9. Jefferson Davis, "Speech at Richmond," January 5, 1863, in Crist et al., eds., *The Papers of Jefferson Davis* (Baton Rouge, 1997), vol. 9, p. 13.
10. First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861, vol. 4, p. 271; Second Inaugural Address, March 1865, vol. 8, p. 333.
11. "A House Divided": Speech at Springfield, June 16, 1858, vol 3, p. 461.
12. See Charles B. Dew, *Apostles of Disunion: Southern Secession Commissioners and the Causes of the Civil War* (Charlottesville, 2002).
13. Alexander H. Stephens, "Cornerstone Address, March 21, 1861," in Frank Moore, ed., *Rebellion Record* (New York, 1862), vol. 1, pp. 44-46.
14. Republican Party Platform, Chicago, Ill., May 16, 1860.
15. Joshua Chamberlain, *The Passing of the Armies* (reprint, Dayton, 1982), p. 267.
16. Some of these references occur in Stephen Douglas' portion of his debates with Lincoln, which appear within Lincoln's *Collected Works*, but Lincoln's references to slaves and slavery still far outnumber those to any other issue.
17. Alfred H. Conrad and John R. Meyer, "The Economics of Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South," *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 66 n.1 (1958): pp. 95-130.
18. See, e.g., Leonard A. Carlson and Robert S. Chirinko, "A Reinterpretation of The Slavery/Profitability Question" [2000], summary online at http://www.eh.net/Clio/Conferences/ASSA/Jan_00/carlson.shtml.

TO PRESERVE THE UNION

New books on Lincoln

LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION

Daniel Farber

"Farber offers exciting insights that challenge some of the conventional wisdom regarding Abraham Lincoln and the American Civil War. He speaks to the realities of presidential war powers in Lincoln's time and also our own."
—Emory M. Thomas, author of *Robert E. Lee: A Biography*

Cloth $27.50





New in paperback

ABRAHAM LINCOLN and the Forge of National Memory

Barry Schwartz

"This is a book that can take its place among the most sophisticated and timely work in the field."
—Jim Cullen, *Journal of American History*

Paper $18.00

Available in bookstores
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
www.press.uchicago.edu

CIVIL WAR SOCIETY BOOKSHELF

The following books are available to both Executive and Associate Society members at discounted prices.

CROSSROADS OF FREEDOM: ANTIETAM, THE BATTLE THAT CHANGED THE COURSE OF THE CIVIL WAR by James M. McPherson (Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. 203.) Retail: $26.00, Civil War Society Member Price: $18.00.

"The Battle of Antietam wielded enormous influence over the course of the Civil War. Although not a decisive tactical victory, it boosted the Union cause in profoundly important ways. James M. McPherson's engaging and perceptive narrative places Antietam within the broader context of the war, assessing major commanders, evaluating strategic decisions and movements, and explaining the battle's background as well as its seismic political and diplomatic consequences. Anyone interested in learning about Antietam should begin by reading this book."

—Gary W. Gallagher, author of *The Confederate War* and *Lee and His Army in Confederate History*


James M. McPherson
Crossroads of Freedom
ANTIETAM
The Battle That Changed the Course of the Civil War


The
CIVIL WAR
REENACTORS'
ENCYCLOPEDIA
William C. Davis

THE CIVIL WAR REENACTORS' ENCYCLOPEDIA by William C. Davis (Globe Pequot Press, 2002. Pp. 256, multiple color illustrations, maps and battle histories). Retail $35.00, Civil War Society members $20.00.

This Book is a must for all reenactors! This is the definitive, authoritative, and comprehensive guide to the major battles, uniforms, flags, insignia, major Union and Confederate units, and *much* more.

Now, at the dawn of the 21st century, the fascinating hobby of conducting Civil War reenactments is more popular than ever, in both the North and South, as more and more Americans replay the events of long-ago battles in an effort to recapture the drama of the most horrific and heartbreaking war in United States history.

The Civil War Reenactors' Encyclopedia will serve as the indispensable bible to all who participate in reenactments of Civil War battles and units, whether they are loyal to the Lost Cause of the Confederacy or are rallying around the flag of the Union forever. This book contains all the information anyone will ever need to replicate exactly the uniforms, equipment, insignia, and significant events of all the major campaigns of the Civil War.

Call or write: Civil War Society, 33756 Black Mountain Rd., Tollhouse, CA 93667 • (559) 855-8637

N&S SPECIAL ISSUES


NORTH&SOUTH
CAVALRY SPECIAL
The Evolution of Union Cavalry Tactics
Confederate Cavalry in the Army of Northern Virginia

2, #2: RARE FIND ! LIMITED! ...$25.00
CAVALRY SPECIAL
"The Best Cavalry in the World"—*Patrick Brennan*
A Taste of Northern Steel—*Laurence D. Schiller*
War Horse—*David J. Gerleman*
Hay: The Linchpin of Mobility
—*Charles Dana Gibson*
Learning the Hard Lessons of Logistics
—*Eric J. Wittenberg*


COULD MEADE HAVE DESTROYED LEE?
NORTH&SOUTH

2, #6: RETREAT FROM GETTYSBURG ...$4.95
Ten Days in July: The Pursuit to the Potomac
—*Ted Alexander*
"Hurry Was the Order of the Day"—*Steve French*
"A Night Never to Be Forgotten"—*Eric J. Wittenberg*
A Golden Bridge—*Kent Masterson Brown*


ROBERT E. LEE - SPECIAL ISSUE
NORTH&SOUTH
LEE'S STRATEGIC VISION
LEE'S FLAWED STRATEGY
The Generalship of ROBERT E. LEE
LEE VS GRANT

3, #5: ROBERT E. LEE ...$4.95
The Generalship of Robert E. Lee
—*Gary W. Gallagher*
Demolishing The Myth—*Alan Nolan*
Lee, Prescience, and the Overland Campaign
—*Gordon C. Rhea*
Lee's Quest For the Battle of Annihilation
—*Peter Carmichael*
"As Stupid A Fellow As I Am"— *Joseph L. Harsh*
How Great A Captain?—*Keith Poulter*


SPECIAL INFANTRY TACTICS ISSUE
NORTH&SOUTH
BACKGROUND TO BLOODSHED
THE INFANTRYMAN IN COMBAT
THE CHANGING FACE OF BATTLE

4, #6: INFANTRY TACTICS ...$4.95
The Infantryman in Combat—*Reid Mitchell*
Background to Bloodshed—*Perry Jamieson*
The Changing Face of Battle—*Herman Hattaway*
Arms and the Man—*Louis A. Garavaglia and Charles G. Worman*
Field Fortifications—*David Lowe*
The Civil War and the Evolution of Infantry Tactics
—*Keith Poulter*


THE MAKING OF "GODS AND GENERALS"
NORTH&SOUTH
THE LOST ORDER
ANTIETAM

5, #7: ANTIETAM ...$5.95
The Decisive Event of the War
—*James M. McPherson*
The Making of "Gods and Generals"—*Dennis Frye*
"It Looked Like a Task to Storm"
—*D. Scott Hartwig*
The Twisted Tale of the Lost Order
—*Stephen W. Sears*
"Through God's Blessing"—*Dennis Frye*
Antietam: The Bloodiest Day—*Ted Alexander*

SOCIETY EXECUTIVE MEMBERS
10% discount on *ALL* available back issues.
For a complete list of available back issues
see the magazine index at:
www.northandsouthmagazine.com

800-546-6707
Overseas: 559-855-8637

Never Mind the Bullets,
It's the Biscuits That'll Kill You



A TASTE *for* WAR
WILLIAM C. DAVIS
The Culinary History of the Blue and the Gray

A TASTE FOR WAR
The Culinary History of the Blue and the Gray

by two-time
***Pulitzer Prize** nominee*
William C. Davis

Includes authentic recipes from the Civil War for those looking to take a bite out of history.

$26.95, HC, 240 pages, 0-8117-0018-6

STACKPOLE
BOOKS
Available from your favorite bookseller or call 800-732-3669
www.stackpolebooks.com

Endorsed by The Civil War Society

Civil War
Weekend



Touring Battlefields
of the
Blue & Gray

Small groups, upscale lodging, good food –
our tours combine intensive study with soldiers' stories.
www.civilwarweekend.com • 1-866-CWW-TOUR(299-8687)

Coming this Fall . . .
Your Key
to Chattanooga



Storming *the* Heights
A GUIDE TO THE BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA
Matt Spruill
Maps by Lowell Forbes

Storming the Heights
A Guide to the Battle of Chattanooga
MATT SPRUILL
$21.00, ISBN 1-57233-237-9
Available in November in an illustrated paperback

The only book of its kind on the Battle of Chattanooga, *Storming the Heights* provides an in-depth study and tour of a Civil War battlefield, with detailed directions, topographical maps, and excerpts of reports from participants. Organized in the format still used by the military on staff rides, the book allows the reader to understand how the battle was fought and why leaders made the decisions they did.

The UNIVERSITY *of*
TENNESSEE PRESS
www.utpress.org
(800) 621-2736

MATT MATTHEWS AND KIP LINDBERG

"SHOT ALL TO PIECES"

The Battle of Lone Jack, Missouri, August 16, 1862



"Thousands entered the war, got just a taste of it, and then stepped out again permanently."
—*Mark Twain*

Lone Jack battlefield and cemetery, 2003. *Photograph by Alinda Miller*

FOR SEVERAL DECADES THE SMALL COMMUNITY OF LONE JACK, MISSOURI, hosted an annual picnic commemorating the turbulent Civil War battle fought there on August 16, 1862. Families drove wagons or rode horses for miles, arriving early to spread their blankets in the best location, under the shade trees near the speakers' platform. Following lunch a succession of speakers would address the crowd and recall, between pitches made by aspiring politicians, the dramatic events of the Battle of Lone Jack.

One year the keynote speaker was a local office seeker, "Colonel" Crisp, who was renowned for his vivid descriptions of the town's historical event. The colonel awed the crowd with his recounting of the glorious charges, snapping banners, and dashing uniforms. At his feverish climax, however, an aged veteran struggled to his feet and interrupted the mesmeric oration. "Colonel, that didn't happen that way," he announced. "I was there, and I know what took place. You've misrepresented the facts." Without a moment's hesitation Colonel Crisp declared, "God Damn an eyewitness anyway! He always spoils a good story!"[1]

The history of the Battle of Lone Jack is a good story, and one that is now largely forgotten. Few outside of Jackson County have ever heard of the battle, except perhaps in a passing literary or film reference.[2] While certainly not an engagement of national note, the Battle of Lone Jack was of great local importance; it was, by and large, a battle fought by the men of western Missouri—men who were friends and neighbors, boyhood chums, and blood relatives. And because both sides were the "home team," playing under the evaluative gaze of loved ones, it became a personal and passionate fight, marked by extremes in both courage and casualties.

By the summer of 1862 Missouri, while far from serene, was certainly more



Left: Colonel DeWitt Clinton Hunter. *Bushwhacker Museum, Nevada, Missouri*

Below: Colonel Jeremiah Vardeman "Vard" Cockrell. *General Sweeny's Civil War Museum, Republic, Missouri*

peaceful than it had been the previous summer. The first year of the war had witnessed several large battles and dozens of skirmishes. Tens of thousands of Federal troops from Missouri, joined by others from Kansas, Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana, traversed the state, engaging the pro-Southern Missouri State Guard, irregular partisans, and Confederate troops from Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, and the Indian Territory. A series of Southern victories had wrested much of the state from the Union, but lacking the logistical resources to retain their foothold the Confederate forces withdrew. By the onset of winter, the Missouri State Guard was left as the solitary guardian of the trophies won during the previous summer. But it too was poor in resources. Many of the guardsmen left for their homes to harvest crops, planning to return to the ranks after spring planting. Those who remained in the army did so in winter camps across southwest Missouri. Cut off from these secessionist havens, potential recruits in the northern part of the state awaited the opportunity to join their compatriots.

A turn in fortunes would alter their plans. Union forces under Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis launched a campaign in January 1862, pushing the Missouri State Guard and its recently organized counterpart, the Missouri Confederate Brigade, from the state. Defeated at the Battle of Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn Tavern, in March, these rebels were forced to continue the fight in Arkansas and Mississippi, dreaming of the day they could return to their beloved home state.

Meanwhile, Federal authorities furthered their goal of securing Missouri for the Union. In the absence of an organized enemy, Federal troops could focus on eliminating the small but steadily growing numbers of partisan guerilla bands that posed an increasing threat to Union lines of supply and communication. While Federal authorities continued to raise volunteer regiments with which to prosecute the war farther south, they badly needed a force that would constitute a deterrent to local insurrection.

The force they organized was named the Missouri State Militia, or MSM. Armed, equipped, and funded by the federal government, this force was to be retained for service within the state, securing strategic centers of population and commerce, and patrolling vital avenues of communication. Since each company operated in the locality in which it was raised, the rank and file knew every country lane, briar patch, and river bottom, and soon became effective in ferreting out enemy bands. In contrast to the negative connotation implied by the title "militia," these forces were more effective in small-scale, anti-guerilla operations than much larger volunteer or regular army units.

In an effort to further augment Union forces in the state, the newly appointed governor, H.R. Gamble, authorized the commander of the District of Missouri, Brigadier General John M. Schofield, to issue General Order No. 19. Effective July 22, 1862, the order stated that all able-bodied men were required to join the pro-Union Enrolled Missouri Militia, or EMM, bringing with them their own horses and weapons. In addition, all weapons and ammunition in civilian hands were to be confiscated and used for the public defense. Further orders clarified the intent: in order to "put down robbery, plunder, and guerilla warfare, which it is plainly the duty and interest of every citizen to aid in doing," Missouri men had to don Union blue or face stiff fines or incarceration. Exemptions were granted to those willing to "contribute money rather than personal service," as well as "all disloyal men and those who have at any time sympathized with the rebellion." Those men, while not required to serve in the Union militia, still had to register for service, giving their names and place of residence, and surrendering their weapons. Not made specific was the certainty that those who refused to join the militia for reasons of self-proclaimed disloyalty would be closely observed under what was essentially house arrest.[3]

Farther south, in and around Van Buren, Arkansas, a number of Missouri cavalry regiments were attempting to complete their organization before being accepted for Confederate service. All were under strength and desperate for an infusion of recruits. The sheer distance from Missouri, and the inability of recruits to make the journey south without molestation by the Federal MSM, prompted Confederate authorities to approve a raid into Missouri for the purpose of gathering recruits. Brigadier General James S. Rains, senior officer of the greatly diminished Missouri State Guard, assigned command of this expedition to Colonel Jeremiah V. Cockrell. The colonel, more widely known as "Vard" Cockrell, was a Methodist minister from Warrensburg, Missouri. He and his brother, Colonel Francis Marion Cockrell (quickly rising to fame in the Confederate Missouri Brigade), were well known among the Southern families in Jackson County, and it was believed his presence would influence others of similar belief to enlist. Cockrell was to lead the force into west-central Missouri, an area known for its pro-Confederate views. Word of Order No. 19 had reached the wilds of Arkansas, and it was earnestly hoped that thousands of Missourians, forced to choose between compulsory Union service and voluntary Confederate service, would choose the latter and join Cockrell.

In the last week of July 1862 Colonel John T. Coffee and Lieutenant Colonel John C. Tracy, each with about three hundred men, rode from their camps at Frog Bayou and headed north to Missouri. Both commands considered themselves independent from Cockrell, as Coffee still refused to join the Confederate service and Tracy remained convinced he would soon receive some special dispensation from Richmond.

On August 1 Cockrell and his small command moved out, accompanied by Colonel Dewitt C. Hunter and his seven hundred and fifty soldiers. The advance guard of the expedition consisted of roughly seventy troopers led by Captain Joseph O. Shelby. With Cockrell in overall command of the expedition, Lieutenant Colonel Sidney Jackman took charge of his four hundred and fifty men. Jackman's command was badly mounted and equipped, in part because of the abysmal supply system of the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy. Many of these men lacked saddles and rode bareback, while most of their bridles were simply ropes or lengths of braided bark.

As the secessionists rode rapidly north, hundreds of men who had refused to join the enrolled militia flocked to the rebel banner. They "pranced [in] from every direction," recalled Jackman. "The woods seemed alive with men, and all fleeing the wrath of what was known as the Gamble order." Many already had friends or family in rebel service, and did not want to be forced into facing them across a battlefield.[4]

On August 11, as these mounted forces moved north, the Union high command was stunned by the fall of Independence, Missouri. A combined force of Confederates under Colonels John T. Hughes, Upton Hays, and Gideon Thompson, supported by William Quantrill and his small guerilla band, had struck without warning, capturing the entire Federal garrison. Among the handful of secessionist casualties was Colonel Hughes, killed at the head of his regiment. With Hughes dead, Upton Hays assumed control of their combined commands.

Bewildered by the sudden influx of Confederate recruiters into Missouri, and chagrined by the loss of Independence, Schofield ordered Brigadier General James Totten, the commander of the Central Division of the District of Missouri, to start assembling a force to drive the secessionists out of western Missouri. Wishing to give further support to Totten, Schofield appealed to the Kansas departmental commander, Brigadier General James G. Blunt, for additional troops.


Library of Congress

Kansas State Historical Society

Left: Brigadier General John M. Schofield, commander of the District of Missouri.
Right: Brigadier General James G. Blunt, Kansas departmental commander.

On August 12 Totten ordered one company of the 7th Missouri State Militia (MSM) Cavalry to move from Syracuse to Sedalia. As Company H moved out, Major Emory S. Foster of the 7th MSM was ordered to Sedalia to take command of the forces assembled there and move quickly to Lexington, where he was to take charge of an ad hoc force and move south into Jackson County.[5]

Totten's selection of Major Foster to command this northern pincer movement was almost certainly due to Foster's reputation as one of the most aggressive officers in the Missouri Militia. Only twenty-three years old, the former newspaper editor from Warrensburg had already garnered the respect of friend and foe alike. Foster was a staunch Unionist for whom the war had begun on a personal note. At an election in Warrensburg early in 1861, pro-secession opponents had murdered his brother Marshall as he was on his way to vote. With the coming of the war Foster raised and commanded a company of Union cavalry known as the "Fremont Scouts," leading them against local secessionist forces comprised of the very men he suspected had assassinated his brother. Foster quickly gained notoriety as a courageous warrior, an honor he shared with his younger brother Melville, who also served as a company commander in the 7th MSM Cavalry. In April 1862 the brothers were wounded in an engagement with Quantrill's guerillas just outside Warrensburg. Recovered from their wounds, they resumed their vendetta.[6]

To add some firepower to the Federal strike force Totten ordered a section of the 3rd Indiana Light Artillery, under the command of Lieutenant James C. Devlin, to join Foster's command. Devlin's two guns were of a type known as "James Guns," being outdated M1841 six-pounders altered for greater accuracy by rifling the bronze tubes to a pattern developed by inventor and former senator Charles T. James.[7] Late on the night of August 12 the train carrying the Indiana section sped past the depot at Syracuse. A witness recalled that the cars "whirled by our depot with the speed of lighting, without making any stop, amid the wild cheers of the men… half enveloped in sparks of fire, [the train] seemed to be *whirling to Hell.*"[8]

The following day Totten ordered newly promoted Brigadier General Fitz Henry Warren and his 1st Iowa Volunteer Cavalry, supported by a section of artillery, to move north from Clinton, Missouri, into Jackson County. There he was to link up with Foster's party moving south from Lexington, smashing any rebel forces in between.

At 11:00 a.m. on August 14, following a grueling forty-eight hour forced march, Foster arrived in Lexington with Devlin's section of Indiana artillery, Company H of the 7th MSM Cavalry, and two companies of the 8th MSM Cavalry. That same day Schofield wired Totten, telling him it was time to strike the Confederate force reported near Lone Jack, a small community in southeast Jackson County. Schofield was sure that this rebel force, which he thought numbered no more than a thousand men under Hughes and Quantrill, would be easy prey for the converging Federal forces. Totten quickly issued orders to effect this edict.

At 1:00 a.m on the morning August 15 Foster received Totten's order to sally forth from Lexington at daylight. He was to move some thirty miles southwest to Lone Jack, where he would rendezvous with Warren's command. Foster left Lexington at dawn with approximately eight hundred men. He had with him five companies of the 7th Missouri Volunteer Cavalry, three companies of the 6th MSM Cavalry, two companies of the 8th MSM Cavalry, three companies of the Second Battalion, Missouri State Cavalry, Company H of the 7th MSM Cavalry, and Devlin's two James guns. Melville Foster accompanied the force, undoubtedly as eager as his older brother to close with the enemy.[9]

Unbeknown to Foster the campaign had already suffered a serious setback. Warren, for reasons still unknown, had disobeyed orders, moving his six hundred men southwest from Clinton instead of north toward Lone Jack. Receiving reports from alarmed Union citizens along his route, Warren telegraphed his superiors in Leavenworth, Kansas, that a large rebel force under Coffee, Jackman, and others had passed through the area with a column of around 6,000 men, moving north. Totten was stunned by the news of such a large Confederate force in Jackson County. He immediately sent word to Lexington to recall Foster, but the command had already left Lexington, moving south at a rapid pace. Couriers were dispatched, but Totten could not be assured Foster would receive the order in time.[10]

Unlike the slow moving and directionally challenged Warren, the third column of Union soldiers left Fort Scott, Kansas, at 9:00 a.m. on August 15 destined for Jackson County. Brigadier General James G. Blunt led his 2,500 men swiftly north, placing his infantry in wagons so that they could keep up with his cavalry.[11]

MAP 1 UNION MOVEMENTS



Map Graphics © DLF Group 2003

* * *

MEANWHILE, THE SECESSIONISTS HAD NOT BEEN IDLE. Cockrell and Shelby had started for Jackson County on the evening of August 14, Cockrell desiring to see his family, turning command over to Colonel Hunter and departing for his home in Warrensburg. The next morning Hunter marched the command farther north, halting at Lone Jack about midday on August 15.[12]

The village of Lone Jack had been founded in the early 1830s, acquiring its name from a giant blackjack oak tree that was visible for miles across the prairie. In 1843 a new addition, known as "New Town," was established to the south of the existing settlement. By 1862 New Town consisted of two stores, a blacksmith shop, a saloon, a post office, and a few small residences. The most impressive structure was a large frame hotel known as the Cave House. "The oddity of such a hotel in such a place was ludicrous in the extreme," recalled one visitor, "for it could easily have accommodated in one night all the visitors it had any reason to expect in a month." About 1,300 people lived in the community, almost all committed to the rebel cause.[13]

After searching the area for much needed supplies the secessionist force deployed around the town. Hunter and Jackman marched west, establishing their encampments about four miles from Lone Jack. Quantrill's guerillas, arriving on the scene, bivouacked about a mile farther west. Coffee, with Tracy's independent command, set up camp about a mile south of town. Captain Shelby and his command were not present, having forayed into Lafayette County the previous day. It was his desire to recruit enough men in his home county to raise an entire regiment.[14]

Meanwhile Foster's column was making good time as it pushed south into Jackson County. Around noon the major received intelligence from friendly residents that the rebel commander, John T. Coffee, was camped near Lone Jack with some 1,600 followers. This news, combined with the knowledge that Hays and Quantrill were also near Lone Jack, should have given the major pause. However, Foster was undeterred. Sending a message back to his commander in Lexington, Foster promised he would be in a grand fight by that evening.[15]

Cockrell never made it to his family home. Approaching Warrensburg he heard that Union forces were converging on Jackson County. Reversing course, Cockrell returned to his command, arriving at his camp about 9:00 p.m. on August 15.

At approximately the same time, Foster's command reached Lone Jack. Interrogating citizens, the Federal commander learned that Coffee and his force, now estimated at only eight hundred men, were camped just south of town. Issuing orders to tighten girths and ready weapons, Foster delivered on his promise of an engagement before day's end, leading his command into action at 11:00 p.m.

Just south of town Foster's advance ran into rebel pickets. A scattering of musketry, quickly followed by volleys of carbines and blasts of cannon fire, illuminated the night. Foster's command rapidly shattered the enemy line, capturing several Confederate outposts before sweeping into the rebel encampments. Completely unprepared for the assault, Coffee's and Tracy's commands abandoned their camps, fleeing in confusion and disappearing into the darkness.[16]

While the impetuous attack was successful it was by no means decisive, for most of the rebels escaped. Even worse, elements of the Union command lost contact in the darkness and became disorganized. During the skirmish some of Foster's cavalry mistook the Indiana artilleryman for the enemy, firing into them and killing four men. Foster placed section commander Lieutenant Devlin under arrest, later claiming the Hoosier officer was drunk. Whatever the reason, either mistaken identity or dereliction of duty, this friendly fire maddened and disheartened the Indiana boys.[17]

As Coffee's and Tracy's men vanished into the dark of night, the echo of Union artillery continued to reverberate for miles, alerting the individual secessionist commands that an event of great importance had occurred. The fact that a Union force was in the area and confidently operating at night was unsettling, and their supporting artillery suggested it was a sizable force and not just a scouting party. Soon after the skirmish ended Colonel Hays, with his four hundred men, rode into Vard Cockrell's camp. Included in Hays' command was a company commanded by Captain Caleb Winfrey, a physician whose home and office were in Lone Jack. Having served as a surgeon with the Missouri State Guard the previous year, Winfrey had exchanged his medical kit for a sword and recruited his own cavalry company. Joining Hays only days before, Winfrey's company had an intimate knowledge of Lone Jack and a vested interest in its security.[18]

Colonel Cockrell ordered his men into battle formation and waited for Coffee and Tracy to join him. As the troops rested on their arms Cockrell learned that a Union force of unknown strength had attacked Coffee and Tracy, and returned to Lone Jack for the night. Uncertain as to what action would be prudent, Cockrell consulted Jackman, who urged an attack on the town in the morning, fearing that the Union force, whatever its strength, would hamper a withdrawal south. Cockrell agreed.[19]

Soon Tracy and his command straggled into Cockrell's camp, having lost their pursuers before circling west. Tracy had no knowledge of Coffee's condition or location, only that the two commands had become separated in their flight south from Lone Jack.

Civilians from New Town informed Cockrell that the Union force numbered about one thousand men, and with the addition of Tracy's command Cockrell believed he held a numerical advantage and planned his attack accordingly. The Confederate forces would position themselves for a dawn assault on the town. Hays would prepare a mounted diversion from the north while Hunter, Jackman, and Tracy moved dismounted through a weed-choked field west of town. Once the Unionists were focused on Hays' feint, the dismounted men would emerge from their cover and assault the town from the west.


Left: Colonel Upton Hays. *Jackson County (Missouri) Historical Society.*
Right: Major Emory S. Foster, commander of Union forces at Lone Jack. *Lone Jack Museum.*

The success of the flank attack depended greatly on surprise, as the rebels lacked the resources for a sustained fight. Despite the fact that his men had an average of only six cartridges apiece, Cockrell thought that sufficient as the "enemy would run after a shot or two." Not wanting to delay the attack by distributing a greater supply of ammunition, and unwilling to await Coffee's uncertain return, the entire Confederate command was ordered into position.

Hays rode away with his column while Cockrell, Hunter, Tracy, and Jackman led their commands to a point a half-mile from Lone Jack, where the men dismounted. About half the Confederate force, approximately 1,500 men, was unarmed, having enlisted with the expectation of being issued weapons. These men were to wait near the ammunition wagon, which had been brought up to a point northwest of town. Meanwhile, Cockrell's force closed on the Union position. Hunter, with perhaps one hundred fifty men, joined Jackman's command of five hundred soldiers, and together with Tracy's three hundred fifty recruits moved through the fallow field of weeds west of town. They halted at a point estimated to be a mere hundred yards from the enemy position, secure in the knowledge that Hays, with his force of four hundred men, was preparing to attack from the north.[20]

Following their disorganized assault on the Confederate camps, Foster and his men had returned to Lone Jack. The Federals were completely exhausted by the events of the past few days. Most of the men picketed their horses close to the main street, tying their reins to an Osage orange, or bois d' arc, hedge running parallel to and about fifty yards from the eastern edge of the street. When properly trimmed such a hedge presented a tough and nearly impenetrable mass of thorns, each several inches in length. These hedges had become popular in the previous decades as an effective barrier to errant livestock, protecting cropland more efficiently than either split rail or stone fencing. The hedgerow ran north and south along almost the entire eastern length of the street, turning east at its northern and southern ends to surround a field of tall corn. As the command collapsed into sleep up and down the street, Foster established his headquarters in the Cave Hotel. The two cannons of the Indiana battery were parked near the blacksmith shop.

As soon as the Union cavalrymen returned to town it became clear to the residents that the Federals intended to stay. Fearing the secessionists would give battle in the morning, most of the inhabitants took what valuables they could easily remove and fled under cover of night. By morning only a few diehard families remained. Mrs. Bart Cave, whose husband was proprietor of the Cave Hotel, remained with her three small children and her mother-in-law. She soon saw their home turned into a field hospital, as Foster ordered the Confederates wounded in the skirmish to be treated there, and delegated Assistant Surgeon William H. Cundiff from the Second Battalion Missouri State Militia Cavalry to that duty. In the early morning hours Foster informed his commanders that at daybreak the command would mount and ride west, ready to give battle to whatever enemy they could find. At no point during the night did a messenger arrive from Lexington with word of Totten's order to withdraw, and Foster remained blind to the fact that a Confederate force more than three times the size of his own was within striking distance.


A rare photograph of Missouri Confederates. Left to right: Thomas H. Brown, William A. Brown, and Abe Brown, all of whom served at Lone Jack with Colonel Upton Hays. *The Lone Jack Museum.*

As daylight approached Hunter, Jackman, and Tracy waited patiently for Hays' flank attack to begin—the signal to launch their own assault. The eastern horizon began to brighten, and still there was no sign of an attack nor further word from Hays. Then to Jackman's great astonishment Hays appeared out of the darkness, riding slowly down the rebel line. Jackman called out, "Colonel Hays, in the name of God, what are you doing here?" Hays responded that his attack would soon begin and, after surveying the line, turned and slowly rode away. Jackman believed the only explanation for Hays' delay and personal reconnoiter was that the colonel was distrustful of his fellow commanders' experience and intent.[21]

As Hays' men made their final preparations for the attack a ripple of gunfire broke the early morning calm. Union pickets had discovered Hays' advance and loosed a few panicky shots. The discharges alerted Foster to a possible threat but did not seem to unduly alarm the men themselves. A Union picket, recalling the three or four shots fired north of town, believed that a few of his wayward comrades were simply "aiming to get some chickens for breakfast." Whether alerted by this gunfire, or simply following his decision to pursue the rebels at first light, Major Foster ordered his men to rise and prepare for battle.[22]

As the minutes ticked by, and the first rays of sunlight began to emerge in the east with no further sign of Hays' attack, Jackman's men grew more anxious. Circulating among his men, Jackman heard a number of voices mutter fearfully that something was wrong; it was not safe to remain in their exposed position any longer. While the tall weeds gave them concealment, they would provide no protection once the Federals spotted their position, for minie balls would cut through the grass as easily as the blade of a scythe. Private C.B. Lotspeich of Jackman's command remembered lying prone in the field and listening to the Union forces as they began stirring. "We lay there and could hear them give every command," he said, "hear them putting on accouterments, loading their guns [and] forming lines of battle." Listening to his opposite number issuing commands, Hunter chaffed at the delay, badly wanting Jackman to order an attack regardless of Hays' failure to appear. "We waited until they had donned the blue, seized their guns, [and] provided themselves with plenty of ammunition," he later complained. "[They] formed into line and counted off, as if on parade, and were thus ready and waiting for a foe to fight." As the Federals continued their preparation Hunter pleaded with Jackman to launch the attack immediately. Jackman declined to attack before Hays, a decision seconded by Tracy, and the entire command continued to hug the ground and wait in baited silence.[23]

The Federal pickets fell back into the town, heralding the Confederate threat to the north. Although Foster later claimed he had forty minutes to prepare for the Confederate assault, other eyewitness testimonies differ, suggesting the Federal commander barely had time to organize his command. Nonetheless, compared to their opponents, Foster's men were well trained and disciplined, as well as slightly better armed, and they went to their work with alacrity. Rushing into position along the street north of the blacksmith shop were Companies A, C, E, F, and I of the 7th Missouri Volunteer Cavalry. Many men in this unit were equipped with Hall's breech-loading carbines, giving them a slight edge in rate of fire over their muzzle-loading foes. With the exception of the 7th Missouri Volunteers, however, Foster's force was armed almost exclusively with M1854 Austrian "Lorenz" rifles, M1841 "Mississippi" rifles, and a handful of M1853 British "Enfield"-pattern rifles.[24]

In the center, forming in and around the blacksmith shop, were Companies A, C, and F of Nugent's Second Battalion MSM Cavalry, supported by Company H, 7th MSM Cavalry—the only company present from Foster's personal command. On the far left of the Federal line Companies A, B, and E of the 6th MSM Cavalry speedily assembled in the road, while Companies F and H of the 8th MSM Cavalry formed to their right.

A small force from the 7th Volunteers, probably no more than a company, occupied some houses on the northern edge of town, rapidly turning the dwellings into fortified fighting positions. Whether through lack of time or neglect, or the desire to keep their means of a rapid withdrawal close at hand, the command's mounts were left where they had been picketed the night before. Tied to the hedgerow, the horses were prepared for action, but lacking any cover they were dangerously exposed to hostile fire. Most would still be in the street when the attack began.[25]

The two rifled James guns were soon unlimbered to the right-front of the blacksmith shop, the new location of Foster's headquarters, and the Union commander ordered that the cannon be positioned to command the street from end to end. With Lieutenant Devlin still under arrest, command of the artillery section went to Sergeant James M. Scott and Sergeant J.C. Updegraff. Captain Milton H. Brawner, commanding Company A, 7th Missouri Volunteers, was assigned the responsibility of supporting the guns.

Foster evacuated his combatants from the Cave Hotel, leaving behind Surgeon Cundiff and his three Confederate wards. Mrs. Cave, with her children and mother-in-law, again chose to stay, perhaps believing they were as safe in their own home as anywhere else in town. Before departing, Major Foster ordered the hotel marked with a yellow flag to denote its occupation as a hospital.[26]

The sun was now up and, even though there was no sign of Hays, Jackman issued the order to attack. Yelling as they struggled through the tall weeds and hemp, the three Confederate commands charged toward the enemy. Pausing only to take aim, the rebels poured a galling fire upon the Federals in the street. "Our line of battle was scarcely formed when they came upon us, yelling like savages," reported Captain William Plumb, commanding Company B, 6th MSM, "and sending their balls into our ranks thick as hail." A soldier in the 8th MSM recalled that the attack was so swift his unit was forced to fight dismounted "for they had not time to mount." For most of the Federals this was just as well, as it would have been extremely difficult to reload their muzzle-loading rifles on horseback.

The attackers hastened to close with the enemy, for most were armed with double barreled shotguns, effective only at short range. The rebels emerged from the weeds, only to come up against a rail fence running north to south some fifty yards from the Union position. As the Confederates struggled to clear the obstacle a massive volley erupted from the Union line. The Federal cavalrymen had opened fire on their exposed foe, and were quickly joined by the Indiana artillery discharging blasts of canister. Jackman saw a man on the left of Hunter's line go down; rushing to his assistance Jackman saw there was little he could do, and after pleading desperately

Lieutenant Colonel Sidney Drake Jackman. *U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.*

Dr. (Captain) Caleb Winfrey. *General Sweeny's Civil War Museum, Republic, Missouri.*

for water for several minutes the man died. Under this "rain of lead" Private Joseph Burcham, recruited into Hunter's command just six days before, observed a number of men running away. Others became "less anxious to press to the front" and flung themselves behind what cover could be found.[27]

Returning to the battle line, Jackman witnessed Captain Levin Lewis fall from a wound to the head. Regaining his composure, Lewis, a Methodist minister in civilian life, explored the injury. The bullet was evidently almost spent when it struck the captain, for despite the flow of blood Lewis could feel the ball had simply embedded itself in his skull. Amid the din of battle he removed the offending bullet himself, only to be struck again in the hand. Jackman observed the injury and the self-surgery that followed, and later joked with Captain Lewis that he "had hoped to convert [Lewis] to Campbellism, but since Yankee bullets could not penetrate his head, there was no use in trying...."[28]

While Hunter's and Jackman's men sought protection behind the fence, Tracy's command negotiated the obstacle and rushed boldly toward the barricaded houses to their front. They did so, however, without their commander, who turned to make his way to the rear as the assault on the Federal position began. One of his men recalled, "All of the sudden Tracy retreated to the rear, making as many gyrations as a burning worm, saying he was shot."[29]

As the assault progressed, the battle was joined by Hays' tardy command, which moved to attack from the northwest. For some unexplained reason Hays too dismounted his force, contrary to Cockrell's orders. In the forefront of this assault were Captain Winfrey and his men. Incensed that the Federals had occupied his house and office, Winfrey launched an immediate charge upon his own residence. His company was repulsed in a brutal hand-to-hand encounter. Undeterred he reformed and attacked again, driving the Union men out of his home and into the street beyond. Tracy's men linked up with Hays' command and engulfed the buildings in a deadly close-range crossfire.

Heavily outnumbered and taking horrendous casualties, the Federal right collapsed. Abandoning the barricaded dwellings they quickly retreated southeast toward the blacksmith shop, followed closely by the triumphant Confederates. With their flank now turned, the advanced companies of the 7th Missouri Volunteers retired from their position along the north end of the street, falling back to the line formed by the Indiana battery and their own Company A.[30]

From the blacksmith shop Major Foster watched as a mass of Southerners ran across the northern end of the street. Recalling the desperate situation, Foster noted, "A considerable body of men on foot, and armed with shotguns, running and firing as they ran, sought to pass on the north of our position to our rear." To counter this threat Foster ordered Captain William Long and a portion of his Second Battalion MSM Cavalry to move back behind the hedgerow to his right, and take up a defensive position.

From his supporting position near the guns, Captain Brawner witnessed the cannons turn toward the swarm of advancing Confederates. Although under considerable fire themselves, the artillerymen "opened upon them with terrible effect, scattering them in confusion." Recoiling under the bombardment the rebels took cover next to the Osage orange hedgerow. Under a withering fire from Brawner and the two rifled cannons to their south, the Confederates were now fired upon by Long's cleverly concealed force.

The devastating crossfire was too much for many of the Confederates, who abandoned their position and took cover in the tall hemp. Others stuck fast to the hedgerow and continued the fight. John S. Kritzer of Hays' command recollected that each time they fired their shotguns and old brindle-stock squirrel rifles, "There was sure to be meat in the pot, in other words, a dead Yankee near the cannon."[31]

Meanwhile, the attack on the Federal left had stalled. Hunter's men hugged the fence, while the troopers of the 6th MSM fired back from an even more exposed position in the street. Soon, however, realizing they could not sustain such an exposed position, Captain Plumb and the three companies of the 6th MSM moved north up the street, seeking the protection of the dwellings on the east side of the road.

Plumb's detachment moved north to find shelter and Hunter formed his men into column, intending to attack east across the street. But as he prepared to launch the assault, he learned that most of his soldiers had already exhausted their meager supply of ammunition. To make

Left: Private John Berry, Company H, 8th Missouri Militia Cavalry. Berry suffered a broken right shoulder at Lone Jack, probably in one of the deadly assaults on the guns. *Luretta Williams Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks.* Right: Henry D. Moore, captain of Company H, 8th MSM Cavalry. At Lone Jack he was shot twice in the left thigh and once in the right ear. *Courtesy Jerry Moore.*

MAP 2 LONE JACK 5AM TO 7AM AUG 16, 1862


UNKNOWN
HUNTER
JACKMAN
TRACY
To Ammo Wagon
Tall weeds
Tall weeds
HAYS
4
3
5
6
PLUMB
Street
F
8MSM
A
7MVC
BRAWNER
Street
FOSTER
1
7
7
2
CPT SLOCUM
CPT LONG
Long's Counterattack
LONG
Corn
Corn
Corn
Corn
MAP KEY (MAPS 2 & 3)
Two James rifled cannons (Union)
Old frontier-style weather boarded single story house
Outbuildings (i.e., cow sheds, etc.)
1 Blacksmith shop (Foster's headquarters); large building, single story
2 Blackjack oak tree; very tall, visible for miles
3 Cave Hotel; two story building, frontier-style and weather boarded
4 Log cabin
Public square
5 Stables
6 Dr. Caleb Winfrey's house and store
Osage orange hedgerow
7 Openings in hedgerow
Rail fence
Cornfields
Area of tall weeds
Building used as field hospital
W
S
North
E
0
150 feet

Map Graphics © DLF Group 2003

matters worse, he received word that a Union cavalry force was moving through the cornfield on his right flank and reasoned that, “unless immediate steps were taken, they would capture our horses and ammunition, and also be able to charge me in the right rear.”[32]

The flaws in the independent nature of the rebel command and the resulting poor communication were quickly becoming apparent. Unbeknown to Hunter the horsemen moving on his right were not Union cavalry but fellow Confederates. Although it will probably always remain an enigma, it is highly probable that this force was part of Coffee's missing command, or possibly a mounted force led by Captain David Shanks of Hays' command. Far from threatening Hunter's position this force, numbering perhaps two hundred men, was attempting to turn the Union left flank. Plumb's Union detachment, catching a glimpse of the horsemen as they emerged from the cornfield, opened fire as it crossed to the east side of the street. Plumb later claimed he “repulsed a large force of cavalry, which charged furiously upon our left, aiming to rout us at the first dash.”[33]

Plumb's fusillade may well have discomforted the mounted rebels, but a greater shock was quickly to follow. Foster had once again dispatched a small force behind cover of the hedgerow, this time under the command of Captain Elias Slocum of Company H, 7th MSM Cavalry. Pulling two companies from the center, Slocum worked his way south along the prickly barrier to a point perhaps a hundred feet south of the Union left, where the hedge, turning sharply, ran into the cornfield.

As the rebel horsemen charged through the tall corn south of the hedge, MAP 3 LONE JACK 7AM TO 10:30AM AUG 16, 1862


Tall weeds
Hotel on fire, 9 a.m.
Tall weeds
HUNTER-&-JACKMAN
TRACY
HAYS
Corn
5
6
3
Federal withdrawal 1030 a.m.
Street
Street
By 9 a.m. Foster rolled the two guns into the street
1
7
7
2
W
S
North
E
Corn
Corn
Corn
Corn
MAP KEY (MAPS 2 & 3)
Confederate unit
Union company
Confederate attack
Union attack
Secondary Confederate attack
Union counterattack
Confederate march route
Union movement
Confederate retreat
Union retreat

Map Graphics © DLF Group 2003

hoping to outflank the Union position, they smashed headlong into the formidable hedgerow. Describing the resulting carnage, Foster wrote:

> Furious cries and fearful maledictions, mingled with the sharp rattle of Slocum's rifles, told of confusion on the one side and deadly determination on the other of that green wall. Here was one of the deadliest spots on the bloody field of Lone Jack. But the killing here was all done by Slocum, for so great was the confusion among the guerrillas—those behind crowding forward upon those checked by the hedge—that not a hundred shots, all told, were fired by them. Finding this route impracticable they returned to the main body of Confederates massed on our front.[34]

Hunter, not sure who was on his right and with his men almost out of ammunition, marched his command southwest in a maneuver designed to protect his flank. Then, changing his mind, he resolved to replenish his ammunition and headed northwest, the last known direction of the ammunition wagon. By doing so Hunter abandoned the field completely, leaving an irate Jackman with his right flank completely exposed.

Shortly after Hunter's departure Jackman ordered his own men to retire, partly because of the exposed flank but also because they too were out of ammunition. Marching west, Jackman's soldiers rejoined Hunter and together they moved north toward the ordnance wagon. A lull descended on the southern portion of the field.[35]

In stark contrast, the fighting to the north grew in intensity. The roar of musketry and cannon fire rose to a crescendo, and pausing only long enough to regroup, Tracy's and Hays' commands renewed their assault. The Confederates, led by Hays himself, stormed from the west side of the street. With their trapped comrades from the hedgerow joining them, the Confederates aimed their attack squarely at the two guns of the Indiana battery. Desperate for cover, many of the Union men brought up their mounts to use as a living breastwork. Seeing this, Hays ordered his men to direct their fire at the animals. Brawner's company alone lost twenty-six of them in rapid succession. For many years residents and veterans would recall the piteous screams and groans of these dying horses as they collapsed in heaps.[36]

The Hoosier cannoneers worked the two guns at a feverish pace, discharging blasts of canister as quickly as the cylinders could be rammed home. With each discharge dozens of iron balls belched from the guns, and billowing clouds of white smoke, combining with the smoke from hundreds of small arms, choked the air and obscured friend and foe alike.

Just moments after Hays ordered the charge the surging rebel tide swept over the artillery pieces. A brief but bloody close-quarter engagement ensued. One young Confederate jumped up on a captured gun, yelling "Hurrah for Jeff Davis!" before falling dead, riddled with bullets. The surviving cannoneers abandoned their guns and ran to the rear, passing the blacksmith shop and squeezing through the break in the hedge beyond, with Brawner's supporting cavalry joining the rout. Directly on their heels came the screaming rebels, many following the Union men through the opening in the hedgerow. As the rebel force poured around the hedge Captain Long and his detachment fled south into the cornfield. Word that the guns had been captured spread quickly along the Union line, disheartening the defenders.[37]

Toward the left-center of the street, Company F of the 8th MSM Cavalry was ordered to mount up and ride north toward the captured James guns, but as they neared them the order was countermanded. Instead the company was directed to find a way to enter the cornfield east of the hedgerow and drive the enemy out. The company of Federals proceeded south, finding another break in the hedgerow. "We went out some twenty or thirty rows [into the cornfield,] turned north, then wheeled into line and made a charge," stated Corporal William L. Roney. "The enemy was packed in there as thick as they could lie on the ground. They rose up and gave [us] a frightful volley, and wounded quite a few." Forced back by a hail of gunfire, Company F retreated to its original position and dismounted.

As Captains Brawner and Long tried to rally their shaken men, Major Foster took steps to remedy the situation. With no enemy on his left flank he ordered Captain Plumb to move with two companies toward the center to help recapture the guns. Taking his own Company B, and Company A of the 6th MSM Cavalry, Plumb united with some rallied soldiers and rushed toward the captured guns.[38]

Amid the dust, smoke, and mangled heaps of dead and dying men and horses, the Unionists struck back. Fighting hand-to-hand the blueclad troopers recaptured their cannon and quickly got them back into action. The shattered Confederates were once again driven back across the street, while an equal number took refuge on the east and west side of the hedgerow. Among the bodies littering the street was that of Plumb, stopped by a rifle ball that shattered his right shoulder.

Meanwhile Jackman, arriving at the ammunition wagon, was astonished to find hundreds of men simply milling around. Jackman witnessed Cockrell "urging them, with all his power that was in him, to return to the battle, but with little effect." While most of Hunter's and Jackman's men hurriedly filled their pockets and cartridge pouches with ammunition, the remainder seemed unconcerned about future operations. Perhaps Foster's spirited defense was judged too great to overcome, or this style of fighting deemed too reckless for new recruits, but many in the Confederate force refused to return to the fight. The presence of so many reluctant warriors had a detrimental impact on those preparing to return to battle. These men told Jackman, "Why [should] a few of us go back to be killed, when the whole command is here and refuses to go back?" Nevertheless, gathering up all who would follow, Jackman and Hunter marched directly back toward New Town.[39]

On his way to the firing line Jackman spotted Colonel Tracy being carried from the field by two men. Jackman, alarmed, inquired about his fellow commander's injury. Tracy told him he had been wounded by an exploding shell while attacking the Federal guns. The rain of iron fragments had, in Tracy's words, "cut me on the top of the head and some cut my legs terribly in front and one piece struck me in the fundament, and now the blood is running down my legs." After a quick examination, Jackman could find no trace of the wounds, and in fact could find nothing physically wrong with Tracy. "[I] was thoroughly convinced," stated Jackman, "that [Tracy] was mistaken as to what was running down his legs."[40]

Now resembling more an armed mob than a military unit, Jackman's and Hunter's ad hoc command returned to the fight on the western edge of town. As the Confederates climbed the fence and moved toward the cover of a few scattered outbuildings they were once again met

COLE YOUNGER

First Lieutenant Thomas Coleman "Cole" Younger served under Colonel Upton Hays at Lone Jack. After the war Cole Younger, along with Frank and Jesse James, gained national notoriety as bank and train robbers. On September 7, 1876, the James-Younger gang attempted to rob a bank in Northfield, Minnesota, but were met by a hail of gunfire. Cole and his brothers, Jim and Bob, were seriously wounded and later captured and convicted. Sentenced to life in prison, Cole was helped in his parole efforts by former Lone Jack veteran Major Emory Foster. Surprisingly, the Federal commander wrote to Judge George M. Bennett of Minneapolis in the late 1890s in an effort to help secure Cole's freedom. Foster's letter contains an interesting account of the battle and sheds light on conditions in Missouri immediately after the war:

> During the progress of the fight my attention was called to a young Confederate riding in front of the Confederate line, distributing ammunition to the men from what seemed to be a 'split basket.' He rode along under a most galling fire from our side the entire length of the Confederate line, and when he had at last disappeared, our boys recognized his gallantry in ringing cheers. I was told by some of our men from the western border of the state that they recognized the daring young rider as Cole Younger. About 9:30 a.m. I was shot down. The wounded of both forces were gathered up and were placed in houses. My brother and I, both supposed to be mortally wounded, were in the same bed. About an hour after the Confederates left the field, the ranking officer who took command when I became unconscious, gathered his men together and returned to Lexington.
>
> Soon after [their departure] the Confederates returned. The first man who entered my room was a guerrilla [Quantrill's band arrived after the fight], followed by a dozen or more men who seemed to obey him. He was personally known to me and had been my enemy from before the war. He said he and his men had just shot a lieutenant of a Cass county company whom they found wounded, and that he would shoot me and my brother. While he was standing over us, threatening us with his drawn pistol, the young man I had seen distributing ammunition along in front of the Confederate line rushed into the room from the west door and seizing the fellow, thrust him out of the room. Several Confederates followed the young Confederate into the room, and I heard them call him Cole Younger. He (Younger) sent for Col. Cockrell (in command of the Confederate forces) and stated the case to him. He also called the young man Cole Younger and directed him to guard the house, which he did.

by a withering fusillade from the Federals positioned across the street. The attacking force quickly took cover and returned fire. Aiming at shadowy figures made indistinct by clouds of billowing smoke, some of the shots fired by Hunter's and Jackman's men missed their mark. Flying wide, these bullets smacked into Hays' and Tracy's position behind the hedgerow in the rear of the Federals. One of the men injured by this friendly fire was Private Henry C. Luttrell. Severely wounded, he was dragged away to the rebel field hospital, established in a mill just north of New Town.[41]

Working his way among the prone forms behind the hedge, Colonel Hays tried to rally his dazed command. Desperate to instill an aggressive fighting spirit, he shouted above the roar of battle that he would show his men something. With a pistol in each hand Hays gave the order to "Charge, double quick!" at the Union men in the cornfield. The Southerners rose as one, with even the unarmed men ready to launch themselves at their foes.

From his position in the cornfield Captain Long witnessed Hays' preparations and launched a hasty counterattack. With their backs against the hedge barrier the Confederates found themselves faced with the threat of the charging Federals while still taking fire from their own men across the street. Hays reluctantly ordered a swift retreat, and while most of the rebels managed to escape through the opening in the hedgerow, some found this avenue blocked by the onrushing cavalrymen.[42]

Major Harvey Vivian and three of his subordinates were captured by Long's onrushing troopers. The officer watched as the dismounted Union men shot his three comrades. As they turned on the major a Union officer intervened, insisting Vivian be taken prisoner. While marching their captive toward the blacksmith shop a volley erupted from the Confederates across the street, sending the Union guards diving to the ground. Instead of taking cover Vivian ran, suffering a bullet through the arm in the process. Desperation forced him to claw his way to safety through the thorny barrier. "Upon landing on the other side I was somewhat of a tattered mess," reported Vivian, "[as] the majority of my clothes had hung in the hedge." With his body torn and bleeding he stumbled toward a riderless horse, swung himself into the saddle, and made good his escape.[43]

As the fighting continued to rage, a stream of wounded Federals found their way to the Cave Hotel; with the yellow hospital flag clearly visible it appeared a safe sanctuary from the maelstrom engulfing the street. Inside Mrs. Cave and her family, along with Dr. Cundiff and his assistants, gave what aid they could to the wounded and dying.

Between 7:00 and 9:00 a.m., as the opposing lines consolidated their positions, the battle evolved into a shooting match across the sixty-foot-wide street, Hay's and Tracy's men holding the west side of the street, the Union men the east. To the right-front of the blacksmith shop, the two rifled cannons continued to blast away at any viable target, albeit at a slower rate owing to the number of casualties among the crews. Although the Confederates faced a serious disadvantage, having to fire directly into the rising sun, they nevertheless were now well within shotgun range of the enemy. With both friend and foe firmly entrenched, Foster likened the struggle to "two wrestling athletes [holding] each other in a horrible embrace."

As bullets and buckshot filled the air the Union casualties began to mount. One of Captain Long's cavalrymen was struck in the face by a shotgun blast, the buckshot tearing away his lower jaw. Dazed, the critically injured soldier stumbled against another comrade, who had been wounded when a rifle ball broke

My brother had with him about $300, and I had about $700. This money and our revolvers were, with the knowledge and approval of Cole Younger, placed in safe hands, and... delivered to my mother in Warrensburg, MO.

Cole Younger was then certainly a high type of manhood, and every inch a soldier, who risked his own life to protect that of wounded and disabled enemies. I believe he still retains those qualities and would prove himself as good a citizen as we have among us if set free, and would fight for the Stars and Stripes as fearlessly as he did for the Southern flag.

I have never seen him since the battle of Lone Jack. I know much of the conditions and circumstances under which the Youngers were placed after the war, and knowing this, I have great sympathy for them. Many men, now prominent and useful citizens of Missouri, were, like the Youngers, unable to return to their homes until some fortunate accident through [threw] them with men they had known before the war, who had influence enough to make easy their return to peace and usefulness. If this had occurred to the Youngers, they would have had good homes in Missouri.

Source: *The Story of Cole Younger—By Himself* (1903).

Thomas Coleman ("Cole") Younger.
Historical Society of Missouri

both of his arms. Neither man wanted to leave the fight, so they determined to work in tandem. Unable to load his rifle on his own, the jawless man would hold the cartridge while his comrade tore through the paper with his teeth, exposing the powder and ball. Onlookers watched in amazement as the two continued to blast away at the enemy despite their horrible wounds. Nearby, Foster watched a round tear through the skull of one of Captain Plumb's men. Although mortally wounded the soldier continued to fumble through the motion of reloading his rifle; he died an hour later with the weapon still locked in his hands. Private George T. Delozier of Company F, 8th MSM, was wounded in succession by a bullet through the right shoulder, one through the right side of his neck, and finally a blast in the face from a shotgun. At his post beside the blacksmith shop Private William Hopper, of the Second Battalion MSM, was hit in the hand and knuckles by two spent rounds. As he bent to recover his fallen rifle a third bullet ricocheted off the building and struck him in the back of the head, driving him face forward into the dirt street.[44]

Confederate casualties mounted too. As cannon and small arms fire swept the avenue the rebels managed to work their way through the buildings and lots to the back of the Cave Hotel. Taking devastating fire from the buildings east of the street, Jackman's men broke into small squads, each desperately trying to find cover. The colonel and five others took refuge behind a small cabin in back of the Cave Hotel. In seconds, however, a bullet slammed into the temple of a man beside Jackman. A moment later a round ripped through the head of a first sergeant, who fell beside the other victim, whereupon a third bullet shattered the skull of Captain Abner Bryant. Certain that the next shot would add another body to the rapidly growing pile, Jackman recommended to his surviving comrades that they change position. The words had hardly left his mouth, however, before a fourth shot struck home. Jackman and the remaining man quickly moved to a new location.

Convinced that the deadly sniper fire was coming from within the Cave Hotel, the Confederates began firing into the two-story structure. While this small arms fire easily penetrated the thin board walls it seemed to have little effect, as the rebels continued to lose men to the concealed Federals.

Frustrated, Lieutenant James C. Martin suggested to Jackman that the snipers could be flushed out if the structure was set ablaze. Jackman approved the plan and ordered his remaining soldiers to prepare to shoot any Federals who emerged from the hotel. Martin, assisted by Private Lafayette Logan, sprinted to the back of the structure, picking up bits of paper and other combustibles along the way. Within minutes the two men had crammed the kindling into the weatherboard, setting fire to the hotel.[45]

Busily moving from patient to patient, Dr. Cundiff watched in horror as flames began to consume the back wall of his hospital. Rushing outside, the surgeon pleaded for assistance. From across the street a small force of Union men responded, hastily flanking the hotel and holding the rebels at bay until Cundiff could remove his patients. As the wounded were carried across the avenue Mrs. Cave and her family exited the building, running as fast as they could through a hail of gunfire and making their way over the fence to take cover in the tall weeds. Before long, however, Mrs. Cave, while attempting to comfort one of her offspring, was shot in the chest and mortally wounded. She died five weeks later in the presence of her traumatized children.[46]

Within minutes the entire hotel was engulfed in flames. Miraculously, Cundiff had managed to get almost all of the wounded out of the building. One man, a Confederate badly wounded in the skirmish the previous night, was not moved in time and was burned alive in the flames.

From the limited vantage points offered by the blacksmith shop, Foster continued to scan the horizon for any sign of reinforcements. At 9:15 a.m. he observed a force of some two hundred men about a mile south of town. Believing them to be Federals, Foster's soldiers let out a loud cheer. However, after observing the fight for a short while, the mounted men turned and rode from view; to this day their identity is unknown.

The battle continued to rage, and the Union men around the blacksmith shop began to take accurate fire from a small house to their north. In an effort to dislodge the sharpshooters Foster ordered his two James rifles pushed forward into the street. As Captain Brawner and his company deployed to protect the remaining cannoneers, the Union gunners took sight down the length of their tubes and began to fire salvo after salvo into the house to the north.[47]

With projectiles pummeling their residence, Mrs. William Phillips, her two children, and a sixteen-year-old niece took shelter in a bedroom, crowding into the meager protection of an empty wardrobe. Soon one of the Federal shots ripped through the house, smashing the bedstead and showering the wardrobe with debris; the family lost no time in fleeing.[48]

Shortly after 10:00 a.m. Foster noticed that the Confederate fire was slack-

DEATH OF CAPTAIN LONG

Among the civilians who voluntarily fought alongside Confederate troops in the battle was a group of brothers from Pleasant Hill, Missouri, a community approximately a dozen miles southeast of Lone Jack. James Henley, with ten other boys, raced to the scene of the fight, anxious to get a shot at the Yankees. A brother, Andrew Henley, was also involved in the fight as a recent recruit of Vard Cockrell.

Following the battle James Henley was surveying the carnage when he heard his name being called by a wounded Federal officer. The man was unrecognizable, with black smears of gunpowder and dried blood obscuring his face, but James knew the voice belonged to Captain William Long. Prior to the battle Long had been commander of the Federal garrison at Pleasant Hill, which was located at the old fairgrounds opposite the Henley family home. Long had befriended the family, despite their secessionist leanings.

The brothers decided to take the wounded officer into their own care. When Long said he was too badly hurt to make the trip on horseback, Joseph Henley, the boys' father, rode home and returned with a wagon.

While all of his three wounds were serious, the shot that had shattered Captain Long's leg was most dangerous, and several days after the battle his leg was amputated. By that time Andrew Henley, also wounded in the leg at Lone Jack, had returned home. Long, hearing that the ening. Convinced that the enemy was running low on ammunition, Foster surveyed the area. To his great surprise he witnessed a man on horseback distributing cartridges among the rebel soldiers deployed along the west side of the street. As the Union soldiers fired away the man continued to dispense the greatly needed ammunition, apparently unconcerned by the Federal bullets hissing around him. With his supply finally exhausted the man rode calmly away, amid the cheers of impressed Federals.

Within a few moments the center of the street was once again engulfed in gunfire. As one wing of the Confederate army poured deadly shotgun blasts into the Federal position, some of Hunter's and Jackman's soldiers moved stealthily upon the guns of the Indiana battery. Once again the section of James rifles and Brawner's supporting cavalry came under a blistering fire.

Enraged by what he perceived as the needless slaughter of his men, Lieutenant Devlin broke from arrest and ran to his section, ordering his men to fall back to the safety of the buildings. As the crews began to break, Sergeant Scott, "with blackened face and flaming eyes, and fighting like the devil incarnate," countermanded Devlin's order. The artillerymen, trying to decide whose order to follow, hesitated. At that moment Devlin was struck down, two bullets tearing through his lower abdomen and testicles. As their officer crumpled to the ground, and with a surging mass of yelping rebels bearing down on their position, most of the Hoosiers abandoned their artillery pieces.[49]

Emboldened by the sudden cessation of artillery fire the Confederates stormed into the street. About one hundred and fifty Southerners descended swiftly on Brawner and the few remaining men of the artillery crew. A savage hand-to-hand contest followed, the rebels capturing the guns and forcing the Federals to flee. As the Confederates wheeled the pieces around, and attempted to get them into action, Brawner called for reinforcements. In another mad sortie, Brawner once again secured the guns, driving the Southerners back to the west side of the road. In seconds, however, the Confederates again charged, driving Brawner and his exhausted warriors back to the blacksmith shop.

The bloody contest was by no means over. Again Union soldiers stormed out of the blacksmith shop and surrounding structures, with Captain Brawner leading them forward, back toward the guns. Amid the heaps of dead and dying men and horses, the close-quarter struggle continued, revolvers, clubbed muskets, and fists all being freely used. Brawner's force once again secured the guns as the Confederates retired. Knowing their position was untenable the Union men began to wheel the guns by hand back toward the blacksmith shop. Before they could get far, however, another Confederate charge, the largest of the day, swept forward. In the face-to-face bloodbath that followed, a wounded Brawner and his survivors were sent reeling. As Foster watched from the blacksmith shop, the victorious rebels began to pull the captured guns through the maze of prostrate bodies back to their side of the street.

Meanwhile, Major Foster called on Captain Long for immediate support. Long, who had been fighting Hunter's and Jackman's men south of the blacksmith shop, responded quickly, and despite his wounds personally led sixty men to the blacksmith shop. Foster remembered, "[Long's] coat had been thrown aside and his shirt, open at the collar, exposed his breast bathed in blood and powder stained. He had a strange light in his eye, and his parted lips showed his teeth set sharply together." Through the roar of small arms fire Foster called out

Captain William A. Long (left), commander of Company A, Second Battalion Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and unknown comrade. *Courtesy Margaret McClellan.*

oldest son was recuperating in the next room, asked if it was possible to see him. When Andrew hobbled into the room and over to the bed Long took his friend's hand and shook it heartily.

Captain William Long died soon after, still in the care of the Henley family, and was buried in the Pleasant Hill cemetery.

Source: *Pleasant Hill Times,* August 25, 1911 to Long, asking if he would help recapture the cannons. Long replied in the affirmative, saying, "I would go with you to hell!" With only an empty pistol in his hand, Long and his sixty men followed Major Foster and small force into the firestorm beyond.

Foster's forlorn hope emerged from the blacksmith shop and leapt upon the enemy. Surprised by the savage onslaught, the stunned Southern men again abandoned their prizes and staggered back to the east side of the street. The surviving Union force began wheeling the cannons back to the blacksmith shop, past the ever-growing piles of dead. As he strained to move one gun Major Foster was struck by a bullet to the back, and he fell into the dirt street.

Once the guns were back on the Union side of the street, Melville Foster traversed the road again, under an intense storm of gunfire, to return to his brother's side. As the young captain reached his brother and bent down he too was struck. A bullet ripped through his right breast, emerging near his right shoulder blade. Losing blood quickly, the mortally wounded officer managed to retrieve his brother and struggle back to the blacksmith shop, being hit again in the process. The final charge had been successful; the artillery would remain in Union hands for the duration of the battle. It had been a costly victory. Forty-eight of Long's sixty men were killed or wounded within a few moments. Among the rows of dead and dying men littering the street was Captain Long himself, having fallen at the head of his command. As Major Foster lay in a half conscious state on the floor of the shop the battle continued to rage outside. The few remaining cannoneers, assisted by volunteer cavalrymen, once again manned their guns and opened on the Confederates.[50]

About 10:30 a.m. the firing again seemed to taper off, then cease. From their position the Federals caught glimpses of Confederate troops in small groups of twos and threes breaking from cover and leaving the field. Elated, a spontaneous cheer went up from the Union lines—the rebels had begun withdrawing to the north. To the Unionists it seemed that their sacrifice and struggle had been rewarded with victory.

The celebration was short lived, however. The Confederate retreat halted as the heretofore absent command of Colonel Coffee, over eight hundred strong, emerged from the woods north of town and deployed for battle. The appearance of this force, fresh and apparently ready to redeem their reputation, electrified their exhausted compatriots. "[These reinforcements] arrived just in the nick of time, when victory was poised over the field, uncertain where to perch," reported Hunter.[51]

With Major Foster grievously wounded, Captain Brawner took command of the remaining Union forces. It did not take him long to evaluate the combat effectiveness of his dwindling command. His men were exhausted, having traveled over a hundred miles in the previous days and fought the skirmish the night before, and having been heavily engaged since daybreak. In addition, they were nearly out of ammunition. With reinforcements nowhere in sight, Captain Brawner reluctantly but prudently gave the order to abandon Lone Jack and retreat to Lexington.[52]

This would not be easy, as scores of horses had been killed and wounded. All of the horses belonging to the artillery section were dead, their crumpled corpses still harnessed to the limbers. Unable to drag the cannon by hand to Lexington, some of Foster's exhausted survivors rolled the guns south down the street, past the hedgerow, and into the cornfield beyond.[53] Here the artillery pieces were spiked, the tubes dismounted from the carriages, and the carriages given a superficial camouflage of corn stalks.[54]

Mounting his command, with some no doubt riding double, Brawner led his men out of the village they had fought so hard to defend. Nearly every officer in his command had been killed or wounded, including Brawner himself. Unable to take their wounded with them, the Federals gathered them into a small store building near the smoldering ruins of the Cave Hotel, where they were left to the mercy of the rebels. Among these bleeding men were the two Foster brothers and Captain Long. The Federal dead were left where they fell, as there was not time enough for their burial. The cavalry column wound north from Lone Jack unmolested, reaching the Federal garrison at Lexington at 7 p.m.

Photograph of the subdivision located on the eastern portion of the Lone Jack battlefield.
Photograph by Alinda Miller.

The Friends of Historic Lone Jack, who support the Lone Jack Battlefield, Soldier's Cemetery & Museum in a variety of ways—including conducting all tours and providing publicity for the museum—are actively trying purchase and preserve the remaining portion of the battlefield.

To learn how to make a donation to the Lone Jack preservation project or to become a member of the Friends of Historic Lone Jack, visit their website: http://www.friendsofhistoriclonejack.org or write to: Friends of Historic Lone Jack, P.O. Box 34, Lone Jack, MO 64070.

Other questions can be directed to Alinda M. Miller, president of the Friends of Historic Lone Jack, at: President@friendsofhistoriclonejack.org

Captain Brawner expressed confidently to his superior that his men had won the battle. The price for this "victory," however, had been high; of the eight hundred men who left Lexington the day before fewer than half returned. Brawner reported forty-three men killed, 154 wounded, and seventy-five missing, for a total of 272. This does not fully explain the return of less than four hundred of the command. Perhaps the rest were slightly wounded, either taking refuge in sympathetic homes along the route of retreat or returning to their own homes to recuperate; or perhaps they were troopers who straggled or were forced to march on foot, arriving in Lexington later. In any case, Foster's command suffered a casualty rate of at least thirty-four percent, and perhaps more than fifty percent.[55]

Bolstered by Coffee's arrival the combined rebel command once again entered Lone Jack, only to find its bullet-riddled buildings deserted. As the rebel surgeons began ministering to the Union wounded the soldiers began to comb the battlefield for much-needed ordnance and supplies. The retreating Federals had left behind hundreds of rifles, pistols, and carbines. Scattered through the buildings and yards were sets of leather accouterments, canteens, blankets, and pieces of clothing. In addition, scores of saddles and bridles were removed from the dead cavalry horses for further use. Hunter found the two artillery pieces where they had been left, guarded only by a small boy and two horses. The guns were jubilantly claimed as trophies of war.[56]

The blistering August sun made it imperative that the bodies of the dead be buried quickly. Two parallel trenches were dug under the shade of the large blackjack tree, with the bodies of the dead laid inside, segregated into friend and foe. Colonel Hunter walked along the trenches, surveying the bodies as they awaited a covering of earth. Inquiring of the officer in charge of the burial detail, Hunter learned that 119 Federals and forty-seven rebels had been brought there for burial. Undoubtedly more Confederates had been killed, as several sources list a nearly equal number of dead for each side. Most likely many of the Southern dead were identified and their bodies retrieved by friends and family for private burial. Whatever the number of Confederate casualties they were certainly severe, as Colonel Tracy reported after the fight that the Southern command was "shot all to pieces, crippled, and bleeding."

Important, too, was the disposal of the dead cavalry and artillery horses. One local farmer, Tom Roupe, was ordered to drag some seventy-five to one hundred dead or dying horses off the main street and deposit their carcasses outside of town, an effort that took all day.[57]

As the secessionists completed policing up the battlefield their commanders took stock of the situation. Operationally their campaign had been a success. Men had been recruited in adequate numbers, enough to field several full regiments. Even better, the Federal loss in arms and equipage significantly benefited the Confederate command.

However, the rebels knew their position was untenable, so preparations were made to begin their movement south. They too would leave the seriously wounded behind. Those who could not journey to their own homes to recuperate would be left with local citizens or await the return of the Federal army.

By mid-morning of August 17 the remaining rebels were warned of the presence of another Federal force. General Warren entered Lone Jack that morning, and General Blunt arrived from Fort Scott the next day, his 2,500 men making the trip with remarkable speed. Discovering the fate of Foster's command, and ascertaining the Confederate route of retreat, Blunt set off in pursuit. The Union pursuit was dogged, but the Confederates made good their escape, soon reaching the relative safety of north-central Arkansas.

* * *

MANY OF THE MAJOR PARTICIPANTS, including Foster, Hunter, and Jackman, contributed their memories of the battle to a series of newspaper articles published in the 1880s. Understandably, the accounts were in many respects contradictory. Moreover, many of the writers, especially the ex-Confederates, descended to character assassination. Prompted by this public squabbling Henry Luttrell, having survived his wound and served until the end of the war, wrote:

> Let the honors fall on those who deserve them. But after the sad story is all and truly told it reveals the sorry spectacle of contention for the honor of superiority in command among the officers, where unity should have existed. Even at this late day we see that the venom has not all been exhausted. No wonder the Confederacy collapsed.[58]

KIP LINDBERG is archivist of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Collection, U.S. Army Chemical School, Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri, and the former site superintendent of the Mine Creek Battlefield State Historic Site.

MATT MATTHEWS is an opposing forces specialist with the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is also the former mayor of Ottawa, Kansas.

The authors are currently completing a book on the Baxter Springs, Kansas, massacre.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: The authors would like to thank Alinda Miller, president of the Friends of Historic Lone Jack, and LTC Frank Gammon for their help in researching this article.

NOTES

1. A teenage Harry S Truman, future U.S. president, was among those in the audience when veteran and Truman family friend Abe Koger corrected Colonel Crisp. This is his recollection of that event. Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman* (Berkley, CA, 1974), p. 68; David McCulloch, *Truman* (New York, 1992), p. 63.
2. "Rooster" Cogburn, the fiction character created by author Charles Portis for his book *True Grit*, and portrayed by John Wayne in the 1969 motion picture of the same name, claimed he lost his eye as a Confederate participant at the Battle of Lone Jack.
3. *Organization and Status of Missouri Troops (Union and Confederate) in Service During the Civil War* (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1902), pp. 48-54.
4. Richard L. Norton, ed., *"Behind Enemy Lines": The Memoirs and Writings of Brigadier General Sidney Drake Jackman* (Springfield, MO, 1997), pp. 72-73, 81.
5. United States War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 Vols. (Washington, D. C. 1880-1901), Series I, Volume 13, p. 238 (hereafter cited as O.R.; all citations of O.R. refer to Series 1 unless indicated otherwise).
6. George S. Grover, "Major Emory S. Foster," *Missouri Historical Review*, Vol. XIV, Nos. 3-4 (April-July, 1920), pp. 425-32.; *Liberty Weekly Tribune*, April 4, 1862.

7. Ordnance Reports, Box 767-768, RG: 94, Stack: 8WC, Row 13, Compartment 16, Shelf B, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Frank J. Gammon of Huntersville, North Carolina, conducted this research, which clearly shows that the two guns used by Union forces at Lone Jack were bronze M1841 6-pounders with 3.67-inch bores, rifled to the James system. In addition, newspaper articles and veteran accounts make numerous mentions of "rifled bronze cannon" and specify James shells.
8. S.K. Hall, Letter to Harris, 12 September 1862, from the collection and courtesy *General Sweeny's Museum of Civil War History*, Republic, Missouri.
9. *O.R.*, Vol. 13, pp.238, 569, 575.
10. *O.R.*, Vol.13, pp. 569, 575.
11. *O.R.*, Vol. 13, p. 571.
12. Norton, ed., *Behind Enemy Lines*, 82-84.
13. Kit Dalton, *Under The Black Flag* (Memphis, 1912), p.76; Romulus L. Travis, *The Story of Lone Jack* (n.p. 1907).
14. Norton, ed., *Behind Enemy Lines*, 84.
15. *O.R.*, Vol.13, p. 239.
16. *O.R.*, Vol.13, pp. 237, 239.
17. S.K. Hall, Letter to Harris; *O.R.*, Vol. 13, p. 239.
18. Norton, ed., *Behind Enemy Lines*, 85; W.L. Webb, *Battles and Biographies of Missourians: or the Civil War Period of Our State* (Kansas City, 1900), pp.153, 159.
19. Norton, ed., *Behind Enemy Lines*, 86.
20. *Ibid.*, 89-90.
21. *Ibid.*, 92.
22. Corporal William L. Roney, hand-written memoirs, scrapbook, compiled by the Independence, Missouri, chapter, United Daughters of the Confederacy, transcribed by *The Blue and Gray Chronicle*, Independence, Vol. 6, Number 3, February, 2003.
23. Norton, ed., *Behind Enemy Lines*, p. 92; C. B. Lotspeich, Manuscript, Mid-Continent Library, Independence, Missouri; *Missouri Republican*, September 12, 1885.
24. Ordnance Returns for 7th Missouri Volunteer Cavalry, Second Battalion Missouri State Militia Cavalry, 7th Missouri State Militia Cavalry, 6th Missouri State Militia Cavalry, 8th Missouri State Militia Cavalry, National Archives, Microfilm, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
25. *Missouri Republican*, August 1, 1885; Norton, ed., *Behind Enemy Lines*, 93.
26. *Missouri Republican*, September 26, 1885.
27. *O.R.*, Vol. 13, p.237; Roney memoir; Lotspeich manuscript; Norton, ed., *Behind Enemy Lines*, 92-93; Leslie Anders, "Fighting the Ghost at Lone Jack," *Missouri Historical Review*, Volume LXXIX, Number 3 (April, 1985), p. 342.
28. Norton, ed., *Behind Enemy Lines*, 93. Campbellism was founded by Thomas Campbell and his son Alexander Campbell, in the early 19th century. The order was known by many names such as, the Restoration Movement, Disciples of Christ, and The Christian Church. Many in the church believed that it was a return to the pure New Testament and teachings.
29. Lebanon *Rustic Leader*, May 12, 1881.
30. Webb, pp. 159, 328-30.
31. *O.R.*, Vol. 13, pp. 237, 239; Missouri Republican, August 1, 1885; *Confederate Veteran*, April 1916, p. 63.
32. *Missouri Republican*, September 12, 1885.
33. Janet B. Hewett, ed., *Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Addendum [Reports], Vol. 13, Serial No. 19 (Wilmington, 1996), p. 46.
34. *Missouri Republican*, August 1, 1885. Foster wrongly believed this to be Quantrill's command.
35. *Missouri Republican*, September 12, 1885.
36. W.L. Webb, *Battles and Biographies of Missourians: or the Civil War Period of Our State* (Kansas City, 1900), p.157.
37. Webb, 158.
38. *O.R.*, Vol. 13, p. 237; Roney Memoirs; *Supplement to the O.R.*, Vol.13, Serial No. 19, p. 46.
39. *Supplement to the O.R.*, Vol. 13, Serial No. 19, p. 46; Norton, ed., *Behind Enemy Lines*, 96.
40. Norton, ed., *Behind Enemy Lines*, 97. A previous example of Tracy's behavior comes from Dr. John W. Armstrong, who fought at Lone Jack. Armstrong claimed that Tracy ran away from a fight in "Hog-eye," Missouri, early in the campaign. *Lebanon Rustic Leader*, May 12, 1881. It should be noted, however, that Tracy had by all accounts performed honorably at the Battle of Wilson's Creek, where he was wounded in action. Henry C. Luttrell, a Lone Jack veteran, made the following statement after reading Jackman's account of Lone Jack: "Tracy certainly did not show any sign of cowardice while leading his regiment to the charge on that fated morning; he faced 'the music' like a little man to my certain knowledge up to the time of his wound. What he did afterwards, I, of course don't know, but I don't believe he acted the pusillanimous cur that Jackman describes." *Missouri Republican*, October 3, 1885.
41. *Ibid.*
42. Webb, 157. Letter from Major Vivian, Jackson County Historical Society Archives.
43. Article on file at the archives of the Jackson County Historical Society.
44. *Missouri Republican*, August 1, 1885; Pension application of William Hooper, National Archives and Records Administration
45. Norton, ed., *Behind Enemy Lines*, 99-100; *Missouri Republican*, September 12, 1885.
46. *Missouri Republican*, September 26, 1885; Webb, 159. Jesse M. Cave, "Memories of the Battle of Lone Jack," *Independence Examiner*, August 14, 1937.
47. *Missouri Republican*, August 1, 1885.
48. W.Z. Hickman, History of Jackson County (Topeka, KS, 1920), p. 283.
49. *Missouri Republican*, August 1, 1885.
50. *Ibid.*, Roney Memoirs.
51. *Missouri Republican*, August 1, 1885; September 12, 1885.
52. *O.R.*, Vol.13, pp. 237-38.
53. Roney memoirs.
54. "Spiked" means the cannon were damaged, probably by driving a rat-tailed file into the vent hole to prevent the insertion of a friction primer or other ignition device. By removing the trunnion caps and lifting the carriage trail a cannon tube could easily be dismounted. Weighing around eight hundred pounds, it would take several men to remount the tube on the carriage. According to Captain Brawner's after-action report, "we spiked one of [the guns] and otherwise very much injured the other, while the ammunition belonging to them was mostly destroyed before we left."
55. Report of Colonel Dan Huston, September 23, 1862, from the collection and courtesy *General Sweeny's Museum of Civil War History*, Republic, Missouri.
56. *Missouri Republican*, September 12, 1885.
57. Norton, ed., *Behind Enemy Lines*, 110; Ernest N. Roupe, "Boyhood Memories of the Civil War," from the Jackson County Historical Society Archives.
58. *Missouri Republican*, October 3, 1885.

Have you looked at the *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* lately?

It is linked and searchable at

northandsouthmagazine.com

"I am a 20 year old student from Poland.... And after I've read the May edition of your magazine, I can say it is very interesting and I will buy it continually."
—Miko Lenczewski, Warsaw, Poland

"Keep up the good work with your excellent magazine!"
—Marcia Lowrie, Zürich, Switzerland


HOW GOOD A GENERAL WAS SHERMAN?
NORTH & SOUTH
THE OFFICIAL MAGAZINE OF THE CIVIL WAR SOCIETY
VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 2
THE ROAD TO DISUNION, 1776-1850
THE HENRY AND DONELSON CAMPAIGN

IN OUR NEXT ISSUE: VOL 7, #2

(Mails to subscribers 2/13; on sale in stores 2/27)

The Road to Disunion, 1776-1850 *—William W. Freehling*

Hell on Horseshoe Ridge *—Patrick Brennan*

Cannonade! Napoleonic and Civil War Artillery
—Steven Fratt

The Henry and Donelson Campaign *—Kendall D. Gott*

How Good A General Was William Tecumseh Sherman?*—Albert Castel and Steven E. Woodworth*

William P. Sanders: Son of the South, Defender of the Union *—Dorothy E. Kelly*

GOOD THINGS TO LOOK FORWARD TO:

"Civil War" or "War Between the States?" *—John Coski*

In Defense of Governor Isham G. Harris *—Larry Daniel*

The Southeast Blockading Squadron *—Stephen Wise*

The First Battle of Newtonia *—Matt Matthews and Kip Lindberg*

The Secession Ordinances *—Mike Ballard*

The Battle of Chickamauga *—Glenn Robertson*

"I certainly will continue to recommend your outstanding magazine in my circle of acquaintances. *—Jean Marie Dehenin, Tienen, Belgium*


"CIVIL WAR" OR "WAR BETWEEN THE STATES"?
NORTH & SOUTH
The Role of Cavalry in the Civil War
THE SOUTHEAST BLOCKADING SQUADRON


THE WORST TEN GENERALS OF THE CIVIL WAR
NORTH & SOUTH
THE CONFEDERATE DEBATE OVER ARMING THE SLAVES


TURNING POINTS OF THE CIVIL WAR
NORTH & SOUTH
THE MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN


THE ROAD TO DISUNION 1820-1850
NORTH & SOUTH
THE BRIGADE: KEY TO THE BATTLEFIELD


ESCAPE FROM ELMIRA
NORTH & SOUTH
THE II CORPS RAID

TO SUBSCRIBE OR TO GIVE A GIFT SUBSCRIPTION, simply call the 800 number below, or mail your payment or credit card number to: NORTH & SOUTH, 33756 Black Mountain Road, Tollhouse, CA 93667. PAYMENT SHOULD BE MADE TO CIVIL WAR SOCIETY (U.S. funds only). One year (7 issues) $39.99; two years (14 issues) $69.99; three years (21 issues) $99.99. OVERSEAS, add $10.00 per year (U.S. funds only) to your subscription. **TO BECOME AN EXECUTIVE MEMBER OF THE CIVIL WAR SOCIETY,** add $10.00 per year to your subscription (lifetime membership $500, includes yearly 7-issue subscription).

Join/Subscribe Today 800-546-6707

Overseas: 559-855-8637

FIGHTING FOR THE PAST
THE CIVIL WAR SOCIETY

THE TRUCE AT COLD HARBOR

Gordon C. Rhea



"Flag of Truce" by Julian Scott depicts Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Lyman seeking to negotiate the removal of Union dead and wounded two days after the June 3 battle at Cold Harbor. *Courtesy The Snite Museum of Art, University of Notre Dame*

OF THE CONTROVERSIES surrounding Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant and General Robert E. Lee, none has excited greater passion than the plight of wounded soldiers left between the lines after the unsuccessful Union assault at Cold Harbor. The two commanders delayed, equivocated, and bickered for more than four days, seemingly concerned more about protocol and debating points than about the welfare of the men lying between the armies.

Critics have generally faulted Grant, asserting that he was willing to subject his wounded soldiers to agonizing deaths rather than to concede that Lee had bested him. "If it be asked why so simple a duty of humanity as the rescue of the wounded and burial of the dead had been thus neglected, it is answered that it was due to an unnecessary scruple on the part of the Union commander in chief," a highly placed Union officer claimed. "Grant delayed sending a flag of truce to General Lee for this purpose because it would amount to an admission that he had been beaten on the 3rd of June." More recently, a noted Civil War scholar denounced Grant's conduct as a "sacrifice of brave men for no apparent purpose except to salve his rankled pride."[1]

Grant's partisans have pointed a finger at Lee. It was Grant, they maintain, who demonstrated the moral courage to first propose a truce, and it was Lee who quibbled over terms in hope of exacting a concession of defeat from Grant. "Lee's punctilio was satisfied," one of Grant's aides later noted, bitterly questioning "whether [Lee's] military reputation gained sufficiently to compensate for the sufferings he deliberately and unnecessarily prolonged."[2]

The truth in this sad and unfortunate episode lies somewhere between the extremes.

* * *

AT 4:30 A.M. ON JUNE 3, 1864, three Union army corps—the XVIII, VI, and II, arrayed in line north to south in that order—stepped from their entrenchments near Cold Harbor, Virginia, and started toward the distant Confederate line. Southern engineers had sited the rebel works along high ground to fashion overlapping fields of musketry and artillery fire, in places staking out exact ranges for the gunners. Cleverly arranged and backed by ample reinforcements, Lee's fortifications at Cold Harbor were well-nigh impregnable.

In the northern sector, Major General William F. "Baldy" Smith deployed three of his XVIII Corps brigades into tightly packed columns and hurled them into ravines that penetrated deep into the Confederate defenses. Unknown to Smith, the rebels in his front—veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia's First Corps—had transformed the gullies into pockets bristling with muskets and cannon. Massive firepower slammed Smith's men from three sides as they advanced, inflicting fearful slaughter. "It was almost impossible to move and live, the lifting of a head or hand being the signal for volleys of musketry," a New Englander recalled. Soldiers hunkered low in hollows and stacked corpses for shelter from the deadly fire. One man likened the ground to a "boiling cauldron, from the incessant pattering and plowing of shot, which raised the dirt in geysers and spitting sands."[3]



Both Library of Congress

Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant (left) and General Robert E. Lee

Battles in Virginia had generally ended with one side quitting the field, leaving the other to care for the wounded. There had been occasional local truces, but the notion of an army-wide arrangement was a novelty.

Conditions in the center of the assault formation were better only by degrees. The men of Major General Horatio G. Wright's VI Corps had occupied their stretch of line for two days and were intimately familiar with the folly of charging the rebel fortifications. After receiving orders to attack, Wright's units made a token advance and began digging. One brigade pushed into a ravine and found itself in the same dilemma that confronted Smith's soldiers to the north. "Men could not live in the fire poured into them from front and flanks," a Confederate professed.[4]

On the southern Union wing, two divisions from Major General Winfield Scott Hancock's II Corps advanced under a relentless fire. Sweeping across open fields immediately south of Cold Harbor Road, Brigadier General John Gibbon's division reached within eighty yards of the rebel position. "They opened on us with canister [and] grape," a Union soldier recounted, "hurling it in our faces and mowing down our lines as wheat falls before the reaper." Proclaimed a Northerner: "It was simply a butchery, lasting only ten minutes." Elements from Brigadier General Francis C. Barlow's division breached the Confederate defenses but were quickly expelled, sustaining severe casualties. Retreat across the open field was impossible, and the survivors began digging for their lives, scouring out shallow trenches with bayonets, knives, and even their hands. "One was reminded," a Yankee surgeon observed, "of the colonies of prairie dogs with their burrows and mounds."[5]

The aftermath of the attack was almost as bad as the charge itself. "Many of the wounded left on the field and unable to get to cover were deliberately shot dead by the inhuman rebel wretches," a New Hampshire man wrote years later, his anger undiminished by time. "They not only shot at those who showed any signs of life, but amused themselves by making targets of the bodies of those that were dead." The extent of the butchery shocked even the Confederates. "I had seen the dreadful carnage in front of Marye's Hill at Fredericksburg, and on the 'old railroad cut' which Jackson's men held at Second Manassas; but I had seen nothing to exceed this," reflected Brigadier General Evander McIver Law, whose Alabamians slew Smith's Federals in droves. "It was not war; it was murder."[6]

Precisely how many injured men lay between the lines cannot be determined. The day after the attack, the Army of the Potomac's medical director estimated at eight hundred fifty the number of Federal wounded "who are yet on the field under fire of sharpshooters, and who cannot be brought off." Not all of the invalids, however, were Yankees. Late on June 3 the Confederates made several counterattacks, leaving well over a hundred Floridians and North Carolinians lying in the field. Roughly speaking, perhaps a thousand wounded men dotted the clearings, the vast majority wearing blue.[7]

The no-man's land between the armies was only a few hundred yards wide, and anyone who ventured into the killing zone was immediately shot. Moved by the suffering of their comrades, Union soldiers crept into the field under cover of night to try and rescue the survivors. In Smith's sector, soldiers from the 12th New Hampshire managed to slip blankets under some injured men and haul them to safety. On Hancock's front, a daring escapade involved the recovery of Peter A. Porter, colonel of the 8th New York Heavy Artillery, killed during the attack. Concealed by darkness and a blinding rainstorm, several of Porter's men edged near the corpse, tied a rope around the dead colonel, pulled the remains back to a hollow, and carried them to safety.[8]

But large numbers of wounded soldiers continued to languish beside the decomposing corpses of their friends. Baking under a relentless midsummer sun, tormented by flies and insects, they had neither food nor water, and any movement drew fire from sharpshooters. "Imagine, if you can," a witness reflected, "their horrible predicament, lying on a bullet-swept field, without ability to crawl, their wounds infested with maggots." By June 5 the odor had become unbearable, and calls from wounded men waned fewer and fainter. "We became indifferent to the noise and bloodshed and privation of the horrible scenes," a Confederate confessed, "but we could not be indifferent to the stench arising from the unburied dead."[9]

* * *

The question of how to recover injured men trapped between the lines was something of a novelty for the armies in Virginia. Battles in the Old Dominion had generally lasted but a few days, ending when one side abandoned the field and left its wounded to the care of the victor. Sometimes, when the armies remained close together, local commanders convened informal "truces" covering discrete sectors of the field. After the Battle of Fredericksburg, for example, a Federal corps commander proposed an armistice to collect wounded troops. His Confederate counterpart—Lieutenant General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson—insisted on a written application, and the Union man acceded. The brief ceasefire at Fredericksburg, however, applied to only a portion of the field; nothing was done to establish a formal procedure, and the army heads never sought army-wide


8th N.Y. Heavy Arty in Barlow's charge, in Cold Harbor
Friday June 3rd 1864
A. R. Waud

Library of Congress

This Alfred Waud sketch depicts Francis Barlow's division in Lee's lines at Cold Harbor, taking prisoners (right foreground) and turning captured guns on the Confederates.

truces. The same practice carried into the spring campaign of 1864. During the three weeks that Grant and Lee fought at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, and the North Anna River, neither commander asked for a truce to remove wounded men from the battleground.

The largest concentration of wounded men at Cold Harbor lay in front of Hancock's division, and around noon on June 5—more than forty-eight hours after the deadly assault—the II Corps commander decided to take the matter up with headquarters. "Can any arrangement be made by which the wounded in front of Barlow can be removed?" Hancock wrote Major General George G. Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac. "Is it possible to ask, under flag of truce, for permission to remove the wounded now lying between our lines, and which the enemy's sharpshooters prevent me bringing off?" Meade wrote across the bottom of Hancock's message and forwarded the note to Grant. Wounded men, he added, were still in front of the II, VI, and XVIII Corps.[10]

Hancock's message struck a responsive chord in Grant. A year before, Grant had launched attacks against the Vicksburg defenses that left many Union dead and wounded on the battlefield. Despite entreaties from one of his generals, Grant did nothing. Finally the stench of decaying bodies drove the Confederate commander, Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton, to propose a cessation of hostilities for two and a half hours "in the name of humanity . . . that you may be enabled to remove your dead and dying men." Grant accepted Pemberton's proposal and sent out burial parties that evening.[11]

Perhaps regretting that he had not acted with greater dispatch at Vicksburg, Grant now suggested to Meade that a flag "might be sent proposing to suspend firing where the wounded are, until each party get their own." Meade, however, was unwilling to accept the responsibility. "Any communication by flag of truce will have to come from you," he insisted to Grant, "as the enemy do not recognize me as in command whilst you are present."[12]

Grant bit the bullet and penned a proposal to Lee, taking the initiative to open negotiations toward a truce. "It is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of both armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupied respectively by the two armies," he began. "Humanity would dictate that some provision should be made to provide against such hardships. I would propose, therefore, that hereafter when no battle is raging either party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded without being fired upon by either party. Any other method equally fair to both parties you may propose for meeting the end desired, will be accepted by me."[13]

Both Library of Congress

Left: II Corps commander General Winfield Scott Hancock: "Can any arrangement be made by which the wounded in front of Barlow can be removed?"

Below: II Corps generals and staff at Cold Harbor. Francis C. Barlow (left of tree), Winfield S. Hancock (right of tree), David B. Birney (right of Hancock), and John Gibbon (right of Birney).

Soon afterward Meade dispatched his aide, Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Lyman, with Grant's note, suggesting that he cross to the enemy lines under a flag of truce at a place to be chosen by Hancock. Lyman had served on Meade's staff for almost a year, but this was the first that he had heard of flags of truce, and his ideas about such matters, he later wrote his family, were "chiefly medieval and were associated with a herald wearing a tabard." Wanting to look appropriate, Lyman donned a sash, white gloves, and all the finery he could scrounge. Unable to find a bugler, he settled for a cavalry sergeant to accompany him on his mission.[14]

Lyman located Hancock near the Cold Harbor intersection. "Well, colonel," the general cautioned, "you can't carry [a message] out on my front, it's too hot there. Your best way is to go to the left, where there are only pickets, and the officers there will get it out." Hancock directed his aide Major William G. Mitchell to get Lyman a white flag and whiskey to placate the rebels. The whiskey Mitchell found right away, but the white flag proved problematical. Resisting the temptation to raid Hancock's supply of clean white shirts, Mitchell ripped up a white pillow case, tied it to a pole, and handed Lyman the make-shift banner.

Starting south along dispatch Station Road, Lyman and his sergeant acquired a guide in the person of Colonel Charles E. Hapgood of the 5th New Hampshire, a tall, sinewy officer with bullet holes through his hat, trousers, and scabbard. A short ride took them to Colonel Nelson Miles' brigade headquarters at the southern terminus of the Union line. Continuing into a stand of pines, Lyman found Lieutenant Colonel John S. Hammell of the 66th New York. "Do you know where you are going?" Hammell inquired. "There have been two field officers killed just here."

Riding on, Lyman, Hapgood, and Mitchell reached a field. "Now," cautioned Hapgood as he pointed across the clearing, "those tallest trees are full of their sharpshooters; if we strike into the field fifty yards above here, they will fire; but just below, they can't see."

Their white flag flapping, Lyman and his entourage galloped across the opening into the far woods and up to an assemblage of Confederates. "It looked exactly like a scene in an opera," Lyman wrote home later that day. "There was never anything that so resembled something got up for stage effect. The sun was near setting, and in the heavy oak woods, the light already began to fade. On the road stood a couple of Rebel officers, each in his gray overcoat, and, just behind, were grouped some twenty soldiers—the most gypsy-looking fellows imaginable; in their blue-gray jackets and slouched hats; each with his rusty musket and well-filled cartridge box."

Lyman introduced himself to Major Thomas L. Wooten of the 18th North Carolina sharpshooters, who was obviously in charge. The major's dignified bearing impressed the New Englander. "To see us all together," Lyman wrote, "you would suppose we had met to go out shooting, or something of that kind." Wooten explained that Grant's dispatch would be received if in proper form, and that he expected an answer in a few hours. There was nothing to do but wait, so the Yankees and Wooten's men—soldiers from Brigadier General James H. Lane's brigade of Tar Heels—sat down together in a cleared glen.[15]

As the hours dragged by, Lyman's wait became increasingly unpleasant, made especially so by the reek of dead horses killed in a savage cavalry battle three days earlier. Around 8:30 p.m. musketry picked up close by, and firing rippled along the opposing lines. Lyman conjured up visions of the Yankees and rebels around him panicking and blazing away at one another, himself and the sergeant in the middle. "The officers sprung to their feet and ran down the lines, to again caution the men," Lyman observed with relief, "so nobody fired; and there we sat and listened to the volleys and the cannonading, that opened very heavily."

Sometime after ten, Major Wooten set off to investigate the delay. An hour later, a rebel lieutenant appeared. Lyman, he advised, could go back; Lee's reply, when it came, would be passed through the picket lines. After shaking hands with the Confederates, Lyman and his sergeant crossed to their own side and returned to Meade's headquarters. The army commander was relieved to see them. "Hullo, Lyman," he called out. "I thought perhaps the rebs had gobbled you during that attack."

* * *

Lee's written response reached Grant's headquarters early on June 6. The Confederate commander agreed with the spirit of Grant's proposal to suspend hostilities to remove dead and wounded men from between the lines, but he had problems with Grant's suggested procedure. Allowing litter bearers to wander into sectors where fighting had temporarily quieted struck Lee as a bad idea. "I fear that such an arrangement will lead to misunderstanding and difficulty," Lee cautioned, and he suggested a different course that he judged less risky. "I propose, therefore, instead," wrote Lee, "that when either party desires to remove their dead or wounded, a flag of truce be sent, as is customary. It will always afford me pleasure to comply with such a request as far as circumstances will permit."[16]

Understanding Lee's letter as insisting only that the rebel commander wanted a flag of truce to accompany the litter bearers, Grant drafted a reply that he thought met Lee's demands. He intended, he wrote, to "send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to do the same. I propose that the time for doing this be between the hours of 12m and 3 p.m. today. I will direct all parties going out to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops." Assuming that the matter was now settled, Meade notified his corps commanders of Grant's timetable and instructed them to make arrangements to comply.[17]

Grant, however, had misunderstood Lee's framework. The rebel commander wanted a general army-wide armistice, not informal local truces that might spawn confusion. Lee's initial jotting had been imprecise, and Lee conceded as much. "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date and regret to find that I did not make myself understood in my communication of yesterday," Lee explained in a new message that came across the lines a few hours later. "I intended to say that I could not consent to the burial of the dead and the removal of the wounded between the armies in the way you propose, but that when either party desire such permission it shall be asked for by flag of truce in the usual way. Until I receive a proposition from you on the subject to which I can accede with propriety, I have directed any parties you may send under white



Both US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle

Major William G. Mitchell (left) ripped up a pillow case and tied it to a pole to form a makeshift flag of truce. Lieutenant Colonel John S. Hammell (right) was a twenty-two-year-old regimental commander at Cold Harbor. Breveted brigadier general in March 1865 for distinguished service, he died in January 1873 at age thirty.

flags as mentioned in your letter to be turned back."[18]

Grant was in no mood to delay over details. Lee's reference to a flag of truce "in the usual way" was perplexing, but Grant had no objection to Lee's apparent insistence on a general armistice. "The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention, between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours," he wrote in response. "Permit me to say that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to send out on the same duty, without further application."[19]

* * *

While their generals tried to reach agreement, the soldiers of both armies fathomed that some sort of cease-fire was afoot and took it upon themselves to arrange informal truces. The 19th Maine's historian reported several such agreements between the men of his regiment and the rebels facing them. When Major General David B. Birney learned that a picket officer had sanctioned a truce, he arrested the man, complaining that his carelessness had afforded the enemy a look at the Union position. "By tacit understanding our pickets have ceased firing on each other," Birney informed headquarters. "I have forbidden all intercourse of an irregular character."[20]

Other generals issued injunctions similar to Birney's, but the men seemed to have ignored them. "Our picket lines are but a few rods apart," a Union officer wrote, "and have, just in our front, agreed not to fire upon each other except in case of an advance. Some of our boys are trading with them coffee for tobacco—you see that General Orders have very little influence over a picket line." A captain in the 141st Pennsylvania ordered his men to stop consorting with the enemy only to discover several of his troops sitting with their rebel counterparts. "I got right upon them before they saw me, and the rebels looked quite surprised to see me there," he remembered. "They saluted me with, 'Good morning, Captain.' I ordered my men back to their posts and the Confederates to theirs."[21]

During the afternoon, one of Baldy Smith's subordinates reported that the enemy "ceased firing and stood upon their works and our men did likewise, supposing a cessation of hostilities was going on according to the request of the commanding general of the army." Smith paid a visit and reported what he saw. "An informal agreement had been made with the enemy troops in their front to stop picket firing," he wrote headquarters. "As this was very much in accordance with my own ideas, I expressed a wish that this state of affairs would extend all along my lines, as my men in the rear lines were suffering severely from such firing."[22]

Informal truces also occurred in the VI Corps sector. During the afternoon, General Wright reported Yankees and rebels bringing in their wounded, "both parties refraining from firing as if by tacit consent." Brigadier General Thomas H. Neill, commanding one of Wright's divisions, apparently sent out a flag of truce on his own responsibility. The Confederates, however, refused to recognize the overture because it did not emanate from corps headquarters. In another mix-up a rebel burial party, acting under the mistaken belief that a truce had been declared, went out to locate the body of Lieutenant Colonel John R. Murchison of the 8th North Carolina, killed on June 1. Union pickets captured the rebels and brought them back to the Union lines.[23]

* * *

Although Grant and Lee had finally agreed by the afternoon of June 6 on a procedure for removing the dead and wounded, their timing remained horribly off. The difficulties of sending messages across the lines delayed Lee's reply until 7:00 p.m. "I regret that your letter of this date asking a suspension of hostilities to enable you to remove your wounded from between the two armies was received at so late an hour as to make it impossible to give the necessary directions so as to enable you to effect your purpose by daylight," the rebel commander explained. "In order that the suffering of the wounded may not be further protracted, I have ordered that any parties you may send out for the purpose between the hours of 8 and 10 p.m. today shall not be molested, and will avail myself of the privilege extended to those from this army to collect any of its wounded that may remain upon the field. I will direct our skirmishers to be drawn close to our lines between the hours indicated, with the understanding that at

Both Library of Congress

Left: XVIII Corps commander Major General William F. "Baldy" Smith.

Below: General Smith (seated) with his XVIII Corps staff at Cold Harbor.

the expiration of the time they be allowed to resume their positions without molestation, and that during the interval all military movements be suspended."[24]

Lee's latest letter, however, did not reach the Union outposts until after ten o'clock that night. By then, the new deadline set by Lee had passed, and the long-suffering invalids faced another agonizing night in no-man's land.[25]

* * *

At 10:30 on the morning of June 7, Grant again wrote Lee. "I regret that your note of 7:00 P.M. yesterday should have been received at the nearest corps headquarters to where it was delivered after the hour that had been given for the removal of the dead and wounded had expired," he began. "10:45 was the hour at which it was received at corps headquarters, and between 11 and 12 it reached my headquarters. As a consequence it was not understood by the troops of this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of collecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected."

Grant also addressed the question of the captured Tar Heels. "Two officers and six men of the 8th and [51st] North Carolina regiments, who were out in search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were captured and brought into our lines," he explained. "I regret this, but will state that as soon as I learned the fact I directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must be returned to their commands. These officers and men having been carelessly brought through our lines to the rear, I have not determined whether they will be sent back the way they came or whether they will be sent by some other route. Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of wounded men left upon the battlefield have been rendered nugatory, I remain, U.S. Grant."[26]

Conspicuously missing from Grant's exposition was a request for another truce. Lee, however, took the initiative in a message sent at two o'clock that afternoon. "Your note of 10:30 A.M. today has just been received," he noted. "I regret that my letter to you of 7 P.M. yesterday should have been too late in reaching you to have the effect of the removal of the wounded. I am willing, if you desire it, to devote the hours between 6 and 8 this afternoon to accomplish that object upon the same terms and conditions as set forth in my letter of 7 P.M. yesterday. If this will answer your purpose, and you will send parties from your lines at the hour designated with white flags, I will direct that they be recognized and be permitted to collect the dead and wounded."

"I will also notify the officers on my lines," Lee continued, "that they will be permitted to collect any of our men that may be on the field. I request you will notify me as soon as practicable if this arrangement is agreeable to you. Lieutenant McAllister, Corporal Martin, and two privates of the Eighth North Carolina regiment, and Lieutenant Hartman, Corpl. T. Kinlow, and Privates Bass and Grey were sent last night, between the hours of 8 and 10 P.M., for the purpose of recovering the body of Colonel Murchison, and as they have not yet returned, I presume they are the men mentioned in your letter. I request that they be returned to our lines."[27]

On receiving Lee's latest letter—it was now after 5:00 p.m.—Grant forwarded it to Meade. "I will notify General Lee that hostilities will cease from 6 to 8 for the purposes mentioned," he wrote, instructing Meade to "send the officers and men referred to as you deem best." Meade's staff immediately informed his corps commanders of the agreement and directed them to "send out, under a white flag, medical officers with stretcher-bearers to bring in the dead and wounded. No other officers or men will be permitted to leave the lines, and no intercourse of any kind will be held with the enemy, and the medical officers and attendants will be enjoined not to converse upon any subject connected with the military operations or likely to give information to the enemy."[28]

Grant then penned a reply to Lee. "Your note of this date just received," he observed. "It will be impossible for me to communicate the fact of the truce by the hour named by you (6 P.M.), but I will avail myself of your offer at the earliest possible moment, which I hope will not be much after that hour. The officers and men taken last evening are the same mentioned in your note and will be returned."[29]

Two days of negotiations, marred by miscommunications and delayed transmissions, had finally generated a procedure for a truce and a workable timeframe. In later years, writers criticized Grant as heartless and Lee as too formalistic. Neither description is accurate. Grant initiated the idea of a truce on June 5, offering a plan and announcing at the outset his readiness to accept a reasonable counterproposal. The generals consumed June 6 with a flurry of exchanges that were unduly prolonged, not because of stubbornness, but because of honest misunderstandings and the diffi-

Right: VI Corps commander Major General Horatio G. Wright.

US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle



Below: Wright (center) and his VI Corps staff photographed at Cold Harbor.

Library of Congress

culties of communicating across active battle lines. Lee wrote a response that was genuinely ambiguous, and Grant misunderstood Lee's letter as requiring only that a white flag accompany each localized truce. Lee set Grant straight, apologized for his imprecise language, and explained more clearly his concern that the cease-fire be army-wide. Grant again readily accepted Lee's proposal, but impediments in transmission cost another day. And most of June 7 was frittered away finding an acceptable time for the recovery parties to go out. Neither general looked his best during this laborious exchange, but both were striving in good faith to solve a very knotty problem.

* * *

The formal truce began soon after 6:00 p.m. on June 7. "There was little time for ceremony," a surgeon in the 23rd Massachusetts recalled. "Carrying a ramrod, to which had been fixed a sheet of lint, I climbed over the works. On the neutral ground, I met a Mississippi major, who speedily assured me—it needed little demonstration—that all our men not already dead, had been made prisoners by the enemy."[30]

A chaplain in the 15th New Jersey watched in awe as soldiers from both armies clambered onto their earthworks in plain sight of one another. "The Rebels who came with the flag were good natured and ready to talk with us," an officer from Rhode Island discovered with relief. "Enemies met as friends," remembered a man from Vermont. "There was no boasting, no bandying of words—the event was too solemn for jokes between those who had fought with such stern bravery for so long." A Confederate had similar recollections. "Over the breastworks went Rebel and Yank, and met between the lines, and commenced laughing and talking, and you would have thought that old friends had met after a long separation," he related. "Some were talking earnestly together, some swapping coffee for tobacco, some were wrestling, some boxing, others trading knives."[31]

US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle

Colonel Thomas W. Hyde, Horatio Wright's aide, was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for gallantry at Antietam, and breveted brigadier general in April 1865. He died in 1899.

Lyman strolled into the killing fields and found himself next to a grave holding ten bodies. A crowd had gathered, and the Confederates were inquiring who would be the next president. When a Union man spoke up in favor of Abraham Lincoln, a Southerner denounced him as an abolitionist. "A general fisticuff ensued," wrote Lyman, "only stopped by the officers rushing in."[32]

A surgeon with the VI Corps could scarcely believe his eyes. "It was a strange sight," he wrote later that day. "Five minutes previously it was worth a man's life to be seen upon the defenses, but now hundreds and thousands of both parties swarmed over the neutral ground, conversing in the most kindly and friendly manner." Officers from both sides exchanged mutual congratulations as stretcher bearers by the hundreds hauled off corpses and wounded men. "No one to see officers and men of these contending armies in so close and friendly intercourse would have supposed that their business here was for no other purpose than the slaughter of their fellow man," the surgeon marveled.[33]

But the unexpected show of camaraderie could not diminish the scene's horror. Constant shelling had gouged the ground so thoroughly that it looked as though it had been ploughed. A foul odor—"the most unearthly stench that ever assailed the nostrils of mortal man," a witness remembered—caused squeamish soldiers to vomit. The corpses were in terrible condition; General Gibbon later noted that bodies had dissolved into a "mass of corruption very offensive to everybody, friends and enemy, in the vicinity." One of Hancock's aides described the dead "in a horrible state of putrefaction." In places burial parties could only dig trenches and deposit the remains in common graves.[34]

No one kept count of the wounded men still alive. Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana wrote two days later that only two injured soldiers were recovered, along with 432 dead. Dana must have been mistaken, as numerous first-hand reports from various parts of the field document the removal of wounded men. Those who were brought back had terrible tales to tell. One survivor related that he had "quenched his thirst by sucking the dew from such grass as he could pull at his side, and had allayed the pangs of hunger in the same way."[35]

* * *

Meade had not forgotten the North Carolina prisoners and instructed Wright to see that they were returned. The VI Corps commander, however, was reluctant to send them back through his lines, suspecting that their purported mission was a "fraud to get information of the strength of our position."[36]

The task of bringing the wayward North Carolinians back fell to Wright's aide, Colonel Thomas W. Hyde. It was night when Hyde received the assignment. Understandably concerned that he might get shot in the dark, Hyde decided to try his luck in front of David Russell's division, which was arrayed in fortified entrenchments connected with zig-zags that reached close to the enemy line, reducing the distance he and his wards had to cross.

Working his way to the foremost entrenchment, Hyde found himself among a brigade of New Jersey troops commanded by Colonel William H. Penrose, lying down and trading lively fire with Confederates two hundred yards away. "Indeed the same thing was going on for some three miles," Hyde reminisced, "and it would have been impossible for anything to live between those rows of breastworks."[37]

Hoping to calm the rebels, Hyde asked Penrose to direct his men to stop shooting. Penrose complied, and after a while the rebel firing decreased to a few stray shots. Climbing over the works, Hyde, accompanied by Penrose, strode toward the rebel army. Midway, Hyde called out, "I want to see the commander of the rebel line." Penrose quickly interjected, "Say Confederate, for God's sake," and the staffer repeated his call with the correction.

"What do you want?" a Southern voice piped up from close by, and Hyde explained his mission. "Wait till we communicate with General Lee," the man answered, and promptly disappeared. Penrose chose this moment to go back to his own fortifications, leaving Hyde alone to ponder his situation. "The thought came to me what it meant waiting there," Hyde later reminisced. "If any irresponsible party fired his gun, it would all commence again just as it was going on to the right and left in vistas as far as I could see, and then there was no chance whatever for me. So I crouched in a half-filled grave and waited, despite the stench and horror of it all."[38]

Hyde waited for what seemed an hour, watching shadows move in the darkness and listening to low murmurs from the rebel pits. Finally two forms materialized from the blackness and identified themselves as a colonel and his adjutant from a Mississippi regiment. Receiving permission to bring the prisoners across, Hyde went back for the Tar Heels, who had become so frightened the shooting might start up that they had to be forced over the Union works.

* * *

Although the truce had been slated to expire at 8:00 p.m. on the 7th, soldiers of both armies seemed reluctant to see it end. Penrose's troops and the Confederates across from them were determined to extend the reprieve, and when the sun rose the next day, they continued to lounge on top of their rifle pits and stand brazenly upright. "About seven o'clock in the morning, some of the Confederates opposite us waved newspapers, and some of our men went out and made exchanges, shaking hands most cordially and parting with good wishes for each other's welfare," a New Jersey man remembered. "There were shots above and below us, but none on our front all day."[39]

Soldiers in the 106th Pennsylvania, on Hancock's front, continued the armistice well into the next day, bathing in Boatswain Creek with Tar Heels from Brigadier General James G. Martin's brigade. "It seemed very odd to see these men mingling with each other, laughing and joking and very friendly, that only a short time before were watching for an opportunity and trying their best to kill each other, and would so soon be trying it again," a Pennsylvanian reflected. Shortly before noon, a rebel officer instructed his men to get back behind their works and gave the Yankees five minutes notice to do the same.

Minutes later, the rattle of musketry broke the quiet. The truce was over, and the Battle of Cold Harbor started up again.[40]

GORDON C. RHEA is the author of a series of award-winning books about the Overland Campaign. His new book, *Carrying the Flag*, will be released by January 1, 2004. It tells the story of the forty-year-old epileptic who carried the 1st South Carolina's battle flag at the Bloody Angle.

NOTES:

1. Francis A. Walker, *General Hancock* (New York, 1895), pp. 225-26; Shelby Foote, *The Civil War: A Narrative* (New York, 1974), Vol. 3, p. 296.
2. Adam Badeau, *Military History of General Ulysses S. Grant* (New York, 1881), Vol. II, 310n.
3. Asa W. Bartlett, *History of the Twelfth Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteers* (Concord, N.H., 1897), p. 207; William P. Derby, *Bearing Arms in the Twenty-seventh Massachusetts Regiment* (Boston, 1883), pp. 306-07; James A. Emmerton, *Record of the Twenty-Third Regiment Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry* (Boston, 1886), pp. 208-09. Details of the June 3 assault are in my *Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26 - June 3, 1864* (Baton Rouge, 2002), pp. 318-64.
4. Joseph B. Polly, *Hood's Texas Brigade: Its Marches, Its Battles, Its Achievements* (New York, 1910), p. 242.
5. Joseph Willett Letter, June 5, 1864, quoted in Wilbur R. Dunn, *Full Measure of Devotion: The Eighth New York Volunteer Heavy Artillery* (Kearney, Neb., 1997), Vol. 2, p. 312; W.I. Hallock to editor, *American Tribune*, August 24, 1893; Bibb to Clisby, June 4, 1864, *Macon Daily Telegraph*, June 14, 1864; George T. Stevens, *Three Years in the Sixth Corps* (New York, 1866), p. 354.
6. Bartlett, *History of the Twelfth Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteers*, 208; Evander McI. Law, "From the Wilderness to Cold Harbor," in Clarence C. Buel and Robert U. Johnson, *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (New York, 1884-1888), Vol. 4, p. 141.
7. Thomas A. McParlin's Report, in *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, D.C., 1880-1901), Vol. 36, Pt. 1, p. 210 (hereafter cited as OR).
8. Bartlett, *History of the Twelfth Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteers*, 211; see documents collected in Dunn, *Full Measure of Devotion*, Vol. 2, pp. 327-30.
9. Isaac O. Best, *History of the 121st New York State Infantry* (Chicago, 1921), pp. 158-59; Thomas D. Cockrell and Michael B. Ballard, eds., *A Mississippi Rebel in the Army of Northern Virginia* (Baton Rouge, 1995), p. 277.
10. Winfield S. Hancock to Seth Williams, 1:00 p.m., June 5, 1864, in OR, Vol. 36, Pt. 2, p. 603; George G. Meade's indorsement, *ibid.*, 604.
11. John C. Pemberton to Ulysses S. Grant, and Grant to Pemberton, both on May 25, 1863, in OR, Vol. 21, Pt. 1, pp. 276-77.



Library of Congress

Black soldiers and civilians disinterring the dead at Cold Harbor in April 1865 for reburial.

12. Grant's Indorsement, June 5, 1864, in OR, Vol. 36, Pt. 2, p. 604; Meade to Grant, 1:30 p.m., June 5, 1864, *ibid.*, 599.
13. Grant to Robert E. Lee, June 5, 1864, *ibid.*, 600.
14. Theodore Lyman's account of his adventures delivering the flag of truce is from his letter of June 5, 1864, reproduced in part in George R. Agassiz, *Meade's Headquarters, 1863-1865* (Boston, 1922), pp. 149-53, and from his narrative, "Operations of the Army of the Potomac, June 5 - 15, 1864, in *Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts* (Boston, 1906), Vol. 5, pp. 11-15. The established etiquette for a parley required a trumpet or bugle to be blown to prove no surprise was intended.
15. A vivid description of Major Wooten appears in William H. McLaurin, "Eighteenth Regiment," in Walter E. Clark, ed., *Histories of the Several Regiments and Battalions from North Carolina in the Great War* (Goldsboro, N.C., 1901), Vol. 2, p. 59.
16. Lee to Grant, June 5, 1864, in OR, Vol. 36, Pt. 2, p. 600.
17. Grant to Lee, June 6, 1864, *ibid.*, 638; Army of the Potomac Circular, 9:00 a.m., June 6, 1864, *ibid.*, 640.
18. Lee to Grant, June 6, 1864, *ibid.*, 638.
19. Grant to Lee, *ibid*, 638-39.
20. John Day Smith, *The History of the Nineteenth Regiment of Maine Volunteer Infantry* (Minneapolis, 1909), pp. 193-94; Hancock to Andrew A Humphreys, June 6, 1864, in OR, Vol. 36, Pt. 2, pp. 643-44; David B. Birney to Francis A. Walker, June 6, 1864, *ibid.*, 648-49.
21. David Craft, *History of the One Hundred Forth-First Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers* (Towanda, Pa., 1885), p. 210.
22. William F. Smith to Meade, June 7, 1864, in OR, Vol. 36, p. 2, pp. 687-88.
23. Horatio G. Wright to Meade, 11:05 a.m., June 7, 1864, *ibid.*, 679; Jessica H. DeMay, ed., *The Civil War Diary of Berea M. Willsey* (Bowie, Md., 1995), p. 154.
24 . Lee to Grant, *ibid.*, 639.
25. Note in Letter Book, Headquarters Armies of the United States, *ibid.*, 666.
26. Grant to Lee, 10:30 a.m., June 7, 1864, in OR, Vol. 36, Pt. 2, p. 666.
27. Lee to Grant, 2:00 p.m., June 7, 1864, *ibid.*, 667.
28. Grant's indorsement, June 7, 1864, *ibid.*, 667; Army of the Potomac Circular, June 7, 1864, ibid., 669-670.
29. Grant to Lee, 5:30 p.m., June 7, 1864, *ibid.*, 667.
30. Emmerton, *A Record of the Twenty-Third Regiment Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry*, 212; Larry B. Maier, *Rough and Regular: A History of Philadelphia's 119th Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, The Gray Reserves* (Philadelphia, 1997), p. 232.
31. Alanson A. Haines, *History of the Fifteenth Regiment New Jersey Volunteers* (New York, 1883), p. 212; Elisha Hunt Rhodes, *All for the Union*, ed. by Robert Hunt Rhodes (New York, 1991), p. 161; Edwin M. Haynes, *A History of the Tenth Regiment, Vermont Volunteers* (Lewiston, Me., 1870), p. 82; LeGrand James Wilson, *The Confederate Soldier* (Fayetteville, Ark., 1902), p. 179.
32. Agassiz, *Meade's Headquarters*, 154.
33. Daniel M. Holt, *A Surgeon's Civil War*, ed. by James M. Greiner, et. al (Kent, Ohio, 1994), pp. 201-02.
34. Holt, *A Surgeon's Civil War*, 201; John Gibbon, *Personal Recollections of the Civil War* (New York, 1928), p. 233; Francis A. Walker, *A History of the Second Army Corps* (New York, 1887), p. 518.
35. Charles A. Dana to Edwin M. Stanton, June 9, 1864, in OR, Vol. 36, Pt. 1, p. 94. Grant in his memoirs also mentioned two survivors, apparently relying on Dana's number.
36. Wright to Marsena R. Patrick, 7:40 p.m., June 7, 1864, *ibid.*, Pt. 2, p. 680.
37. Thomas W. Hyde, *Following the Greek Cross* (Boston, 1894), p. 212.
38. *Ibid.*
39. Haines, *History of the Fifteenth Regiment New Jersey Volunteers*, 213
40. Joseph R.C. Ward, *History of the One Hundred and Sixth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers*, 268; Charles H. Banes, *History of the Philadelphia Brigade* (Philadelphia, 1876), p. 275.

Imagine A Daily Newspaper That Covers *Only* the Civil War

(Why Imagine?)

Civil War Interactive *Premium*

www.cwipremium.com

A Subscription-Based Civil War News Site

* * *

News stories that concern the Civil War—every day.

Feature Articles • Daily Trivia • Book Reviews • An Entire Civil War Cookbook • A Civil War Television Guide • Discussion Board • Real-time Chat Room • This Day in The War • Contests—and Much More.

BRIEFINGS *Reviews*

RIGHTEOUS ARMIES, HOLY CAUSE
Apocalyptic Imagery and the Civil War

By Terrie Dopp Aamodt (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2002. Pp. xix, 235. $35.00, ISBN 0-8655-4738-6).

This book is a brief but thorough and thoughtful analysis of the use of apocalyptic imagery by each side in the Civil War. Persons on both sides not only believed their cause was right, but also saw in the coming of the war the portents of the final great battle between good and evil that would, depending on one's theology, either herald the end of the world and the return of Christ or at least the beginning of the one thousand years of peace and righteousness known as the Millennium. Because of a "common focus" of the preachers, poets, and artists of the Civil War era, there was a "remarkable convergence" (p. 146) of wartime apocalyptic images. Artists like Frederic Church, in his painting "Cotopaxi," and poets like Julia Ward Howe, in "The Battle Hymn of the Republic," expressed some form of the idea of a final, divinely ordained cataclysm. For the South, the sketches of Adalbert Volck spewed vitriol against those who would dare to tamper with the institution of slavery, depicting them as arch enemies of the Almighty, whom He would shortly judge.


APOCALYPTIC IMAGERY AND THE CIVIL WAR
RIGHTEOUS ARMIES, HOLY CAUSE
TERRIE DOPP AAMODT

Northerners expressing apocalyptic ideas generally believed that the coming Armageddon would purify the nation by ridding it of slavery. Southerners held that it would purify the nation by ridding it of the North, which they saw as being guilty of a whole catalog of sins, chief of which was opposition to slavery. As the war progressed and came to its final conclusion, the tone of such apocalyptic allusions became decidedly more pessimistic. For the South, the war had been lost. For the North, it had been won, but with much greater expense in life than the country had imagined at the outset.

Aamodt concludes with a fascinating final chapter in which she analyzes the apocalyptic significance of Mark Twain's *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court* as well as the enduring use of apocalyptic images. The book overall shows keen insight and excellent knowledge of the Civil War and of the religion of that and other eras.

—*Steven E. Woodworth*
Texas Christian University

GETTYSBURG EXPEDITION GUIDE
The Ultimate Gettysburg Collection

(TravelBrains, Inc., 2000. Pp. 56, Spiral-bound, multimedia CD-ROM and audio CD edition. $29.95, ISBN: 0-97-05809-08).

Gettysburg beckons to nearly two million visitors a year. Those who come range from families there for the first time to pilgrims returning to one of the country's most historic shrines. The *Gettysburg Expedition Guide* is designed to enhance a visit.

The packet contains a multimedia CD-ROM of the Gettysburg Campaign and either a cassette or CD audio tour with a guidebook. The result is an excellent blending of our technological era and an endlessly fascinating story.


GETTYSBURG EXPEDITION GUIDE
Audio CD Version
The Ultimate Gettysburg Collection
CD-ROM • AUDIO TOUR • GUIDEBOOK

The CD-ROM contains six menu areas—a thirty-minute animated movie, a description of how Civil War armies were organized, animated interactive maps of the three-day battle, a demo version of a computer game, a helpful travel guide for planning a trip to the area, and an interactive quiz on the Civil War. It is easy to install and easy to use.

Although all of the menu sites are well done, the battle site with the interactive maps should please serious students of the conflict. The three days of combat are presented in various modes. In the tactical mode, a viewer can touch a brigade line and see each individual regiment in the alignment. The sounds of musketry and cannon fire enhance the experience.

The audio tour guide contains two CDs or cassettes and an accompanying guidebook. The tour follows the National Park Service's tour stops and is narrated by Wayne Motts, who laces his narration with human interest stories that are both illuminating and interesting.

A major omission for an "ultimate" Gettysburg collection, however, is the absence of the cavalry clash on East Cavalry Battlefield. Nevertheless, this is still a very fine guide. Older elementary students and high schoolers could learn much from this format. Seasoned visitors may quibble with certain facts or interpretations, but should derive both knowledge and enjoyment from it. Even a computer klutz, like this reviewer, found it easy to use.

—*Jeffry D. Wert*
Centre Hall, Pennsylvania

LEGACY OF DISUNION
The Enduring Significance of the American Civil War

Eds. Susan-Mary Grant and Peter J. Parish. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003. Pp. viii+267 pp. $34.95, ISBN 0-8071-2847-3).

According to its editors, *Legacy of Disunion* seeks to explore the Civil War's consequences from a "transatlantic perspective" since a history written exclusively by insiders or by outsiders "is only half-studied." The editors have thus chosen an eclectic collection of scholars from both the United States and Great Britain to write essays about the various legacies of the American Civil War, hoping that a "European perspective" will illuminate a number of important truths about the conflict that Americans might feel uncomfortable confronting. The authors generally write well and clearly describe the state of debate in their various fields; still, some of the essays want nuance—in several cases both the arguments and the context within which authors present them seem simple and dualistic.

Although many of the essays overlap in their themes, the editors have divided the book into three sections. The first investigates the development of certain myths associated with the war, the battles waged over them, and their impact (with particular reference to the South). Charles Joyner opens this section with a heartfelt and personal plea, telling fellow Southerners that if they wish their region to achieve its full potential, they must dispense with what Robert Penn Warren called the "Great Alibi"—by which the South "explained, condoned, and transmitted defeat into victory, defects into virtues, and ignorance into divine revelation"—and "accept the past as it was." Joyner scores telling points throughout his essay, but it remains unclear what practical steps Southerners ought to take once they accept that past—assuming there is a single past. The following essay, by Bruce Collins, which traces the fluctuating fortunes of the Southern myth, is less effective. Not only does he indiscriminately lump shifts in popular opinion with changes in academic attitudes (two areas that are notoriously unsynchronized), but his evidence that defeat has not ameliorated or softened the Southern character seems irrelevant. On the other hand, Robert Cook's investigation of the attempts of various African-American organizations to influence the centennial celebrations of the Civil War succeeds in weaving a complex story that includes political, popular, and academic elements. Finally, Melvyn Stokes' disappointing investigation of film and the Civil War seems overly mechanistic and simple in its explanation of, among other things, *Gone with the Wind*'s sustained influence on the American public.

The second section, which focuses on Lincoln as it investigates the political legacies of the war, is perhaps the strongest. In their exploration of the war's impact on Northern party politics, Adam I.P. Smith and Peter J. Parish capture the ambivalence and confusion that resulted from the contest over the war's legacy, neatly conveying the complex interplay between memory, events, and political strategy that allowed the Republican Party to survive into the postwar period. Jeffrey Leigh Sedgwick's "Abraham Lincoln and the Character of Liberal Statesmanship" is crisp, well written, and perceptive, but by looking almost exclusively at Lincoln's speeches and writings instead of his acts and policies, it seems to focus more on political theory than statesmanship. Parish's survey of Lincoln's lasting influence on the formation of American nationhood is also well written, but by focusing on the president's objectives and achievements, it tends to marginalize the legacy of his means (war). James McPherson's survey of the extent to which Lincoln was conscious of this legacy and that the Civil War would influence a "vast future" often fails to comprehend the complex manner in which contemporaries in America and abroad reacted to what they saw as Lincoln's future impact.

The final section studies the war's legacies from a variety of perspectives. Brian Holden Reid persuasively argues the war's influence on civil-military relations was ambiguous when it was not "transient and insubstantial." Patricia Lucie provides a clear introduction to the manner in which the three Civil War amendments transformed the Constitution and became the subject of a lasting dialog between Congress, the courts, the states, and the people. Susan-Mary Grant presents the most provocative argument in the book when she claims—counter to the current of contemporary historiography and political theory—that Civil War myth-making played an integral role in creating an organic (or more European-style) rather than voluntarist concept of the nation in America. Unfortunately, in an attempt to puncture the myth of the war, she pushes her argument too far, among other things following Henry Kammen's assertion that the war was the nation's "darkest hour precisely because the basest qualities in our character chiefly became ascendant then." Richard N. Current's argument that the war delayed the emergence of the United States as a world power is probably correct, but his evidence often seems thin.

Like many other collections of essays, *Legacy of Disunion* is a mixed bag, alternately challenging, provoking, frustrating, and disappointing the reader. With perhaps a few exceptions, a distinctly transatlantic perspective does not emerge, and a number of the essays seem to contradict one another. For these reasons, the book does not feel quite so iconoclastic as the editors perhaps intended.

—Hugh Dubrulle
Saint Anselm College

SO FAR FROM DIXIE
Confederates in Yankee Prisons

By Philip Burnham (Lanham, MD: Taylor Trade Publishing, 2003. Pp. 312, $25.00, ISBN: 1-58979-016-2).

In his introduction Philip Burnham asserts that when it comes to the "well-kept secret" of Union prisons, "We suffer from a collective amnesia. Our condition may be best explained by the venerable dictum that the winner writes history." It is true that the prisoner of war issue has been relatively neglected, but Burnham's historiographical assessment is highly inaccurate. Very little has been written about Southern prisons aside from Andersonville, but Camp Chase, Camp Douglas, Fort Delaware, Rock Island, and Point Lookout have all been the subject of at least one published book-length study. Burnham's book on Elmira (which is what this book is, despite the title's broader implications) is the third in as many years. His claim that most writing on this subject has been victor's history and therefore pro-Yankee and anti-Rebel reveals a lack of familiarity with the literature. For the past fifty years historians have virtually excused mortality in Southern prisons as resulting from a lack of resources, while they have condemned that in Northern prisons as inexcusably high due to Yankee neglect and/or vindictiveness.

The book's problems are not solely historiographical. Burnham accepts uncritically postwar writings by people such as the unreconstructed rebel politician Anthony Keiley, making no effort to test such accounts against wartime evidence. Had he done so he would have discovered information suggesting that Federal officials were not as unconcerned about conditions at Elmira as he claims. In October 1864, for example, Colonel Benjamin Tracy asked William Hoffman for permission to conduct "a thorough investigation [of] all the probable causes of disease in this camp...." Hoffman supported the call, and when the


Encyclopedia of Nineteenth Century Land Warfare

Military elephants used to transport heavy artillery.

DO YOU KNOW?

1. On February 3, 1862, President Lincoln rejected the offer of war elephants for the Union army from this nation.
2. This man was the owner of the Arlington, Virginia, estate chosen to be a Union cemetery.
3. This man was the featured speaker at the dedication of the national cemetery at Gettysburg on November 19, 1863.
4. This was the largest ironclad built by the Confederacy.
5. This engagement resulted in the first Union land victory east of the Alleghenies.
6. Which was the last state to secede?

TEASER: This Union state had the highest per capita loss rate among its soldiers.

THE ANSWERS to questions 1-6 are below. If you know the answer to the teaser question, send it to: NORTH & SOUTH, 33756 Black Mountain Road, Tollhouse, CA 93667. The author of the correct answer drawn from the *North & South* hat will win a free book prize.

WE HAVE A WINNER

The Teaser question in volume 6, #6 was "Which Union regiment was led by James T. Kirk?" The correct answer was the 10th Pennsylvania Reserves. Once again we received a bunch of correct answers, and none incorrect. The name chosen from the *N&S* hat was that of Linda H. Reed of Cortland, New York, who receives as her prize a copy of James M. McPherson's *Battle Cry of Freedom.*

DYK ANSWERS:

1. Siam (today known as Thailand).
2. Robert E. Lee.
3. Noted orator Edward Everett.
4. CSS *Tennessee* of Mobile Bay fame.
5. Dranesville, Virginia, December 20, 1861.
6. North Carolina.

CSA Brogan
$95
Horseman's
turn-down
boot $210

Artillery or
ankle Boot
$148⁵⁰
Fugawee boots
are steam-molded

Fugawee Corporation

1-800-749-0387

<www.fugawee.com>



CIVIL WAR 2004 CALENDAR

By America's Most Published Civil War
Photographer Chris E. Heisey

"Chris Heisey's calendar is terrific. His striking photographs of Civil War battlefields in all seasons provide powerful and moving images to help us contemplate the meaning of that war. This calendar offers a complete history of the war in photos and captions. It is an ideal gift for every student of the Civil War."

—Dr. James McPherson, Pulitzer-Prize winning author, Princeton University

Published by Tidemark Press:
www.tidemarkpress.com
Available at bookstores nationwide or by
calling toll-free **1-888-461-4619**.

A portion of the proceeds will be donated to battlefield preservation efforts

investigation blamed much of the camp's health problems on Foster's Pond and the lack of barracks, work began in the fall of 1864 to remedy the situation. Had he checked wartime records more thoroughly Burnham would also have discovered that in February and March 1865—after all prisoners were in barracks, Foster's Pond had been drained, and hospital facilities had been significantly expanded—917 prisoners died (slightly over thirty percent of the total deaths). Such a figure, coming after major reform efforts, seems at least to suggest that factors other than Yankee callousness (perhaps the dilapidated condition of Confederates arriving in late 1864/early 1865?) were at work.

The book, which lacks citations and a bibliography, is ultimately a Lost Cause style chronicle of Southern prisoners' sufferings at the hands of hard-hearted Yankee brutes. Following the old, simplistic, and flawed theory that superior resources in the North should have insured that Federal military prisons were relatively safe and healthy, Burnham fails to move beyond proving that life at Elmira was horrible—something already well-known—or to explore why mortality at Elmira put that depot in a class by itself. Such an exploration would have been a truly positive addition to the literature. Readers looking for more analytical and balanced treatments of Union policies regarding treatment of Confederate prisoners will be much better served by Benton McAdams' *Rebels at Rock Island* and Michael Gray's *The Business of Captivity*, which is by far the best work available on Elmira.

—Jay Gillispie
Sampson Community College

THE SHATTERING OF THE UNION: America in the 1850s

By Eric H. Walther (Wilmington, Delaware: SR Books, 2003. Pp. 232, illustrations, notes, bibliography, $17.95, paper ISBN 0-8420-2799-8).

The purpose of Eric Walther's *The Shattering of the Union: America in the 1850s* is to synthesize in a single volume the events leading to the Civil War. This is no easy task, and Walther, an associate professor of history at the University of Houston, will be both praised and criticized for his efforts.

Written for undergraduate students, Walther's volume is the fourteenth in "The American Crisis Series: Books on the Civil War Ear" published by SR Books. Covering the political events from the Compromise of 1850 to the election of Lincoln in 1860, *The Shattering of the Union* is the broadest in scope of the series. Walther's hope is to update David Potter's *The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861*, first published in 1976, by incorporating recent scholarship into a more abbreviated format.

General readers, not just undergraduate students, will find Walther's narrative engaging. He has interspersed his description of the complex events of the sectional crisis with rich and interesting details about many of the decade's political figures. For example, he provides fascinating and colorful information about "Fire-Eater" James D. B. De Bow and his appointment as director of the Census Bureau by President Franklin Pierce. Walther is equally engaging in his discussion of many of the decade's political events. In particular, his examination of William Walker's "Filibuster" schemes is rich with detail and texture. Overall, Walther is best when writing about the "Fire Eaters," a subject about which he has published previously.

While general readers will enjoy the details included in Walther's narrative, they may be disappointed by the lack of interpretive insights into the sectional crisis. Walther organizes his narrative along traditional chronological lines. While this approach may help undergraduate students learn the political events in the 1850s, it does not help them or general readers understand the larger issues that caused the sectional conflict. Walther, for example, provides little discussion of the economic, cultural, constitutional, and moral conflicts underlying the sectional crisis. The political events he describes, consequently, lack the larger theoretical context needed to give them meaning other than as interesting stories.

It is extremely difficult to organize the massive amount of information, summarize recent scholarship, and introduce readers to the complex ideas of the sectional crisis in an effective, readable, and brief narrative. Walther's book provides many colorful details, but much of its effectiveness is blunted by the absence of a theoretical framework.

—Stephen Hansen
Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville

LEGAL CASES OF THE CIVIL WAR

By Robert Bruce Murray (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Press, 2003. Pp. 324, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index, $29.95, ISBN 0-8117-0059-3).

In *Legal Cases of the Civil War*, author Robert Murray, a lawyer for more than forty years, culls through 185 cases that reached the United States Supreme Court to present an interesting spectrum of trials that reflect the unusual legal conflicts arising from the Civil War—cases that involved civil liberties, insurrection, property rights, taxation, currency, and commerce, and cases that had to decide whether there was even an enemy nation.

Abraham Lincoln refused to recognize the Confederacy as an independent nation. How then does one deal with the law when applied to cases that involve a "non-nation"? For example, does a contract made between American citizens living within the Confederate states fall under the jurisdiction of the United States once the war has ended? Can the United States require an individual to pay off his original debt in Confederate currency (or its equivalent value in greenbacks) when the Confederacy is on its last legs and its currency near worthless? Surprisingly, the answer to both questions is yes.

While the Confederacy never passed a legal tender act requiring persons to accept Confederate money in payment of debts, the North passed a legal tender law on February 25, 1862. Prior to the legal tender act debts were paid with specie, coin whose value was intrinsic. The newly issued greenbacks reached a level where it took two dollars in greenbacks to equal one dollar in gold. Even a mathematically challenged student can see that a landowner who signed a contract prior to passage of the act and accepted payment after the act became law would receive only half of the land's value if forced to take greenbacks rather than gold or silver.

In other cases, citizens who took up arms against the United States were deemed to have committed treason. President Lincoln's amnesty proclamation of December 8, 1863, granted full pardons to those who would take an oath to support the Constitution and abstain from any further action against the United States. But were such people morally trustworthy enough to hold high public office? The solution, to many politicians, was to require such individuals to take a new oath that they had not aided or abetted the rebellion in any way. Only then could they hold office. After the war ended Augustus H. Garland, an Arkansas lawyer and former member of the Confederate Congress, sought to practice in all the federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court. On January 25, 1865, the U.S. Congress passed a law requiring anyone who wished to practice before the Supreme Court to take an oath swearing he had not given aid to the Confederacy. But Garland could not take the oath without lying. Garland had received a full pardon from President Andrew Johnson on July 15, 1865, and argued before the Supreme Court that Congress could pass no law that abridged the pardoning power of the president. The president's pardon, Garland argued, absolved him of all penalties for the offenses he was accused of or may have committed. In a landmark decision, the court agreed and took the case one step further. It ruled that a full presidential pardon left the offender as innocent *as if he had never committed the offense* and placed him beyond any punishment—including the denial of the right to practice before the Supreme Court.

These are but a few of the cases Murray discusses in his book, along with cases involving the blockade, prize money, taxation, and military tribunals. Lawyers can often give Morpheus a run for his money in putting people to sleep with their legal style of writing. Robert Murray, using his knowledge of the law and his skill as a writer, has produced a book that is not only important to advancing one's Civil War education, but is clearly written and enjoyable to read. Put this book on your library shelf next to Mark Neely's two legal treatises, *The Fate of Liberty* and *Southern Rights,* and you will have completed your Civil War law library.

—Edward Steers, Jr.
Berkeley Springs, West Virginia

BLACK SOLDIERS IN BLUE
African American Troops in the Civil War Era

By John David Smith, ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. Pp. xxiii, 451. Illustrated, maps, index. $39.95, ISBN 0-8078-2741-X).

This interesting collection of essays is designed to fill what editor John David Smith sees as major gaps in the coverage of black soldiers in the Civil War. Smith begins with his own essay outlining Abraham Lincoln's path, often marked by nuanced steps criticized by all sides, toward the policy of arming both free blacks and former slaves. Later in the book the process of recruiting black soldiers is covered in an excellent article by Michael Meier on Major General Lorenzo Thomas, the Union officer most responsible for that recruitment.

The articles covering United States Colored Troops in combat deal with such battles as Milliken's Bend, Port Hudson, Olustee, Saltville, Fort Pillow, and Nashville. Those on Fort Pillow and Saltville make an interesting comparison. While John Cimprich clearly states that a massacre at Fort Pillow occurred, his careful assessment of the evidence suggests that Nathan Bedford Forrest's culpability is not as clear cut as many would believe. The episode at Saltville in October 1864, covered by Thomas D. Mays, is a much more sinister matter. There a number of black and white Union soldiers left to the clemency of the enemy in the course of the Union retreat were shot in cold blood, either personally by infamous Confederate guerrilla leader Champ Ferguson or by soldiers acting on the orders of Brigadier General Felix Robertson. After being informed of the murders by John C. Breckinridge, Robert E. Lee demanded that both Robertson and Ferguson be brought before a court-martial. While chaotic conditions in the Confederacy prevented this from occurring, a degree of justice was achieved when Union authorities hanged Ferguson after the war.

William Glenn Robertson's essay on two different divisions of USCTs serving in the East, one successfully with Benjamin Butler's Army of the James, the other with less success

ON THE BRINK OF CIVIL WAR:
THE COMPROMISE OF 1850 AND HOW IT CHANGED THE COURSE OF AMERICAN HISTORY

BY JOHN C. WAUGH,
AUTHOR OF
REELECTING LINCOLN

"This book is a tour de force."
—Edwin C. Bearss,
Chief Historian
Emeritus,
National Park Service

Available Now
217 pp. with photos
Paperback $17.95


On the Brink of Civil War
The Compromise of 1850 and How it Changed the Course of American History
John C Waugh

EXCITING NEW CIVIL WAR BOOKS!


The Civil War on the Web
A Guide to the Very Best Sites
Alice E. Carter & Richard Jensen

COMPLETELY REVISED & UPDATED!
THE CIVIL WAR ON THE WEB:
A GUIDE TO THE VERY BEST SITES
FREE CD-ROM WITH HOTLINKS TO WEBSITES

BY ALICE E. CARTER & RICHARD JENSEN

"If you buy only one book this year on the Civil War, this should be it."
—*Civil War Times Illustrated*

Available Now • 258 pp.
Paperback $23.95

THE SHATTERING OF THE UNION:
AMERICA IN THE 1850s

BY ERIC H. WALTHER,
AUTHOR OF *THE FIRE-EATERS*

"Accessible and very readable."
—George C. Rable,
author of
Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!

Available Oct. 2003
232 pp. with illustrations in the American Crisis series
Paperback $17.95



ORDER TODAY FROM
SR BOOKS
800-772-8937
sales@scholarly.com • www.scholarly.com
Also available at major online booksellers (including amazon.com and barnesandnoble.com) and bookstores

New from
Ironclad
Publishing

Protecting the Flank:
The Battles for Brinkerhoff's Ridge and East Cavalry Field, Battle of Gettysburg, July 2-3, 1863
by Eric J. Wittenberg, 2002


Protecting the Flank:
The Battles for Brinkerhoff's Ridge and East Cavalry Field
Battle of Gettysburg, July 2-3, 1863
History of the 124th Regiment of New York State Volunteers
The Orange Blossom Regiment
by Lt. Col. Charles H. Weygant
Introduction by Garry E. Adelman

History of the 124th Regiment of New York State Volunteers: The Orange Blossom Regiment
by Lt. Col. Charles H. Weygandt, 2002
Reprint, introduction by Garry E. Adelman

Also Available:

Compelled to Appear in Print: The Vicksburg Manuscript of General John C. Pemberton
Edited by David M. Smith,
Foreword by Edwin C. Bearss

The Ninth Regiment New York Volunteers (Hawkins' Zouaves)
by Lt. Matthew J. Graham, 1998 reprint,
Introduction by Brian C. Pohanka

IRONCLAD PUBLISHING
CINCINNATI OHIO

www.ironcladpublishing.com
PO Box 175714 Ft. Mitchell, KY 41017

in the Army of the Potomac, illustrates how attitudes in the top leadership could affect the performance of units both positively and negatively. Anne Bailey's fine essay on James B. Steedman's USCT division in Tennessee covers the actions of colored regiments at the Battle of Nashville and indicates how hard it was to get black troops into the field. The main villain in this was William T. Sherman, whose animus against blacks could at times be every bit as virulent as that of the most militant, fire-eating secessionist.

This collection of essays is a fine addition to the literature on the subject.

—*R.L. DiNardo*
USMC Command and Staff College
Quantico, Virginia

NORTHERN NAVAL SUPERIORITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

By David G. Surdam (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001. Pp. xxiv, 286. $34.95, ISBN 1-5700-3407-9).

The contribution of the blockade to Union victory during the American Civil War has long been debated. Among those historians who have questioned the blockade's efficacy are Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, William N. Still Jr., Raimondo Luraghi, Frank Lawrence Owsley, and Stephen R. Wise. They note that until the war's last year the blockade remained a leaky sieve and that the agrarian South never lost a major battle for lack of arms and ammunition. The blockade's scholarly advocates, including Edwin B. Coddington, Bern Anderson, and Stanley Lebergott, stress in contrast such indirect impacts as the disruption of internal trade, the over-taxing of southern railroads, and the overall dislocation of the Confederate economy.

Economic historian David Surdam has waded into this debate with a boldly conceived, valuable book that employs more explicit theoretical models and greatly expanded data. Not confining himself to the blockade alone, Surdam makes four interrelated arguments: (1) The blockade of southern ports imposed heavy burdens on the Confederacy at very low cost to the Union; (2) The blockade also precluded the Confederacy from wielding its near monopoly position in the international market for cotton; (3) The world demand for American cotton, contrary to previous findings, was not "destined for a severe downturn, whether temporary or permanent" (p. 150); (4) Union policies relating to cotton in occupied areas and trade across the lines weakened somewhat the blockade's effectiveness. None of these points, save the third, is entirely original, but Surdam's book certainly pumps up their quantitative muscle.

Surdam pursues the first argument by comparing the blockaded South with an ideal Confederate war effort facing no military barriers to trade with Europe or to transport over inland and coastal waterways. He is therefore able to corroborate Coddington's thesis that the blockade was responsible for the universally acknowledged wartime breakdown of the South's railways. Astronomically higher shipping costs and reduced tonnage—despite the continued success of blockade runners—also prevented construction of a Confederate navy, deprived civilians of many imported necessities, brought a region self-sufficient in foodstuffs to the verge of starvation, and thereby proved instrumental in undermining morale.

On one hand, Surdam is to be applauded for his emphasis on logistics, a subject often neglected in straight military accounts. No study does a better job of showing exactly why Union control of the Mississippi River was so debilitating for the Confederacy. The author has mastered a vast secondary literature on two usually disparate subjects: military and economic history. And he has profitably revisited some classic but musty academic discussions, such as that over southern food supplies originally sparked by Douglass North's 1961 work on antebellum interregional trade.

On the other hand, Surdam is guilty of overstatement when he claims that "the blockade alone might have rendered asunder the nascent Confederacy... [,] albeit more slowly" (p. 186). As he proceeds through his laundry list of all the great things that could have been accomplished without the Union blockade, Surdam seems to lose sight of other constraints the Confederate war effort would have hit, due to limited southern resources. It is not at all clear that even the increased revenue from optimal cotton exports could have purchased enough iron to maintain southern railroads at full throttle *and* build a Confederate navy rivaling that of the Union. Moreover, Surdam counts as part of the blockade many combined naval-land operations that the Union would have mounted anyway for other military reasons. As the book's evidence demonstrates, the capture of New Orleans in April 1862 was the most devastating single blow to Confederate foreign commerce and intraregional trade. How much of the Union's control over rivers and the oceans should be credited to the blockade as opposed to mere naval superiority, the importance of which no one denies? The detractors always admitted that the blockade inhibited the rebel war effort at the margin. To prove that the blockade would have been decisive, Surdam must pay greater attention to similar conflicts where a combatant successfully withstood equally overwhelming naval disadvantages, for instance the Americans during either the Revolution or the War of 1812.

Perhaps the book's most interesting revision relates to wartime cotton demand. While the previous estimates of Gavin Wright and John R. Hanson II assumed a constant elasticity, Surdam argues compellingly that the demand elasticity for American cotton not only changed over time but was not even constant at any one time, instead becoming more elastic at higher prices. This insight unfortunately works at slight cross purposes with Surdam's simultaneous endorsement of Lebergott's suggestion that the Confederacy could have exploited its price setting power over cotton. Not that the tension matters much. A careful look at Surdam's figures shows that any enhanced revenue from output restrictions would have been almost trivial compared to the revenue lost from the blockade—induced wedge between cotton prices in the Confederacy and in Europe.

The book's major weakness is its presentation. Not simply does the author write with the impenetrable prose that characterizes too much of cliometrics, but he apparently had no clear notion about his intended audience. The allocation of material between text and appendices displays no obvious consistency. Some very technical economics remain within the text to befuddle any Civil War historian untutored in the subject. Yet Surdam fails to provide sufficient historical details about such relatively obscure topics as the Confederate cotton embargo or Union cotton policies for economists not experts in the period. As a result, *Northern Naval Superiority and the Economics of the American Civil War* will have trouble reaching the two groups most interested in its conclusions, unless it is accepted on pure faith. In addition, there are some irritating redundancies between chapters, whereas other crucial points are explained so cryptically as to require many close readings. Overall a collection of Surdam's various journal articles might have better served his readers. This cobbled-together, half-hearted attempt at an integrated book ends up the worst of both worlds. For that, the University of South Carolina Press must share some of the blame. Although I realize that publishers nowadays face rising costs, the number of typos in the present volume should make Surdam's editors blush.

—*Jeffrey Rogers Hummel*
Hoover Institution

SEMMES: REBEL RAIDER

By John M. Taylor (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey's, Inc. ,2002. Pp. 128, illustrations , $19.95, ISBN 1-5748-8419-0).

One of the most famous naval officers of the Civil War, Raphael Semmes entered the U.S. Navy in 1826, distinguished himself in the Mexican War, and published a book about his experiences. Semmes took up residence in Alabama and, on that state's secession from the Union, resigned from the U.S. Navy and entered Confederate service as a commander. As captain of the *Sumter*, the first Confederate commerce raider, between June 1861 and January 1862 Semmes took eighteen Union prizes before he abandoned his vessel, in poor repair and blockaded by Union warships, at Gibraltar.

In August 1862 the Confederate Congress advanced Semmes to captain and he secured command of a new ship, built in Britain. Through July 1864 the *Alabama* took sixty-six prizes and sank a Union warship, the *Hatteras*. In all, Semmes took eighty-four Union merchantmen.

His ship badly in need of repairs, Semmes finally put into Cherbourg, France. On June 19, 1864, Semmes sortied to engage the Union steam sloop *Kearsarge*. In one of the most famous single-ship engagements of the war, the *Kearsarge* sank the *Alabama*. Semmes escaped, found his way back to the Confederacy, was promoted to rear admiral, and received command of the James River Squadron. With the fall of Richmond, Semmes destroyed his ships and then briefly commanded the men of the squadron in a naval brigade as a brigadier general. Although Semmes was arrested after the war and briefly held for possible trial, he was released. He then followed a number of professions until settling on the law. In 1869 he

FIRST ANNUAL BOYDS BEAR COUNTRY™
Civil War Living History Weekends
JULY 12-13 • 19-20 • 26-27, 2003
GETTYSBURG, PA
BOYDS BEAR COUNTRY™
The World's Most HUMONGOUS Teddy Bear Store!
Boyds Bear Country™ is located off Business Rt. 15 (Steinwehr Ave.), at 75 Cunningham Rd., south of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.
For More Information
Call Toll Free 1-866-367-8338
www.boydsbearcountry.com℠

T-SHIRTS MUGS ★ CIVIL WAR COLLECTION ★ HATS & MUCH MORE
We produce a full line of Civil War products,
CALL US FOR A CATALOG
800-631-7498
ALL TEES
$16.95+ SHIPPING
OP GRAPHICS, INC
28 S. BRIDGE STREET, CHRISTIANA, PA 17509
GETTYSBURG
BATTLEFIELD
140th ANNIVERSARY
PENNSYLVANIA BUCKTAILS
EST. 1861
ARTILLERY
TEXAS
1861
1865
BATTLE FLAGS

FRONTIER SADDLE
Specializing in Replicas of the
Old West, from Western Saddles
to McClellan Saddles and Accessories
Write or call for our Free Catalog:
GABRIEL LIBRATY
5530 Juel Gill Road (941) 322-2560
Myakka City, FL 34251E-mail: Libraty@juno.com

ON THE HOME FRONT


WHEN SHERMAN MARCHED NORTH FROM THE SEA
RESISTANCE ON THE CONFEDERATE HOME FRONT
Jacqueline Glass Campbell

WHEN SHERMAN MARCHED NORTH FROM THE SEA
Resistance on the Confederate Home Front
JACQUELINE GLASS CAMPBELL
Drawing on evidence from northern soldiers and southern civilians, this compelling new account shows that women fiercely defended their homes and that African Americans' reactions ranged from initial delight to terror.
"A major work."—Mark Grimsley, author of *The Hard Hand of War*
Civil War America
192 pp. **$27.50 cloth**


The Heart of Confederate Appalachia
Western North Carolina in the Civil War
John C. Inscoe & Gordon B. McKinney

—new in paperback—
THE HEART OF CONFEDERATE APPALACHIA
Western North Carolina in the Civil War
JOHN C. INSCOE AND GORDON B. McKINNEY
"Untangles the complex sources of the murder and mayhem that plagued Carolina's mountain folk during the war."—Raleigh *News and Observer*
"Good history."—*Civil War Book Review*
Civil War America
384 pp. **$19.95 paper**

The University of North Carolina Press
at bookstores or www.uncpress.unc.edu

published an extensive defense of his actions during the war, *Memoirs of Service Afloat*.

Author John M. Taylor's study is quite short: only 110 pages of text plus notes, bibliography, and illustrations. One of the "Military Profiles" series edited by Dennis Showalter, it is simply an abridged version of Taylor's previous study of Semmes, *Confederate Raider: Raphael Semmes of the Alabama* (1994). Well-written and fast-paced, it is a fine introductory treatment of Semmes' Civil War career. Taylor begins with the most important event in that service, the engagement between the *Alabama* and *Kearsarge*, and concludes that, while Semmes might simply have walked away from his ship as he did from the *Sumter*, he chose to fight for reasons of honor.

Throughout the book Taylor notes the rather prickly nature of this true believer in the Confederate cause. Certainly he is correct in concluding that Semmes was "one of the most interesting and controversial figures to come out of the war." The emphasis of the book is on Semmes as captain of the *Alabama*: his pre-Civil War career receives only nine pages, his period as captain of the *Sumter* thirteen, and his life after the war exactly seven.

There are a number of biographies of Semmes available. If one wants a short introduction that may easily be read in one sitting, Taylor's book is strongly recommended.

—*Spencer C. Tucker*
Virginia Military Institute

GETTING USED TO BEING SHOT AT
The Spence Family Civil War Letters

Edited by Mark K. Christ (Fayetteville, University of Arkansas Press, 2002. Pp. 218, including photographs, appendices, notes, and bibliography, $24.95, ISBN: 1-55728-726-0).

Mark Christ, the community outreach director for the Arkansas Preservation Program and the author of *Rugged and Sublime: The Civil War in Arkansas* (1994), has compiled the letters of brothers Tom and Alex Spence to present a glimpse of the experiences of two Trans-Mississippi soldiers in the Army of Tennessee. Tom Spence, the older of the two brothers from Arkadelphia, joined the 2nd Arkansas Mounted Rifles in 1861, seeing action in Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Tom was a man of action whose letters tell readers about combat and include information about common experiences such as marching and picket duty. It is truly unfortunate that he was killed charging the enemy at Murfreesboro before he was able to leave more for future generations. Alex too was a man of action, being wounded at Shiloh and mortally wounded at Franklin, Tennessee. He earned the respect of his fellow members of the 1st Arkansas Regiment and rose through the ranks to become captain of Company B. Alex's letters contain accounts of the battles in which he fought and reflections on the hardships of campaigning and losing close friends. He also wrote of his pride at serving with hard-fighting units. The 1st Arkansas, which saw action on a number of famous battlefields and acquitted itself well, was under the command of the talented and formidable Patrick Cleburne.

These letters offer the rare perspective of soldiers from the Trans-Mississippi. That alone makes the book worth reading. Additionally, Christ has done an outstanding job placing the letters into historical context, and his notes are very helpful in identifying the people, places, and events referred to in the letters. This book is a valuable addition to the literature on the war in the West and should be especially useful to those more familiar with the eastern theatre.

—*James Gillispie*
Sampson Community College

CIVIL WAR IRONCLADS
The U.S. Navy and Industrial Mobilization

By William H. Roberts (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. Pp. 320 , $49.00, ISBN 0-8018-6830-0).

In 1999 historian William Roberts published a fine study of the USS *New Ironsides*, the war's most effective ironclad warship. His most recent book examines the entire U.S. Navy ironclad procurement system. As Roberts observes, most authors who treat the navies of the Civil War concentrate on battles and operations, paying little attention to the acquisitions and logistics systems that allowed the U.S. Navy to achieve overwhelming advantage on the seas and inland rivers. Roberts claims that his book is "the first comprehensive study of one of the most ambitious programs in the history of naval shipbuilding."

The U.S. Navy began the conflict with some ninety warships, only forty-two of which were in service. By the end of the war it had grown more than seven fold and was second only to Great Britain's in size. The vast majority of U.S. warships were steamers, many simply converted after being acquired from the civilian sector, and most were involved in blockade duty.

Though the Union enjoyed tremendous advantages, including nine-tenths of the nation's prewar industrial capacity, it faced tremendous obstacles, including the need to build a large number of ironclads in a short period of time based on what was, after all, new technology. Following the March 1862 clash between the CSS *Virginia* and USS *Monitor*, the Northern public demanded large numbers of turreted ironclads of the *Monitor* type, despite the fact that this was in many ways an unsatisfactory design.

Manufacturing facilities had to be found to build the new ships and then shifted over to their production. To meet the challenge the navy established a "project office" system run by Rear Admiral Francis H. Gregory. Gregory, as general superintendent of ironclads, operated independently of the existing navy administrative system and contracted directly with private firms. Inspector General of Ironclads Alban Crocker Stimers provided the necessary drive. Begun with contracts for three ironclads in September 1861, by March 1862 the program had expanded to contracts for more than fifty.

Although the ships were built, Roberts points out that the system was hardly perfect. He details cost overruns, technical delays, and bureaucratic blunders that discredited the project office and led to its disbandment soon after the war. Increased costs and slow government payments, as well as constant design changes, brought about the financial ruin of shipbuilders. Roberts concludes that, far from benefiting the navy and warship construction, the ironclad program actually crippled U.S. Navy ship procurement well into the 1880s.

This is an important book that should be in the library of all those interested in the Civil War at sea.

—Spencer C. Tucker
Virginia Military Institute

ARMY LIFE IN VIRGINIA
The Civil War Letters of George G. Benedict

Eric Ward, ed. (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2002. Pp. x, 246, illustrated, maps, bibliography, index. $26.95, ISBN 0-8117-0139-5).

This is an improved version of George Benedict's 1895 book, which was based on edited versions of the letters he wrote during his brief service in the Army of the Potomac. Benedict was the editor of the *Free Press*, a newspaper published in Burlington, Vermont. In August 1862 the thirty-six-year-old editor enlisted in a Vermont militia company, the Howard Guard. One month later the company, as part of the 12th Vermont Infantry, was called up for nine months service with the Union army. After periods of training in Vermont and near Washington, D.C., the 12th, brigaded with the 13th, 14th and 16th Vermont Regiments, did rear area and picket duty with the Army of the Potomac during May and June 1863. The brigade finished its nine months with a flourish: at the end of June, while the 12th Vermont continued to guard the army's supply trains, the other regiments were called to Gettysburg, where they played a prominent role in the defeat of Pickett's Charge. Benedict, who enlisted as a private and later became an officer serving on the staff of brigade commander George J. Stannard, was present at Gettysburg.

Being a newspaper editor, Benedict had both a sharp eye for detail and some facility with the pen. His letters are generally easy reading, and are filled with great detail about the life of the common soldier.

The book does have its weaknesses. Its scope is limited, and since Benedict was writing letters that he knew would be published in the *Free Press* one has to wonder whether he pulled his punches about individuals. Finally, Ward's narration of general events contains some mistakes.

Given the limited scope of Benedict's service the book will be attractive mostly to Gettysburg buffs.

—R.L. DiNardo
USMC Command and Staff College,
Quantico, Virginia

JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN WARS!

Get Collector's Issues While They Last

Savas Publishing Company
P.O. Box 4527
El Dorado Hills, CA 95762
PH: 916-941-6896
Email: Militarybooks@onemain.com


Civil War Heavy Explosive Ordnance
A Guide to Large Artillery Projectiles, Torpedoes, and Mines
Jack Bell

Civil War Heavy Explosive Ordnance

A Guide to Large Artillery Projectiles, Torpedoes, and Mines

by Jack Bell

The most up-to-date and definitive reference guide on Union and Confederate large caliber projectiles, torpedoes, and mines, profusely illustrated with more than 1,000 photographs of 360 specimens.

"This will become a required reference guide at every Civil War site and related museum."—Wayne E. Stark, author of *The Big Guns*

University of North Texas Press
www.unt.edu/untpress

ISBN 1-57441-163-2 cloth $50.00
8 x 10, 592 pages

Order: 1-800-826-8911

Dave Taylor's
CIVIL WAR ANTIQUES

Quality Antiques,
Guns, Swords,
Uniforms,
Equipment,
Buckles,
Insignia,
Drums,
Flags, Letters,
Diaries,
Photos,
Autographs,
etc.

EVERYTHING ORIGINAL & 100% GUARANTEED!

Dave Taylor/ Civil War Antiques
P.O. Box 87-CWS • Sylvania, Ohio 43560
(419) 878-8355 weekdays.
www.civilwarantique.com
Shop open by appointment in Waterville, Ohio • Catalog Subscriptions $10.00
e-mail: davetaylor.civilwar@sev.org

Crossfire

(continued from page 7) and convictions in the annals of the pro-slavery literature of the U.S. Civil War. Finally, Southern Baptists (Christian Fundamentalists) and their moral descendants have found their match in the Salafis (Muslim Fundamentalists) movement of Osama bin Laden and his criminal cohorts. Wonderful job by your magazine. Keep going.

—*Ed Jazairi, via email*

ED. Not all Southern Baptists are fundamentalists.

VICKSBURG

I just received *North & South*, volume 6, number 7. As a devotee of the Western theatre, I immediately turned to Dr. Castel's article "Vicksburg: Myths and Realities." Finally, an article that places Vicksburg in proper context within the War of the Rebellion. My compliments to Dr. Castel and to *North & South*.

—*Kevin S. Coy, Barton, Vermont*

VICKSBURG: MYTHS AND REALITIES

ALBERT CASTEL

* * *

Albert Castel's reinterpretation of the importance of Vicksburg in the larger scheme of things is, in one sense, definitive. The importance of "opening up" the Mississippi has certainly been over-dramatized by most historians. The fall of Vicksburg did not cause the South to lose, since the war dragged on for two long, hard years after that famous event. On the other hand, the morale factor should not be totally dismissed. Losing Vicksburg (and Gettysburg) probably did mean that the South had lost any real chance of winning the war and most Southerners understood this.

The idea of cutting the Confederacy in half did make sense but the critical cleavage was east-west, not north-south, and Sherman's march to the sea proved that Atlanta was more important than Vicksburg, as Castel points out. An interesting historical footnote to this issue is the fact that Karl Marx, the famous war correspondent, called this to the attention of his readers in March 1862. Dismissing the "Anaconda Plan," which he incorrectly attributed to McClellan, Marx wrote: "The direct route from Virginia and the two Carolinas to Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama leads through Tennessee, which is now occupied by the Unionists. The sole [remaining] route that connects the two sections of the slave states goes through Georgia. This proves that Georgia is the key to Secessia. With the loss of Georgia the Confederacy would be cut into two sections which would have lost all connection with one another."

Castel's piece also correctly suggests that had Grant and Sherman moved east in force directly after taking Vicksburg the war could have been ended at least a year earlier. But this error was Halleck's and Lincoln's, not Grant's. A fine piece of just the type your readers have come to expect.

—*Warren C. Robinson, via email*

NEO-FASCIST

I was rather intrigued by the letter from Bryan R. Due, who suggested that Civil War buffs who identify with the Union cause be labeled "Neo-Fascist" (Vol. 6, #7). I was intrigued not because of any trace of intelligence in his letter, but rather by how somebody alleging to be a Ph.D could be so patently devoid of gray matter.

As someone whose father and uncles risked their lives in the struggle against fascism in World War II, and as someone who grew up in a Brooklyn neighborhood abounding in Holocaust survivors with concentration camp numbers tattooed on their arms, I would like to suggest a label for people like Bryan R. Due, Ph.D. How about "Neo-Ignoramus"? But perhaps in his case that would be too kind. Dr. Due has not only slandered the sacred memory of the 360,000 patriots who sacrificed their lives for the United States of America in the Civil War, he has despicably trivialized one of the most monstrous evils of the twentieth century by linking fascism to the cause of men like Abraham Lincoln, Frederick Douglass, U.S. Grant, Robert Ingersoll, and Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain. For that there can be no forgiveness.

—*Dennis Middlebrooks*
Brooklyn, New York

* * *

Bryan R. Due suggests "Neo-Fascist" as a suitable term for modern supporters of the Union cause, because of its glorification of the state, exaltation of the Yankee race, centralized autocratic government, and severe social and economic regimentation. I would like to point out that the Confederate government was far more centralized than that of the Union, that civil liberties were more curtailed south of the Mason-Dixon line (including the suspension of habeas corpus) than north of it, and that the Confederacy was the first state in history to be established explicitly to perpetuate a system of racial supremacy. It is no coincidence that the Nazi army magazine *Signal* decried Grant and Sherman and extolled the virtues of Lee and Jackson. Neo-Confederates like Due should be careful who they call fascists. If the jackboot fits, wear it!

—*Daniel Johnson, via email*

CUSTOMER SERVICE

Today I received volume 6, number 7, and the back issue volume 3, number 1, both undamaged, for which my sincere thanks.

Also please accept my gratitude for having doubled the envelopes in which you shipped the back issue. That was a very much appreciated gesture, as was the small note added. Not only have you the best Civil War magazine on the market in my view, but your customer service deserves words of praise.

I certainly will continue to recommend your outstanding magazine in my circle of acquaintances.

—*Jean Marie Dehenin, Tienen, Belgium*

Knapsack

(continued from page 10) began circulating after Langdon Cheves made a little joke. While scouring Richmond and environs for silk, one of his daughters had asked what he was up to. Cheves replied, "I'm buying up all the handsome silk dresses in Savannah, but not for you girls." The balloon's multicolored appearance also helped suggest that it had been made from dresses. And thus was born one of the more famous romantic tales of the Civil War.

LINCOLN

"The Mischievous Ox"

Alexander K. McClure (1828-1909) was a prominent Pennsylvania Republican politician and journalist who earned the rank of colonel in the Pennsylvania militia during the Civil War. For many years editor of the *Philadelphia Times*, McClure compiled and edited *Lincoln's Yarns and Stories: A Complete Collection of the Funny and Witty Anecdotes That Made Abraham Lincoln Famous as America's Greatest Story Teller* (Philadelphia, 1901). Among the numerous tales contained therein—not all of which are necessarily "canonical"—is this story of a certain colonel and a certain ox.

> President Lincoln once told the following story of Colonel W., who had been elected to the Legislature, and had also

been judge of the County Court. His elevation, however, had made him somewhat pompous, and he became very fond of using big words. On his farm he had a very large and mischievous ox, called "Big Brindle," which very frequently broke down his neighbors' fences, and committed other depredations, much to the Colonel's annoyance.

One morning after breakfast, in the presence of Lincoln, who had stayed with him over night, and who was on his way to town, he called his overseer and said to him: "Mr. Allen, I desire you to impound 'Big Brindle,' in order that I may hear no animadversions on his eternal depredations." Allen bowed and walked off, sorely puzzled to know what the Colonel wanted him to do. After Colonel W. left for town, he went to his wife and asked her what the Colonel meant by telling him to impound the ox.

"Why, he meant to tell yomosesu to put him in a pen," said she.

Allen left to perform the feat, for it was no inconsiderable one, as the animal was wild and vicious, but, after a great deal of trouble and vexation, succeeded.

"Well," said he, wiping the perspiration from his brow and soliloquizing, "this is impounding, is it? Now, I am dead sure that the Colonel will ask me if I impounded 'Big Brindle,' and I'll bet I puzzle him as he did me."

The next day the Colonel gave a dinner party, and as he was not aristocratic, Allen, the overseer, sat down with the company. After the second or third glass was discussed, the Colonel turned to the overseer and said, "Eh, Mr. Allen, did you impound 'Big Brindle,' sir?"

Allen straightened himself, and looking around at the company, replied: "Yes, I did, sir; but 'Old Brindle' transcended the impannel of the impound, and scatterlophisticated all over the equanimity of the forest."

The company burst into an immoderate fit of laughter, while the Colonel's face reddened with discomfiture. "What do you mean by that, sir?" demanded the Colonel.

"Why, I mean, Colonel," replied Allen, "that 'Old Brindle,' being prognosticated with an idea of the cholera, ripped and teared, snorted and pawed dirt, jumped the fence, tuck to the woods, and would not be impounded no how."

This was too much; the company roared again, the Colonel being forced to join in the laughter, and in the midst of the jollity Allen left the table, saying to himself as he went, "I reckon the Colonel won't ask me to impound any more oxen." ☐

N&S MARKET PLACE

To advertise in *North & South*, contact Keith Poulter for rates and publication schedule:

Telephone: (559) 855-8637
Fax: (559) 855-8639
adspace@northandsouthmagazine.com

ARTILLERY / CANNONS

STEEN CANNONS

Manufacturer of:
Full Scale, Authentic
Reproduction Artillery

For catalong send $7.00
3409 - 13th Street
Ashland, KY 41102

Phone / Website:
606-326-1188
www.steencannons.com

Celebrate July 4th & All Events
BIG-BANG® CANNON
GREAT GIFT IDEA! **$159.95**

The only SAFE substitute for fireworks! Cannons produce a loud bang with a realistic flash of light. Patented in 1907. Made of cast iron and sheet metal. Easy loading and firing. Great for display when not in use. Made in the USA to last a lifetime. Available in 3 sizes: 9" cannon, **$69.95 postpaid;** 17" cannon, **$129.95 postpaid;** 25" cannon (shown here) with rapid firing and automatic loading, **$159.95 postpaid.** The larger the cannon the louder the bang! **Bangsite® ammo, about 100 shots, $8.50; 3-pack $20.00. Spark plugs, 3-pack $2.00.** Order via mail, phone or website. Mastercard, Visa, check or money order accepted. Money back guarantee. Send for **FREE CATALOG!**

The Conestoga Co., Inc., Dept NS, PO Box 405, Bethlehem, PA 18016
★★ Call 1-800-987-BANG ★★
www.bigbangcannons.com

BATTLEFIELD TOURS

KEARNS CIVIL WAR TOUR. Richmond, Petersburg, Fredericksburg, and surrounding areas in Virginia. Standard or personalized tours available of your favorite battlefield site. Please call or write Kevin Kearns, 1833 Commins Road, Aylett, Virginia, 23009. (804) 769-2095.

TOUR
GETTYSBURG
ON YOUR COMPUTER
• *with Gary Kross* •

Licensed Battlefield Guide Gary Kross takes you on a guided tour of the Gettysburg Battlefield with 99 beautiful full-color 360-degree panoramas, historic photos and interactive maps.

For a limited time, three audio CDs of Gary's tour are also included.

www.VirtualGettysburg.com
(800) 417-9596
Virtual Gettysburg™ is a trademark of Another Software Miracle, LLC.

Follow their footsteps!
Civil War Weekend
Battlefield Tours
Toll Free
1-866-CWW-TOUR (299-8687)
www.civilwarweekend.com

★ **WHITE STAR**
BATTLEFIELD TOURS ★

Private Guided Tours Through the Chickamauga - Chattanooga National Military Park
GROUP TOURS AVAILABLE
Professionally Guided Tours of Western Theatre Battlefields
888-828-1864
www.battlefieldguide.com
"Dedicated to the Boys"

BOOKS/PUBLICATIONS

Abraham Lincoln Book Shop, Inc.

Since 1938, Buying and Selling...
Books, Autographs, Manuscripts, Documents, Original Photographs, Prints, Paintings, and Sculpture

Pertaining To...
The Civil War, Lincolniana, U.S. Presidency, U.S. Military History, and Political History

Reach Us At...
357 West Chicago Ave. Chicago, IL 60610
312/944-3085 ◆ Fax 312/944-5549
<www.ALincolnBookShop.com>

MANUSCRIPT THIRTY YEARS RESEARCHED. "The Shot," the most celebrated long-range sniper shot in America's Civil War. A Southern sergeant, a telescopic sighted Whitworth sniper rifle. A Northern general, half a mile away. The detailed story that started modern long-range sniper warfare. 102 pages. Illustrated, maps showing battlelines. Ck/MO $20.00. Dale Martin, 406 S. Price, Troup, TX 75789.

The Civil War Has a Daily Newspaper:
CWI PREMIUM
www.cwipremium.com
< http://www.cwipremium.com/ >

Olde Soldier Books Inc.

The Most Complete Library of Civil War books, Autographs, Letters, Photos & Documents!

Dave Zullo
434-591-0884
www.oldesoldierbooks.com

13 Brassie Terrace
Lake Monticello
VA 22963

We buy Civil War material and WWII books!

CIVIL WAR GENERALS

GENERAL JOHN BELL HOOD. Comprehensive information on the Confederacy's most controversial and misunderstood commander. Visit www.JohnBellHood.org

CIVIL WAR MAPS

AT LAST!! A THEATER MAP OF THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN Watercolored, filled with sites and information and accurately scaled, this map shows the arena of the armies of Lee, Hooker and Meade through June and July 1863. Overall map is 38"x25" and retails at $14.95. Call or write for a free color brochure of our other Civil War maps. MC/Visa/AmEx. McElfresh Map Co., LLC, P.O. Box 565 Olean, NY 14760. (716) 372-8800 • www.mcelfreshmap.com

CIVIL WAR MUSEUMS

MUSEUM OF THE CONFEDERACY. Open daily (except Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year's Day). Located at 12th and Clay Streets, Richmond, Virginia. For more information visit www.moc.org or call 804-649-1861.

Civil War Life The Soldier's Museum

When in the Fredericksburg area, explore Spotsylvania's most extensive collection of Civil War artifacts.



Open daily 9 - 5,
Admission: Adult 4,
Child 2.
Senior, Military &
Group Discounts.

4712 Southpoint Parkway. Next to Spotsylvania County's Visitor Center. Phone 540-934-1859
http://civilwar-life.com

Browse the HomeFront museum store for a large selection of books, prints, T-shirts, souvenirs, and historically relevant gifts.

CIVIL WAR MUSIC/CD-ROM

1861—65 BAND MUSIC

The 37th GEORGIA BAND

announces a new series of CD albums!

Each CD runs 1 hr. or longer, with Confederate and/or Union music played on period instruments. $15 plus $3.60 S&H *each*, with vendor discounts for quantity orders. Georgians add $1.05 tax. *Allow 4–6 weeks for delivery.* (Non-US checks must be drawn on *American* banks, with S&H=$5.00*each*; no *foreign* money orders please.)

CD 1: The Bandmaster's Favorites
CD 2: Rebel Rousers and Concert Classics
CD 3: Serenade in Blue

Contact 37th Regt. Band, 766 Riverhill Drive,
Athens, GA 30606. Ph: (706) 543-4559
http://www.netnik.com/37gaband

NOW AVAILABLE

A Grand Oratorio for Orchestra, Chorus
and Narrated by Senator Paul Simon of Illinois

"An American Civil War Memorial"
In Nine Parts
by Michael James Karasis

2 CD Set Depicting a Musical Anthology of the War Between the States

$19.95 + S&H

Mail Request: ARS Longa Music
185 Penny Ave., East Dundee, IL 60118

Email: arslonga@billspec.com

CD sets will be mailed upon receipt of payment or visit our store at:

http://www.ebaystores.com/arslongamusic

COLLECTIBLES

CIVIL WAR AUTOGRAPHS,
LETTERS, DIARIES, STAMPS,
CURRENCY

Price list upon request.
Top prices paid for
quality material.

BRIAN & MARIA GREEN
P.O. Box 1816 NS
Kernersville, NC 27285-1816

336-993-5100
fax: 336-993-1801

Website: www.bmgcivilwar.com

COMPUTER & DESIGN

DIGITAL GRAPHICS

Production, Editing, Layout, Web,
Photo Repair/Retouching

Call (925) 274-0406 or email:
oshiri@realityresource.com

Specializing in Military History

MILITARY MINIATURES

CIVIL WAR SOLDIERS

In Union blue and Confederate gray, 1/32 (54mm) scale soft plastic figures, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and accessories.

For our price list and illustrations send $2.00 to:

Mr. "K" Products • P.O. Box 5224
Fairlawn, OH 44334

Shown: Cottage Industries' H.L. Hunley Confederate submarine

1/72 scale model $29.99

FREE
Civil War Miniatures Catalog

We stock over 1500 unpainted kits/models & diorama aid products, inc. **figures** (many scales), naval vessels, siege guns, etc. (total of over 50 brands!). Complete on line catalog of figures & models:

www.milminwh.com

To obtain a FREE copy of Cottage Industries' Civil War model kits 4 page catalog (contains photos of Civil War naval vessels, siege guns, etc.):

write: **Military Miniatures Warehouse**
159 Pine Tree Lane, Tappan, NY 10983, E-mail: milminwh@aol.com; call/fax: 845-680-2503

VACATIONS

KOA

Hagerstown/Snug Harbor KOA
11759 Snug Harbor Lane
Williamsport, MD 21795
301-223-7571 or 1-800-562-7607

Come camp with us on the Conococheague Creek. Fish, canoe, or relax. 15 minutes from Antietam Battlefield, 30 minutes from Harper's Ferry & Gettysburg. Complete camping facilities. Tenting, kabins & RV's. Civil War discounts! D, MC, V. Open all year.

VIDEOS

VIDEO ON JEWS IN THE CIVIL WAR. Abraham Lincoln's courageous stand against intolerance in the Union Army. +19.95+$4 s/h. ALDEN FILMS, P.O. Box 449, Clarksburg, NJ 08510. (800) 832-0980 www.aldenfilms.com



The Art of Ron Lesser

"Stonewall Jackson - In the Presence of His Maker"

Robert E. Lee saw him as "his right arm", his men found him "encouraging without measure", but General Stonewall Jackson saw himself . . . as an "instrument of God". It is this image that Ron Lesser has chosen to portray in his latest painting.

On a hill near Fredericksburg, Stonewall Jackson kneels in new fallen snow . . . "in the presence of his Maker." Knowing that a battle is imminent and painfully aware of the sacrifice of those who are soon to fall, he prays for mercy for his men and victory over his enemies.

500 S/N Studio Edition Prints
17"x21" $100.00 ($15 s/h)

50 S/N Canvas Edition Giclees
20"x22" $300.00 ($25 s/h)

For details about these editions, please call or visit our website.

Paths of the Civil War Gallery
212.673.1151
www.PCWgallery.com

To see all of Ron Lesser's Civil War Prints, go to:
www.RonLesser.com

By mail: PCW Gallery, PO Box 263,
Mercersburg, PA 17236

Phone: 212.673.1151

CIVIL WAR LIFE

BIOGRAPHICAL DOCUMENTARIES

"Vintage photographs, clear maps and graphics and realistic live action combine to provide a powerful experience...personalizes the war for viewers as few programs can."

-Dwain Thomas and William Raney, Harper-Collins, in Library Journal

... a refreshing perspective on war and its aftermath."

-Brenda Wilt, Civil War Times Illustrated

"Extremely well done."

- Ed Hulse, Video Business

"An informative film that is interesting..."

- Entertainment Today

"A remarkable story about a soldier in the midst of battle whose determination is an inspiration to all... Highly recommended..."

- Susan Clayton, Library Journal


Civil War Life Movie Series
LEFT FOR DEAD
One man's will to survive.
"A compelling story."
DVD

DVD: $27.95
VHS: $24.95
Running Time: 75 Minutes


Civil War Life Movie Series
SHOT TO PIECES
The man that no bullet could kill.
"Extremely well done."
DVD

DVD: $27.95
VHS: $24.95
Running Time: 80 Minutes


NEW
CIVIL WAR LIFE
BIOGRAPHICAL DOCUMENTARIES
CIVIL WAR LIFE
Two faces of courage under fire.
LEFT FOR DEAD
SHOT TO PIECES
DVD

2 DVD Box Set: $39.95
Running Time: 155 Minutes
Includes: *Shot to Pieces* and *Left for Dead*

The *Civil War Life* DVD Box Set tells the inspiring stories of two courageous soldiers who fought in many of the deadliest battles of the Civil War. Through these biographical documentaries, see how an Ohio schoolteacher and a Harvard student overcome injuries and hardship to fight again and again, winning admiration and respect for their courage and character in battle. This set of two DVDs in a gift box shows how these heroes went far beyond their call of duty to fight for love of their country, fellow soldiers and families.

Civil War Minutes


Civil War Minutes
Confederate
Civil War Minutes Volume 1 - Confederate
Civil War Minutes Volume 2 - Confederate
DVD

Many scarce photographs, letters and artifacts from private collections, live action footage and digitally captured engravings and photographs from rare books.

2 DVD Box Set: $49.95
4 VHS Box Set: $44.95
Running Time:180 Minutes

2 DVD Box Set: $49.95
4 VHS Box Set: $44.95
Running Time:180 Minutes


Civil War Minutes
Union
Civil War Minutes - Volume 1
Civil War Minutes - Volume 2
DVD

"This dynamite program provides another welcome, personal glimpse into the people involved in America's darkest hours."

- Library Journal

"The stories behind letters, photos, newspaper excerpts and other mementos are addressed and period background music adds atmosphere."

- Booklist

"Civil War Minutes goes beyond the epic battles and gets into the heads of the soldiers who lived them."

- Maureen Bavdek, Reuters International News Service

"Civil War Minutes is a treasure trove of interesting information not to be found elsewhere on video."

- Don Troiani, Civil War Historian and Artist, America's Civil War Magazine

Inecom

Copyright © 2003 Inecom Entertainment Company

www.CivilWarLife.com

DVD PRODUCTS
AVAILABLE AT
BORDERS®
BOOKS MUSIC MOVIES CAFE